| Annotation Metadata
|
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wcoai1caze","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":798°Ӻ,"quote":"In his frequently cited critique of RWB, Richard Taylor (1950a) discusses at great length the dubious examples given in RWB. In retrospect, many of his objections seem justified. However, what he says about objects controlled by negative feedback, reveals an apparent misunderstanding: \n\n…such a mechanism is so designed that the effects of its behavior themselves enter as causal factors on its behavior… (p.315, italics in the original). \n\nThis is even more simplistic than the behaviorists’ adage stating that behavior is shaped by its consequences. They at least acknowledged that certain consequences were ‘reinforcing’ whereas others were not. As they quickly discovered, one and the same thing might be reinforcing under certain circumstances (e.g. meat pellets, when the rat was hungry) and not reinforcing under others (e.g. when the rat was well fed). Thus there was no proper causal connection between reinforcement and subsequent behavior, because it was to some extent the rat who decided what it considered reinforcing and what not. \nTaylor wants to turn the effects of a feedback mechanism’s behavior into a ‘causal factor’, but he overlooks that one and the same effect does not always generate the same subsequent behavior.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°,^"jQuery321031186594910690272":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1579289965038°
|
