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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Byuqywxnma","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1112°Ӻ,"quote":"The use Piaget makes of the notion of adaptation is therefore not the same as that suggested by the contemporary school of thought that goes by the name of “Evolutionary Epistemology.” Unlike this school that formed around the work of Konrad Lorenz, in Piaget’s constructivist theory one cannot draw conclusions about the character of the real world from an organism’s adaptedness or the viability of schemes of action. In his view, what we see, hear, and feel, i.e. our sensory world, is the result of our own perceptual activities and therefore specific to our ways of perceiving and conceiving. Knowledge, for him, arises from actions and the agent’s reflection upon them. The actions take place in an environment and are grounded on and directed at objects that constitute the organism’s experiential world, not “things in themselves” that have an independent existence. Hence, when Piaget speaks of interaction, this does not imply an organism that interacts with objects as they “really” are, but rather a cognitive subject that is dealing with previously constructed perceptual and conceptual structures.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Nach Piaget bedeutet Interaktion nicht, dass ein Organismus mit Objekten interagiert, wie sie „wirklich“ sind, sondern dass ein kognitives Subjekt sich mit zuvor konstruierten Wahrnehmungs- und Konzeptstrukturen auseinandersetzt. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1555531065204°
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