Annotation:Annotationen:Problems of Knowledge and Cognizing Organisms/To3p8bp1pa

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Annotation of Annotationen:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2020-07-16T17:06:51.370Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"To3p8bp1pa","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1198°Ӻ,"quote":"We can now turn to the question: How do we come to say that an item, such as a frog, perceives things. As we have seen, both the frog and the environmental things it may perceive are parts of our, i.e. the observer’s, experience. As observers with the rational-scientific heritage of our Western culture we are constantly trying to establish more or less permanent (or at least recurrent) relations between the more or less permanent experiential items we have individuated. Why we do that is a question we shall disregard for the moment. Let it be granted that establishing relations is one of the things we do in order to gain some sort of predictive or explanatory control over our experience. Among the relations that we usually establish with a certain amount of success are those we call “mechanical.” They account for very many “interactions” among very many items we individuate in our experience, but they do not account for all interactions among all items. In particular, there is a fairly varied collection of relatively permanent things which, beyond the interactions for which we can account by mechanical relations, prompt us to posit interactions of a different kind.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321062198627681805642":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1594912011164°