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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mdiq6eebnr","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ27Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ28Ӻ","endOffset":263°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that communicatory signs must be related to their meaning, not by an inferred connection (causal, correlational, part-whole, etc.), but by an altogether different kind of link, is partially implied by Hockett’s DF7 and DF8, SEMANTICITY and ARBITRARINESS. But the discussion in which he states that English words, such as “unicorn” or “and”, lack obvious semantic ties, shows that his SEMANTICITY is derived from the traditional theory of reference, which requires “real” objects as referents. The semanticity of signs is, indeed, an essential condition for communication, but the only limitation on the semantic ties and the items which they link to signs is that they must be the same for all users of the sign, i.e., their use must be conventional. This is inevitably so for all artificial signs if they satisfy the condition of ARBI’I’RARINESS (DF8), which prescribes that the meaning of a sign must not be derived from some perceptual analogy, or “iconic” relation, to the item it signifies (such that it could be inferred from the physical characteristics of the sign). This condition entails that a prospective communicator has no way of acquiring the proper use of a sign, except by agreement with the other users (when the sign is being newly created) or by learning it from them through CULTURAL TRANSMISSION (DF12). I can see no reason why specific signs and their semantic content should not be passed on by genetic transmission. This seems particularly plausible in the case of signs that originated as “incipient movements”Ӷ39Ӻ, i.e., as a part of a chain of movements that comes to signify the whole sequence (e.g., a resting dominant male’s raising its head as though it were about to get up and charge). Once such an incipient behavior is performed, not as the first step of the sequence to which it belonged, but as a means of obtaining the result of the whole chain (e.g., to restore the desired distance when another individual has come too close) it is on the way to becoming an “artificial” sign. In Hockett’s terminology it would, of course, be an iconic sign, but from the point of view of communication theory it is irrelevant whether the semantic link between sign and meaning is iconic or arbitrary—what matters is that this relation is a conventional one and thus, by definition, the same for sender and receiver.\nHockett’s DF10, DISPLACEMENT, is one of the two most relevant for the characterization of linguistic communication. He explicates it by saying: “We can talk about things that are remote in time, space, or both, from the site of the communicative transaction”Ӷ40Ӻ.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°,^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°,^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°,^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°,^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°,^"jQuery321084609571877238732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1568062207345°
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