Annotationen:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge
Argumentation2
If the individual belongs to our culture and is of a scientific bent, he or she will not be satisfied with introspection but will begin to observe other organisms in order to find out how these organisms come to know their environment, which they tacitly but erroneously equate with the world (von Glasersfeld, 1976). Because one cannot really get inside the organism that is being observed, one eventually formulates or builds some kind of a model of this process of “knowing.” That is what students of perception and the neurosciences in general have been doing and are doing. According to the more or less accepted contemporary models, there are “receptors,” “firings,” and “neural networks” or “fields” that compute a “representation” out of the firings. In the present context we can say that it is irrelevant whether or not the investigator then claims that the organism’s representation is functionally equivalent to, isomorphic with, or, simply, a picture of “the real world” —whatever an observer says of it, there can be no doubt about the fact that the organism has to construct a representation out of such proximal data as it has. In the case of the neuronal model these proximal data are small elementary events referred to as “firings of neurons.” As Hebb (1958) wrote: “At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons [p. 461].” It seems, then, that there is simply no way around the assumption that organisms construct their representations of their world, their environment, or whatever one chooses to call what is outside them. In other words, an activity of construction has to be assumed regardless of whether one wants to be a constructivist or not.
If the individual belongs to our culture and is of a scientific bent, he or she will not be satisfied with introspection but will begin to observe other organisms in order to find out how these organisms come to know their environment, which they tacitly but erroneously equate with the world (von Glasersfeld, 1976). Because one cannot really get inside the organism that is being observed, one eventually formulates or builds some kind of a model of this process of “knowing.” That is what students of perception and the neurosciences in general have been doing and are doing. According to the more or less accepted contemporary models, there are “receptors,” “firings,” and “neural networks” or “fields” that compute a “representation” out of the firings. In the present context we can say that it is irrelevant whether or not the investigator then claims that the organism’s representation is functionally equivalent to, isomorphic with, or, simply, a picture of “the real world” —whatever an observer says of it, there can be no doubt about the fact that the organism has to construct a representation out of such proximal data as it has. In the case of the neuronal model these proximal data are small elementary events referred to as “firings of neurons.” As Hebb (1958) wrote: “At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons [p. 461].” It seems, then, that there is simply no way around the assumption that organisms construct their representations of their world, their environment, or whatever one chooses to call what is outside them. In other words, an activity of construction has to be assumed regardless of whether one wants to be a constructivist or not.
Argumentation2
In the biological theory of evolution we speak of variability and selection, of environmental constraints and of survival. If an organism survives individually or as a species it means that, so far at least, it has been viable in the environment in which it happens to live. To survive, however, does not mean that the organism must in any sense reflect the character or the qualities of his environment. Gregory Bateson (1967) was the first who noticed that this theory of evolution, Darwin’s theory, is really a cybernetic theory because it is based on the concept of constraint rather than on the concept of causation. Somehow we always tend to think that the character of surviving organisms is determined by its environment. We speak of “adaptation”, and the idea of causation seems to become associated with that concept so that we end up believing that environmental constraints can cause certain biological structures or certain behaviors in organisms. This is a serious conceptual error. In order to remain among the survivors, an organism has to "get by" the constraints which the environment poses.
In the biological theory of evolution we speak of variability and selection, of environmental constraints and of survival. If an organism survives individually or as a species it means that, so far at least, it has been viable in the environment in which it happens to live. To survive, however, does not mean that the organism must in any sense reflect the character or the qualities of his environment. Gregory Bateson (1967) was the first who noticed that this theory of evolution, Darwin’s theory, is really a cybernetic theory because it is based on the concept of constraint rather than on the concept of causation. Somehow we always tend to think that the character of surviving organisms is determined by its environment. We speak of “adaptation”, and the idea of causation seems to become associated with that concept so that we end up believing that environmental constraints can cause certain biological structures or certain behaviors in organisms. This is a serious conceptual error. In order to remain among the survivors, an organism has to "get by" the constraints which the environment poses.
