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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zuo81c879m","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":966°Ӻ,"quote":"From my point of view, it is important to note in this particular context that Aristotle explicitly states that knowledge is the object of his inquiry, not a specific aspect of the world to be known. Consequently, I feel justified in interpreting what he says about the different ‘explanatory principles’ as an analysis of the conceptual structures we use to “grasp” and to explain the sort of experience we call change. Though Aristotle, as far as I know, did not dwell on this, change itself is, of course, a compound notion because it involves a relation. One observation of a single frame of experience provides no opportunity to conceive of change. We need at least two. The same applies to the notion of state. That is to say, neither of these two basic elements in the construction of our experiential world is conceivable unless we segment experience into separate discrete frames and then focus attention on similarities or differences between the segments.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°,^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°,^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°,^"jQuery321096051066034122692":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1576067506353°
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