Annotation:Annotationen:Problems of Knowledge and Cognizing Organisms/R3utjbh7zm

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Annotation of Annotationen:Problems_of_Knowledge_and_Cognizing_Organisms
Annotation Comment
Last Modification Date 2020-07-16T17:51:00.278Z
Last Modification User User:Sarah Oberbichler
Annotation Metadata
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"R3utjbh7zm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1912°Ӻ,"quote":"In almost every case, these problems stem from a confusion: Traditionally we are supposed to play the role of discoverers who, through their cognitive efforts, come to comprehend the structure of the “real” world. Thus we are always prone to revert to some form of realism and to forget that what we are thinking or talking about is under all circumstances our experience and that the “knowledge” we acquire is knowledge of invariances and regularities derived from and pertaining to our experience.\nIf, on the other hand, we do keep in mind that all invariances and regularities are our construction, this awareness necessarily alters our idea of what is called “empirical investigation” and, indeed, our idea of science itself. We shall come to pay attention to the structure of our concepts and the origin of the categories, rather than assume that any structure and any categories have to be there as such. This, of course, runs counter to the common sense view of the world. But, in fact, it merely modifies our concept of knowledge in exactly the same way as the theory of evolution has modified our concept of living things. Accordingly, knowledge is true and valid as long as it manages to “survive,” that is, as long as it is not demolished by experience. This is the very solid ground for Popper’s insistence on “falsification” as the actual goal of scientific investigation. But a surviving organism cannot be considered to manifest a description of the environment in which it happens to be viable, because an infinite variety of other and different organisms would be just as viable. And, similarly, the regularities, rules, and laws that constitute our knowledge at a given time cannot be said to depict or describe an ontological reality, because an infinite variety of other and different regularities, rules and laws might be just as viable in the “environment” of our experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321091951163900470722":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1594914660017°