Argumentation2
The environment merely eliminates those organisms that knock against its constraints. Anyone who by any means manages to get by the constraints, survives. We all should know that, from looking around us. If one looks around in Athens, Georgia, one can see cardinals and cockroaches, humming birds, bats, chipmunks, and snakes; daddy longlegs, opossums, frogs, and catfish; and a seemingly infinite variety of mushrooms, moulds, butterflies, and worms. All of them survive in that environment and they have found entirely different solutions for survival. For all we know, there is an infinite variety of solutions for survival, an infinite number of ways of being viable. Tomorrow, if the environment should change, some of today’s organisms may no longer be viable, others may make it in spite of the change. In the ordinary way of speaking we would say that those organisms that survive the change have or are adapted to the new environment. This again invites the conceptual error mentioned before, since it suggests that the change in the environment has caused specific corresponding changes in the organisms. But that is not the case. Organisms may indeed change, but the changes they manifest are due to their inherent variability, their mutations, genetic drift, or what you will. All the environment contributes is constraints that knock out some of the changed organisms while others are left to survive. Thus we can say that the only indication we may get of the "real" structure of the environment is through the organisms and the species that have been extinguished; the viable ones that survive merely constitute a selection of solutions among an infinity of potential solutions that might be equally viable.
The environment merely eliminates those organisms that knock against its constraints. Anyone who by any means manages to get by the constraints, survives. We all should know that, from looking around us. If one looks around in Athens, Georgia, one can see cardinals and cockroaches, humming birds, bats, chipmunks, and snakes; daddy longlegs, opossums, frogs, and catfish; and a seemingly infinite variety of mushrooms, moulds, butterflies, and worms. All of them survive in that environment and they have found entirely different solutions for survival. For all we know, there is an infinite variety of solutions for survival, an infinite number of ways of being viable. Tomorrow, if the environment should change, some of today’s organisms may no longer be viable, others may make it in spite of the change. In the ordinary way of speaking we would say that those organisms that survive the change have or are adapted to the new environment. This again invites the conceptual error mentioned before, since it suggests that the change in the environment has caused specific corresponding changes in the organisms. But that is not the case. Organisms may indeed change, but the changes they manifest are due to their inherent variability, their mutations, genetic drift, or what you will. All the environment contributes is constraints that knock out some of the changed organisms while others are left to survive. Thus we can say that the only indication we may get of the "real" structure of the environment is through the organisms and the species that have been extinguished; the viable ones that survive merely constitute a selection of solutions among an infinity of potential solutions that might be equally viable.
Argumentation2
What I suggest now, is that the relationship between our knowledge and “reality” is similar to the relationship between organisms and their environment.[4] In other words, we construct ideas, hypotheses, theories, and models, and as long they survive, which is to say, as long as our experience can be successfully fitted into them, they are viable. (In Piagetian terms we might say that our constructs are viable as long as our experience can be assimilated to them.) This, of course, immediately raises the question as to what “survival” and “viability” mean in the cognitive domain. Briefly stated, concepts, theories, and cognitive structures in general, are viable and survive as long hey serve the purposes to which they are put, as long as they more or less reliably get us what we want. “Getting us what we want,” however, means different things in different realms of experience. In the realm of everyday experience, for instance, Newton’s physics serves our purposes well and is perfectly viable. Most of us simply do not enter the realms of experience where the methods and predictions based on Newton’s concepts break down. This is not so for the ideal scientist (e.g., as portrayed by Popper, 1934/1965 and 1962/1968) who is perennially searching for concepts and theories that “get by” the constraints encountered in all realms of experience and who is, therefore, more concerned with the possible “falsification” of his concepts and hypotheses than with their practical success as means in the pursuit of certain limited ends. This leads to the somewhat peculiar situation that Newton’s ideas are quite “true” for the man in the street, the mechanic, and the working engineer, whereas hey are “false” for a relatively small group of specialized scientists. What must be stressed, however, is that none of this can change the epistemological status of the ideas, concepts, theories, or models that we consider as constituting our “knowledge.”
