Annotation:Annotationen:The Control of Perception and the Construction of Reality: Epistemological Aspects of the Feedback-Control System/O6lflfyf7a

From DigiVis
< Annotation:Annotationen:The Control of Perception and the Construction of Reality: Epistemological Aspects of the Feedback-Control System
Revision as of 19:07, 11 June 2020 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Prämisse3}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Annotationen:The_Control_of_Perception_and_the_Construction_of_Reality:_Epistemological_Aspects_of_the_Feedback-Control_System |L...")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to: navigation, search
Annotation of Annotationen:The_Control_of_Perception_and_the_Construction_of_Reality:_Epistemological_Aspects_of_the_Feedback-Control_System
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2020-06-11T20:07:26.533Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"O6lflfyf7a","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1601°Ӻ,"quote":"“Knowledge” is the construction and maintenance of invariances; and “learning” is an increase in the system’s ability to control sensory signals and to adjust reference signals to do that. Knowledge is not the recognition or awareness of these invariances and learning is not passive recording. This would encumber the model with some form of representational theory and would lead to an infinite regression, i.e. how do we know that we know, etc. This misconception arises from the view that signals, within a control system, usually imply “information” and perhaps knowledge. As D. C. Dennett argues:\nAny time a theory builder proposes to call any event, state, structure, etc., in any system (say the brain of an organism) a signal or message or command (or otherwise endows it with content) he takes out a loan of intelligence. He implicitly posits along with his signals, messages, or commands, something that can serve as a signal-reader, message- understander, or commander (else his “signals” will be for naught, will decay unreceived, uncomprehended). (1971, p. 96, italics in the original)Ӷ7Ӻ\n\nIf we try to apply this to Powers’ model, one thing immediately becomes clear: Though he says that the signal emitted by the first-order input function “is an analogue of an external quantity” (1973, p. 148), this analogical correspondence can be posited only by an observer – the control model has the signal and nothing but the signal. “What we experience is a set of outputs of perceptual functions, and we have no way to detect the true nature of the inputs” (Powers 1974 p. 6).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210196519987011687162":^°°,^"jQuery3210196519987011687162":^°°,^"jQuery3210196519987011687162":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1591898845903°