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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J3jyk1t96t","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":235°Ӻ,"quote":"Given this central notion of fit, the radical constructivist theory of knowledge is essentially a cybernetic theory in that it is based on the principle of adaptation to constraints rather than the principle of causation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321084520804379751982":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Given this central notion of fit, the radical constructivist theory of knowledge is essentially a cybernetic theory in that it is based on the principle of adaptation to constraints rather than the principle of causation.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1568973407903°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jdh09uhq7q","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1891°Ӻ,"quote":"If, as the sceptics have always claimed, there is no way of deriving knowledge of the real world from experience, it would seem reasonable to suggest that we relinquish the traditional scenario of the discoverer. In contemporary terms we might say that one should think of ontic reality as a “black box,” i.e., an entity whose internal structure and functioning are forever inaccessible to the human knower. That does not mean that one should follow the idealist and deny its existence. It merely means that one accepts the fact that one cannot discover what Reality might look like when it is not experienced by a human subject who conceptualizes it within a subjective framework of space and time. \nTo take this view does not mean that epistemological investigation has come to an end. It merely means that we shall adopt a different cognitive scenario and a different conception of what it is “to know.” In fact, the realization that the world of our experience is always and irrevocably the world as we see it, constitutes a new beginning. It immediately raises the question why and, above all, how it comes about that we search for and also seem to find structure in our experiential world. On closer examination this question splits into two. First, we shall have to ask on what grounds and by what means we manage to construct the world of everyday life, the world with which we cope for better or for worse, the world in which and about which we communicate with others. Such an investigation is, in fact, no less and no more than a continuation of what Kant called his “transcendental project.” However, in proceeding with it, we shall deviate in one important way. To accept Kant’s view that neither sensory nor any other kind of experience can furnish reliable knowledge of things-inthemselves does not oblige one also to accept his notion of an immutable a priori.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096357867698300562":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568368315462°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jnnmb88m6n","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":623°Ӻ,"quote":"We constantly make useful distinctions between what we consider “real” and what “illusory,” and between “fact” and “fiction.” If that “reality” and those “facts” are not impressed on us from the outside, we ourselves must have a way of generating them. The question, therefore, turns into: How does the human mind construct its reality? An answer to that question, then, must involve the workings of the human mind. That is to say, it must be found in an area that belongs to psychology and, specifically, to the area that investigates the operations of the mind and the generation of conceptual structures.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321026268161170739812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568377020050°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jvbbgirs3v","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":1891,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":2282°Ӻ,"quote":"That notion, in fact, is no less an ontological assumption than the realist’s assumption that the experiencer-independent ontic reality should have a knowable structure. The character of experiential reality will have to be explained, not as a result of preordained ways of experiencing (Kant’s Anschauungsformen), but as a result of the experiencer’s coordinatory and conceptual operations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096357867698300562":^°°Ӻ,"text":"That notion, in fact, is no less an ontological assumption than the realist’s assumption that the experiencer-independent ontic reality should have a knowable structure. The character of experiential reality will have to be explained, not as a result of preordained ways of experiencing (Kant’s Anschauungsformen), but as a result of the experiencer’s coordinatory and conceptual operations.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1568368305295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ktc0nqsv6v","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":623°Ӻ,"quote":"In the philosophical tradition of the Western World, it is held that knowledge forms a sharp contrast to belief, opinion, hypothesis, and illusion. What is called “knowledge,” is supposed to be not only unquestionable but also independent of the knowing subject. Knowledge, therefore, is considered much more than know-how. It is intended to refer to a “true” picture of the world, of objects and events, and of the rules and laws that govern them. Though the human knower may include some knowledge of the knowing self, by far the greater part of it concerns the world in which that cognizing subject lives.