Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Forw2icntw

Annotation of	Annotationen:Teleology_and_the_Concepts_of_Causation
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date	2019-12-11T14:54:24.232Z
Last Modification User	User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata	^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Forw2icntw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":965°Ӻ,"quote":"The causal agent held responsible for the change in “X” is located at tn, a distant point in the future. Consequently, something that has not yet entered the experiential world is assumed to have the power to determine an experience that is present. One might suggest that this would create no difficulty, if the notion of time that we abstract from the succession of our experiences had nothing to do with the sequence of events in a universe whose goings-on are independent of any experiencer. This assumption is not at all alien to ‘instrumentalists’ and ‘constructivists’ who hold that whatever we want to call knowledge inevitably applies only to the experiential world and warrants no inferences about an independent ontological reality. But even for this school of thought the oddity of this type of causation remains. To connect two experiential items by a concept of cause and effect, one must at least be able to re-present both to oneself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094083677850112722":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1576072463748°