Annotation:Annotationen:The Logic of Scientific Fallibility/M6tcz38jiv

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Annotation of Annotationen:The_Logic_of_Scientific_Fallibility
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Last Modification Date 2020-01-29T14:07:20.229Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M6tcz38jiv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1712°Ӻ,"quote":"Maturana divides the scientific procedure into four steps:Ӷ2Ӻ\n1. Observation. In order to count as “scientific,” an observation must be carried\nout under certain constraints, and the constraints must be made explicit (so\nthat the observation can be repeated).\n2. By relating the observations, a model is inductively derived—usually a model\nthat involves causal connections. (Often an idea of the model precedes the\nobservations of step (1) and to some extent determines their constraints.)\n3. By deduction, a prediction is derived from the model, a prediction that\nconcerns an event that has not yet been observed.\n4. The scientist then sets out to observe the predicted event, and this\nobservation must again comply with the constraints that governed\nobservation in (1).\nI am confident that all who have been trained or engaged in “doing science,” will recognize in this description the famous “hypothetico-deductive Method.” In fact, I have not heard of any scientists, conventional or not, who could not agree with this definition of “science.” Some might want it to include more or to formulate it somewhat differently, but all can accept it as a minimal description of what scientists, by and large, are actually doing.\nWhat is new in Maturana’s break-down is that it illustrates the epistemological implications in a way you will not find in any of the textbooks on “scientific method.” The four steps make clear that what matters is experience. Observing is a way of experiencing and, to be scientific, it must be regulated by certain constraints. The inductively constructed model relates experiences, not “things-in-themselves.” The predictions, too, regard experiences, not events that take place in some “real” world beyond the observer’s experiential interface.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210134134142003336952":^°°,^"jQuery3210134134142003336952":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1580303239910°