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210037671983364997112":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1567684152561°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lfb2ivc9y9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":1908,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":2651°Ӻ,"quote":"What changes, in its various applications, is merely the type of goal. Because inductive knowledge is instrumental knowledge it does not have to, and indeed cannot, match any ontic reality in the sense that it corresponds to, depicts, or represents it iconically; but in order to be good knowledge, it must fit the reality in which we have gathered our past experience. The enormous conceptual difference resides in the fact that, in traditional epistemology, knowledge was supposed to convey or reflect something of the structure of the “real” world, whereas in the radical constructivist theory of knowledge, the term refers exclusively to the schemes of doing and thinking which the knower has constructed to organize and manage experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321035372966343038652":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568976298240°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ny31x2tjef","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":870,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1006°Ӻ,"quote":"The self, thus, is an experiential entity to which the experiencer attributes a number of specific properties, abilities, and functions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321046925796264564092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The self, thus, is an experiential entity to which the experiencer attributes a number of specific properties, abilities, and functions.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1568978170312°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pwm7rstw3n","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":39,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":441°Ӻ,"quote":"The more often a particular conceptual structure has led to satisfactory results, the more closely it comes to resemble what, in the traditional way of thinking, would be called experiential or, more precisely, inductive knowledge. The resemblance, however, is misleading. \nIn the traditional way of thinking, there is a sleight of hand that usually remains hidden even to the thinker him- or herself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028000069703916032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568975196435°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qed6j4r3no","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":278°Ӻ,"quote":"On second thought, though, any such “truth” will need to be verified. To ascertain whether or not a statement is true in this particular “ontological” sense, we shall have to check it with something that is supposed to “exist” in a world apart from statements and experience. That is to say, it would be a question of comparing a statement, not with other statements or past experiences, but with states of affairs that are supposed to be the causes of what we experience, states of affairs that are supposed to be there, in themselves and for themselves in an ontic world, irrespective of anyone’s experience. \nThis comparison is a comparison that can never be made. Xenophanes, one of the earliest among the Pre-Socratics, had already become aware of that impossibility. “If a man succeeded to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself would nevertheless be unaware of it.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100075549691730021352":^°°,^"jQuery32100075549691730021352":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1567688184009°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qgvba1vpvs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":1819,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":1907°Ӻ,"quote":"This viability is, in principle, the same notion as in the case of the lock and the key.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321035372966343038652":^°°Ӻ,"text":"This viability is, in principle, the same notion as in the case of the lock and the key.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1568976037951°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qrotb6l2mk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":201,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":4171°Ӻ,"quote":"An account of these levels has been provided elsewhere.Ӷ12Ӻ Here we shall give merely a brief outline with the help of a simple, prosaic example. \nThe conception of reality we are adopting is based on the notion of repeatability. This is a commonplace notion which, it seems, is used everywhere in conceptual construction. Imagine you are looking out the window, see a dark patch on the lawn and, the next time you look, the dark patch is gone. You now wonder what it was. If there is no ready explanation, you may conclude that it was nothing but a figment of your visual system which is showing fatigue, and you therefore dismiss the experience as illusory, which is to say, you eliminate it from the sequence of experiences that you consider “real.” If, however, the dark patch is seen a second time, you will work much harder to find an explanation for it that would allow you to consider it real. If you are unable to account for it, but you see the patch every time you look out the window, you will be considerably disturbed, because this now means either that there are inexplicable entities visiting your lawn or—no less worrying—that your perceptual system has developed a serious malfunction. In both cases, the dark patch would have acquired a higher degree of reality than it had after you had seen it only once. \nAs a next step, you might walk out and inspect the place where you have seen or are seeing the dark patch. This could, in fact, lead to a “confirmation” of the experience in another sensory mode. If, now, there