Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/Sv6u23dqzm
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Annotation of | Annotationen:Anticipation_in_the_Constructivist_Theory_of_Cognition |
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Last Modification Date | 2019-12-09T10:36:06.971Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sv6u23dqzm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1450°Ӻ,"quote":"Many years ago, Silvio Ceccato, the first persistent practitioner of Bridgman’s operational analysis, devised a graphic method of mapping complex concepts by means of a sequence of frames (I have borrowed the term ‘frame’ from cinematography; Glasersfeld, 1974). Because no single observation can lead to the conclusion that something has changed, we need a sequence of at least two frames showing something that acquires a difference. Consequently, the mapping has the following form: \n \nwhere “X” represents an item that is considered to be the same individual in both frames (indicated by the identity symbol “=“). In short, we maintain an item’s individual identity throughout two or more observational frames, and, at the same time, we claim that in the later frame it has gained a property “A” that it did not have in the earlier one (or we claim that it lost a property it had before). \nThe condition of identity may seem too obvious to mention, but analytically it is important to make it explicit, because of the ambiguity of the expression “the same”. In English we say, “This is the same man who asked directions at the airport”, and we mean that it is the same individual; but we might also say to a new acquaintance, “Oh, we are driving the same car – I, too, have an old Beetle!” and now we are speaking of two cars. In the first case, we could add, “Look, the man has changed – he’s had a haircut!” In the second case, we cannot speak of change although our car is blue, and the other’s yellow. \nIn French, the ambiguity of “le même” is analogous, and in German and Italian, although two words would be available to mark the conceptual difference, their use is quite indiscriminate. In fact, the situation in all these languages is worse, because common usage has modified the meaning of “identical” so that it can refer to the similarity or equivalence of two objects as well as to the individual identity of one.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321045699912028685132":^°°,^"jQuery321045699912028685132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575884166627°
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