Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Wlxe83d61p
Annotation of | Annotationen:Knowledge_as_Environmental_Fit |
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Annotation Comment | |
Last Modification Date | 2019-09-13T14:25:36.985Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wlxe83d61p","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":907°Ӻ,"quote":"We seem to be getting deeper and deeper into a paradox. On the one hand, we are saying, with the sceptics, that the reality we construct for ourselves cannot be considered a picture or iconic representation of an ontic world but, on the other hand, we are not admitting solipsism, although we do say that whatever “reality” we come to have must be our own construction. \nThe way out of this apparent paradox lies in the concept of viability, and the application of that concept is extremely simple, once we manage to get rid of the traditional interpretation of the word “to know.”Ӷ5Ӻ In our habitual way of thinking and speaking, “to know something” is intended to mean that one possesses a conceptual structure that matches some part or aspect of something that is considered ontologically real. From the constructivist perspective, this is an impossibility, and we therefore replace the notion of match with the notion of fit. It is one thing to believe that one has a conceptual structure that represents a part or an aspect of ontic reality iconically, which is to say, that all relevant differences between it and reality have been eliminated; and it is another thing to believe that one has a conceptual structure which will fit a certain type of experiential situation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32103157500187237122":^°°,^"jQuery32103157500187237122":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1568377536619°
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