is some other perceptual discrimination that you can coordinate with the visual discrimination of the patch— the feel of sticky wetness as you put your hand on the ground, a tactual resistance, or even a smell or sound—the experience of the dark patch will make something like a quantum jump with regard to the “reality” you would assign to it. (It is true, of course, that psychologists have found cases of illusion that involve more than one sensory mode, but they are rather rare and you would be extremely reluctant to accept the idea that it is you who is having such a multimodal illusion.) \nObviously, repetition would again play an important part on this second level. If the compound experience were recurrent, so that you have it again after shorter or longer intervals, you would at once assign to it a higher degree of reality than if you had had it only once. \nThe situation may then develop in two different ways. On the one hand, you may be able to draw an analogy and coordinate the experience of the dark patch with some of the rules and regularities that you have (inductively) abstracted in some area of past experience. That is to say, you may be able to construct an “explanation” for the dark patch that conforms to, or is in harmony with, explanations you have successfully used on other occasions and in other circumstances. \nIn that case, the explanation you have just produced would be registered as an hypothesis about the appearance of dark patches on your lawn. If you happened to be of a scientific bent of mind, you would then cease to doubt the reliability of your visual sense and you would begin to search for ways and means of “testing” your hypothesis. \n\nOn the other hand, you may decide to call your spouse or someone else, ask them to look at the particular place on the lawn, and see what happens. If, in the past, they have usually corroborated your perceptions but now do not corroborate your experience of the dark patch, you will have some difficulty in maintaining its reality. (Of course, there is always the possibility of attributing supernatural powers to yourself, but few people are willing to take that rather awesome step with so little provocation.) If, however, your witness concurs and corroborates that a dark patch can be discriminated from the rest of the lawn, then the experience makes yet another jump with regard to its reality: you now are quite sure that it “exists.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321055199315526674482":^°°,^"jQuery321055199315526674482":^°°,^"jQuery321055199315526674482":^°°Ӻ,"text":"An account of these levels has been provided elsewhere.Ӷ12Ӻ Here we shall give merely a brief outline with the help of a simple, prosaic example.\n\nThe conception of reality we are adopting is based on the notion of repeatability. This is a commonplace notion which, it seems, is used everywhere in conceptual construction. Imagine you are looking out the window, see a dark patch on the lawn and, the next time you look, the dark patch is gone. You now wonder what it was. If there is no ready explanation, you may conclude that it was nothing but a figment of your visual system which is showing fatigue, and you therefore dismiss the experience as illusory, which is to say, you eliminate it from the sequence of experiences that you consider “real.” If, however, the dark patch is seen a second time, you will work much harder to find an explanation for it that would allow you to consider it real. If you are unable to account for it, but you see the patch every time you look out the window, you will be considerably disturbed, because this now means either that there are inexplicable entities visiting your lawn or—no less worrying—that your perceptual system has developed a serious malfunction. In both cases, the dark patch would have acquired a higher degree of reality than it had after you had seen it only once. As a next step, you might walk out and inspect the place where you have seen or are seeing the dark patch. This could, in fact, lead to a “confirmation” of the experience in another sensory mode. If, now, there is some other perceptual discrimination that you can coordinate with the visual discrimination of the patch— the feel of sticky wetness as you put your hand on the ground, a tactual resistance, or even a smell or sound—the experience of the dark patch will make something like a quantum jump with regard to the “reality” you would assign to it. (It is true, of course, that psychologists have found cases of illusion that involve more than one sensory mode, but they are rather rare and you would be extremely reluctant to accept the idea that it is you who is having such a multimodal illusion.) Obviously, repetition would again play an important part on this second level. If the compound experience were recurrent, so that you have it again after shorter or longer intervals, you would at once assign to it a higher degree of reality than if you had had it only once. The situation may then develop in two different ways. On the one hand, you may be able to draw an analogy and coordinate the experience of the dark patch with some of the rules and regularities that you have (inductively) abstracted in some area of past experience. That is to say, you may be able to construct an “explanation” for the dark patch that conforms to, or is in harmony with, explanations you have successfully used on other occasions and in other circumstances. In that case, the explanation you have just produced would be registered as an hypothesis about the appearance of dark patches on your lawn. If you happened to be of a scientific bent of mind, you would then cease to doubt the reliability of your visual sense and you would begin to search for ways and means of “testing” your hypothesis.