What I suggest now, is that the relationship between our knowledge and “reality” is similar to the relationship between organisms and their environment.[4] In other words, we construct ideas, hypotheses, theories, and models, and as long they survive, which is to say, as long as our experience can be successfully fitted into them, they are viable. (In Piagetian terms we might say that our constructs are viable as long as our experience can be assimilated to them.) This, of course, immediately raises the question as to what “survival” and “viability” mean in the cognitive domain. Briefly stated, concepts, theories, and cognitive structures in general, are viable and survive as long hey serve the purposes to which they are put, as long as they more or less reliably get us what we want. “Getting us what we want,” however, means different things in different realms of experience. In the realm of everyday experience, for instance, Newton’s physics serves our purposes well and is perfectly viable. Most of us simply do not enter the realms of experience where the methods and predictions based on Newton’s concepts break down. This is not so for the ideal scientist (e.g., as portrayed by Popper, 1934/1965 and 1962/1968) who is perennially searching for concepts and theories that “get by” the constraints encountered in all realms of experience and who is, therefore, more concerned with the possible “falsification” of his concepts and hypotheses than with their practical success as means in the pursuit of certain limited ends. This leads to the somewhat peculiar situation that Newton’s ideas are quite “true” for the man in the street, the mechanic, and the working engineer, whereas hey are “false” for a relatively small group of specialized scientists. What must be stressed, however, is that none of this can change the epistemological status of the ideas, concepts, theories, or models that we consider as constituting our “knowledge.”
Argumentation2
In this context it is important to realize that "constraints of our experience" do not necessarily refer to constraints that have to be thought of as inherent in an ontological reality. It was Piaget who has finally made clear that many, if not all, the constraints that govern our actual and potential experience stem from our own construction. Any construction, be it physical or mental, is subject to certain constraints that spring from the material that the constructor employs. It is easy to see that a bricklayer is to some extent constrained in his building by certain basic characteristics that are inherent in the bricks he uses. In much the same way, I believe, the representation we construct of our adult experiential world is constrained by certain basic characteristics of the building blocks we are using, which is to say, the building blocks which we created during the sensorimotor period. We call these building blocks “space,” “time,” “identity,” and “change,” and some of their early combinations give us, among others, “objects,” “motion,” and “causation”. All of them are crucial elements in our later picture of the world and determine the kinds of world we can represent to ourselves. As Mischel (1971) formulated it, “What he (the subject) responds to is his construal of the external intrusion, and he is also the one who interprets the outcome of his compensatory activities [p. 324].”
In this context it is important to realize that "constraints of our experience" do not necessarily refer to constraints that have to be thought of as inherent in an ontological reality. It was Piaget who has finally made clear that many, if not all, the constraints that govern our actual and potential experience stem from our own construction. Any construction, be it physical or mental, is subject to certain constraints that spring from the material that the constructor employs. It is easy to see that a bricklayer is to some extent constrained in his building by certain basic characteristics that are inherent in the bricks he uses. In much the same way, I believe, the representation we construct of our adult experiential world is constrained by certain basic characteristics of the building blocks we are using, which is to say, the building blocks which we created during the sensorimotor period. We call these building blocks “space,” “time,” “identity,” and “change,” and some of their early combinations give us, among others, “objects,” “motion,” and “causation”. All of them are crucial elements in our later picture of the world and determine the kinds of world we can represent to ourselves. As Mischel (1971) formulated it, “What he (the subject) responds to is his construal of the external intrusion, and he is also the one who interprets the outcome of his compensatory activities [p. 324].”
Argumentation2
A rather convincing case can be made for the notion that all practical learning may be considered the result of a process of induction. The simplest explication of inductive inference, I believe, is this: If an organism has an experience, and that experience is in some sense successful or satisfactory, the organism will be inclined to repeat it. If there is more experience, the organism will begin to extract or compute regularities from its corpus of experience. As David Hume put it, we repeat what was successful in the past, on the assumption that there is some regularity and that the experience that we have not yet had will not be altogether different from the experience we have had. To use this principle in our models of living organisms, it is not at all necessary to presuppose “awareness” or “consciousness” on the part of the organism.
A rather convincing case can be made for the notion that all practical learning may be considered the result of a process of induction. The simplest explication of inductive inference, I believe, is this: If an organism has an experience, and that experience is in some sense successful or satisfactory, the organism will be inclined to repeat it. If there is more experience, the organism will begin to extract or compute regularities from its corpus of experience. As David Hume put it, we repeat what was successful in the past, on the assumption that there is some regularity and that the experience that we have not yet had will not be altogether different from the experience we have had. To use this principle in our models of living organisms, it is not at all necessary to presuppose “awareness” or “consciousness” on the part of the organism.
Innovationsdiskurs2
Even the most naive of naive realists will at some point come to wonder how all the "information" one believes one is gleaning from the real world actually gets from that outside world into an individual’s system so that the individual can have a cognitive representation of it. In other words, one begins to ask: How do I know?
Even the most naive of naive realists will at some point come to wonder how all the "information" one believes one is gleaning from the real world actually gets from that outside world into an individual’s system so that the individual can have a cognitive representation of it. In other words, one begins to ask: How do I know?
