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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Um49it7jr9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":131,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","endOffset":511°Ӻ,"quote":"To say that the flowers on my desk “have faded”, I must believe that the dry, drooping things I now see are the identical individuals that I saw bright and dewy a few days ago. If I suspected a substitution, I could not rightly think of fading, nor would I have grounds to look for some agent that might have caused the change that did not take place. \nIn fact, the construction of the concept of change requires a judgement of “different” with regard to the two experiential items that are considered to be one and the same in the sense of individual identity. On the other hand, it is precisely the concept of change that makes possible the attribution of individual identity to experiential items that are found to be different. Indeed, that attribution has sometimes nothing whatever to do with sameness in the sense of equivalence and may be based solely on whatever is taken as evidence of continuity.\nA person whose identity is questioned because the years of absence have made him unrecognizable to his family, will, as a last resort, recount memories of events experienced in their company. More often than not, this will do the trick, because the possession of specific memories is accepted as unquestionable proof of individual continuity. (It does not matter how he looks or sounds today – if he remembers how we climbed the wall and stole the strawberries from the garden next door, he must be my brother!)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321092797933430119272":^°°,^"jQuery321092797933430119272":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1563987348841°
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