\nOn the other hand, you may decide to call your spouse or someone else, ask them to look at the particular place on the lawn, and see what happens. If, in the past, they have usually corroborated your perceptions but now do not corroborate your experience of the dark patch, you will have some difficulty in maintaining its reality. (Of course, there is always the possibility of attributing supernatural powers to yourself, but few people are willing to take that rather awesome step with so little provocation.) If, however, your witness concurs and corroborates that a dark patch can be discriminated from the rest of the lawn, then the experience makes yet another jump with regard to its reality: you now are quite sure that it “exists.”","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1568977226326°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sjxnqjl80z","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":236,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":1775°Ӻ,"quote":"Ӷ6Ӻ Adaptation to constraints is, of course, a well-known concept in Darwinian and neo-Darwinian theories of evolution. In that context, ‘adaptation’ is the result of the selective effects the environment has on populations of organisms who manifest a certain degree of variability. The criterion of selection is of stark simplicity: an organism either has what it takes to survive in the given environment, or it hasn’t. To say of an organism that it is “adapted to” or “fits” its environment, therefore, is to say that it possesses biological and behavioral features that have enabled it to survive (and procreate) up to now, in spite of whatever constraints (i.e., obstacles, inimical conditions, disasters, etc.) its environment has imposed on it. From the fact that organisms are viable, however, we cannot derive a description of the environment because, whatever the viable organisms are like, they constitute only one out of an unlimited number of possibilities that would also be viable. \nIn the evolutionary context, the viability of organisms is tantamount to survival, and survival is a binary affair.Ӷ7Ӻ An organism either survives or it doesn’t. It has no way of changing its genetic make-up when some genetic feature turns out to be counterproductive. There is no learning in evolution, only natural selection against variations that impede viability. Errors are fatal and they cannot be corrected in individual organisms. They can be “corrected” only in the population of the species by eliminating the deficient organisms.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321084520804379751982":^°°,^"jQuery321084520804379751982":^°°,^"jQuery321084520804379751982":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568973421749°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Surd3zzg2q","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":384,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":742°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence we conclude that the conceptual structures that constitute inductive knowledge are instrumental. And instrumental knowledge is good knowledge as long as it “works,” which is to say, as long as it helps us to attain the goals we want to attain. If it ceases to do so, we discard it, because it no longer fits our purpose and, thus, is not viable.Ӷ11Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321035372966343038652":^°°,^"jQuery321035372966343038652":^°°,^"jQuery321035372966343038652":^°°Ӻ,"text":" Hence we conclude that the conceptual structures that constitute inductive knowledge are instrumental. And instrumental knowledge is good knowledge as long as it “works,” which is to say, as long as it helps us to attain the goals we want to attain. If it ceases to do so, we discard it, because it no longer fits our purpose and, thus, is not viable.Ӷ11Ӻ ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1568976250879°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"T61nx065uj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1801°Ӻ,"quote":"All these skills were the result of observation, of trying things out and inductively retaining what seemed likely to work again. Among these observations there were, of course, many that concerned other people. Once you had come too close to a fire, felt the burning heat, and had your skin blistered, you could observe others make the same mistake—and you could conclude that they, too, had the same burning sensation as you had experienced. Thus, it seemed perfectly clear that the fire was the cause of those burns, regardless of whether they were your burns or another’s. The fire had to be there, a thing that existed in itself and for itself, and anyone coming too close would get burned. Reality was not only very tangible, but it was also pretty reliable. It caused effects in the experiencer, and the effects were sufficiently regular to warrant making predictions. The fact that many of these predictions turned out to be correct made reality all the more real and gave it stability. \nSmall wonder, then, that when questions began to be asked about how one experiences, how one perceives, and how one comes to know, it seemed quite natural to answer them by saying that it had to be Reality that caused what one experiences, what one perceives, and what one comes to know. The scenario of knowing quite naturally took shape as a scenario that has the cognizing subject come into the world as a discoverer, as a subject that must find out what the things of the Real World are like, how they work, and in what way they can be managed. To see was to receive visual impressions, to hear was to receive sounds, and to acquire knowledge was to put all one’s perceptions together and to discover how the things that caused them were actually related and what exactly they were like.