Innovationsdiskurs2
If we accept this concept of viability, it becomes clear that it would be absurd to maintain that our knowledge is in any sense a replica or picture of reality.
If we accept this concept of viability, it becomes clear that it would be absurd to maintain that our knowledge is in any sense a replica or picture of reality.
Innovationsdiskurs2
Though some behaviorists may be shocked, I would suggest that this basic form of inductive inference is exactly equivalent to Thorndike’s “Law of Effect.”
Though some behaviorists may be shocked, I would suggest that this basic form of inductive inference is exactly equivalent to Thorndike’s “Law of Effect.”
Innovationsdiskurs2
If we can accept this view of inductive inference as the establishing of regularities that survive and remain viable as long as our experience does not falsify them, and if we conclude that, by and large, we have no better way of explaining, predicting, and governing our experience, then we can take one further step that is relevant to the problem involved in what Piaget (1975) has called equilibration majorante, i.e., the incremental equilibration that proceeds in spirals, incorporating more and more items and events in the developing organism’s experience. This constitutes a problem because of the tacit assumption that such an effort of incrementation could be explained only by some specific form of motivation.
If we can accept this view of inductive inference as the establishing of regularities that survive and remain viable as long as our experience does not falsify them, and if we conclude that, by and large, we have no better way of explaining, predicting, and governing our experience, then we can take one further step that is relevant to the problem involved in what Piaget (1975) has called equilibration majorante, i.e., the incremental equilibration that proceeds in spirals, incorporating more and more items and events in the developing organism’s experience. This constitutes a problem because of the tacit assumption that such an effort of incrementation could be explained only by some specific form of motivation.
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
As Hebb (1958) wrote: “At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons [p. 461].”
As Hebb (1958) wrote: “At a certain level of physiological analysis there is no reality but the firing of single neurons [p. 461].”
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
In the 1930s, as a student of mathematics, like many of my generation, I thought I had found my bible in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I read and reread that book until one fine day, coming to paragraph 2.223, I hesitated and the beautiful edifice of ideas collapsed. What I read and understood for the first time was: “In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality” (Wittgenstein, 1933/1922, p. 43). How could one possible carry out that comparison? With that question, although I did not know it at the time, I found myself in the company of Sextus Empiricus, of Montaigne, Berkeley, and Vico – the company of all the courageous sceptics who throughout the history of this civilization have maintained that it is impossible to compare our image of reality with a reality outside. It is impossible, because in order to check whether our representation is a "true" picture of reality we should have to have access not only to our representation but also to that outside reality before we get to know it. And because the only way in which we are supposed to get at reality is precisely the way we would like to check and verify, there is no possible escape from the dilemma.
In the 1930s, as a student of mathematics, like many of my generation, I thought I had found my bible in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I read and reread that book until one fine day, coming to paragraph 2.223, I hesitated and the beautiful edifice of ideas collapsed. What I read and understood for the first time was: “In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality” (Wittgenstein, 1933/1922, p. 43). How could one possible carry out that comparison? With that question, although I did not know it at the time, I found myself in the company of Sextus Empiricus, of Montaigne, Berkeley, and Vico – the company of all the courageous sceptics who throughout the history of this civilization have maintained that it is impossible to compare our image of reality with a reality outside. It is impossible, because in order to check whether our representation is a "true" picture of reality we should have to have access not only to our representation but also to that outside reality before we get to know it. And because the only way in which we are supposed to get at reality is precisely the way we would like to check and verify, there is no possible escape from the dilemma.
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
As Mischel (1971) formulated it, “What he (the subject) responds to is his construal of the external intrusion, and he is also the one who interprets the outcome of his compensatory activities [p. 324].”
As Mischel (1971) formulated it, “What he (the subject) responds to is his construal of the external intrusion, and he is also the one who interprets the outcome of his compensatory activities [p. 324].”
WissenschaftlicheReferenz2
Once such a tendency is established – and if living organisms can be described as “inductive systems” (Maturana, 1970), it could not help being established – it would lead the adult organism to engage in some of the activities that seem to defy utilitarian or other simple explanations.
Once such a tendency is established – and if living organisms can be described as “inductive systems” (Maturana, 1970), it could not help being established – it would lead the adult organism to engage in some of the activities that seem to defy utilitarian or other simple explanations.
