Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Xq42umitjy

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Annotation of Annotationen:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2019-12-11T13:32:16.496Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xq42umitjy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":731°Ӻ,"quote":"From my point of view, it is important to note in this particular context that Aristotle explicitly states that knowledge is the object of his inquiry, not a specific aspect of the world to be known. Consequently, I feel justified in interpreting what he says about the different ‘explanatory principles’ as an analysis of the conceptual structures we use to “grasp” and to explain the sort of experience we call change. Though Aristotle, as far as I know, did not dwell on this, change itself is, of course, a compound notion because it involves a relation. One observation of a single frame of experience provides no opportunity to conceive of change. We need at least two. The same applies to the notion of state.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210119137814908731432":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1576067536002°