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321041123179155916622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1567687451587°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U9eyvg69g4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":597°Ӻ,"quote":"When the concept of viability is transferred to the cognitive domain, the situation changes. Here, errors are not always immediately fatal for who makes them. The cognizing organism can, indeed, learn. It can embark on a line of action, realize that it does not lead where it was expected to lead, and either modify the action or abort it and try something else. The method of trial, error, and retention of successful solutions is a deliberate method within the cognitive domain, whereas in the biological domain of phylogeny it is at best a fanciful, metaphorical description.Ӷ8Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321061696582656504072":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568973787912°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Umj2wwlxyn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":976,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1800°Ӻ,"quote":"“Knowledge” and the process of cognizing are therefore seen as inseparable. They reciprocally entail one another in the same way as drawing a “figure” entails categorizing the sheet of paper as “ground.” \n\nKnowledge, thus, becomes the product of an active, constructive mind.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210046333567783282572":^°°,^"jQuery3210046333567783282572":^°°Ӻ,"text":"“Knowledge” and the process of cognizing are therefore seen as inseparable. They reciprocally entail one another in the same way as drawing a “figure” entails categorizing the sheet of paper as “ground.”\nKnowledge, thus, becomes the product of an active, constructive mind.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1568368977497°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uy3uq0r6si","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":130°Ӻ,"quote":"Kant, in fact, extended the sceptics’ argument beyond the area of sensory data to the very structure of experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210196925396241426132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1567689098895°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uyivvznp0t","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":598,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1129°Ӻ,"quote":"Kant, however, pushed doubt much further. By suggesting that time and space are aspects of our human way of experiencing rather than properties of the ontic world, he cast doubt upon the very notion of thinghood. Thus, it is not only the real apple’s color, smell, smoothness, and taste that are uncertain, but we can no longer be sure that there exists a real unitary object, a “thing-in-itself,” that corresponds to the constellation of sensory properties which we isolate as an “apple” from the rest of our experiential field.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210196925396241426132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1567689119233°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vz9cv6boae","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1129,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1569°Ӻ,"quote":"The scenario, in which the knower is supposed to acquire “true” pictures or representations of the real world, is thus inherently unsatisfactory. If the knower can never be sure that the picture of the world which he or she distills from experience is unquestionably a correct representation of a world that exists as such, the knower is cast in the role of a discoverer who has no possible access to what he or she is expected to discover.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210196925396241426132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The scenario, in which the knower is supposed to acquire “true” pictures or representations of the real world, is thus inherently unsatisfactory. If the knower can never be sure that the picture of the world which he or she distills from experience is unquestionably a correct representation of a world that exists as such, the knower is cast in the role of a discoverer who has no possible access to what he or she is expected to discover.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1567689138069°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wlxe83d61p","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":907°Ӻ,"quote":"We seem to be getting deeper and deeper into a paradox. On the one hand, we are saying, with the sceptics, that the reality we construct for ourselves cannot be considered a picture or iconic representation of an ontic world but, on the other hand, we are not admitting solipsism, although we do say that whatever “reality” we come to have must be our own construction. \nThe way out of this apparent paradox lies in the concept of viability, and the application of that concept is extremely simple, once we manage to get rid of the traditional interpretation of the word “to know.”Ӷ5Ӻ In our habitual way of thinking and speaking, “to know something” is intended to mean that one possesses a conceptual structure that matches some part or aspect of something that is considered ontologically real. From the constructivist perspective, this is an impossibility, and we therefore replace the notion of match with the notion of fit. It is one thing to believe that one has a conceptual structure that represents a part or an aspect of ontic reality iconically, which is to say, that all relevant differences between it and reality have been eliminated; and it is another thing to believe that one has a conceptual structure which will fit a certain type of experiential situation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32103157500187237122":^°°,^"jQuery32103157500187237122":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568377536619°
