Annotation:Annotationen:Problems of Knowledge and Cognizing Organisms/Lhinv26bi2
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Revision as of 15:20, 16 July 2020 by Sarah Oberbichler (talk | contribs) (Created page with "{{Prämisse3}} {{TextAnnotation |AnnotationOf=Annotationen:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms |LastModificationDate=2020-07-16T16:20:06.321Z |LastModificationUser=U...")
Annotation of | Annotationen:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms |
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Last Modification Date | 2020-07-16T16:20:06.321Z |
Last Modification User | User:Sarah Oberbichler |
Annotation Metadata | ^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lhinv26bi2","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":875°Ӻ,"quote":"This, too, seems, obvious, a downright commonplace. The way we conceive of “senses” and “perception” simply requires a certain arrangement of items and, by and large, we are no more inclined to question that arrangement today than were Socrates and his listeners. It comprises a perceiver and something which he can perceive. That is to say, through his senses, which carry out a “mediating” function, the perceiver acquires a “percept” that is in some way caused by an “external” object. Once we accept that basic arrangement Ӷand, since Socrates, there have been few who did not accept itӶ2ӺӺ, we have landed ourselves a problem that is indeed insoluble: since we have no access to the “external” object except through the process of perception, we shall never be ‘able to tell whether ours percepts are or are not an accurate or true replica of that object.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321009590704030666732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1594909206085°
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