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^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qb5o39daj8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":857°Ӻ,"quote":"Yet, in spite of their power on the common sense level, the achievements of science and technology do not actually resolve the fundamental problem of knowledge. In order to appreciate this, one has to become aware of the fact that validity in our experiential world is not the same as “truth” in the philosopher’s absolute or ontological sense. It was, indeed, the skeptics themselves who helped to obscure this distinction. Their error did not lie in the logic of their arguments which are in fact irrefutable. But they failed to question the way in which what we know should be related to reality. It is here that Piaget’s use of the notion of adaptation opens a path that makes it possible to accept the skeptics’ logical conclusion without diminishing the obvious value of knowledge.\nThe concept of adaptation stems from biology and it indicates a particular relationship between living organisms or species and their environment. To say that they are adapted means no less but also no more than that they have been able to survive given the conditions and the constraints of the world in which they happen to be living.\nIn other words, they have managed to evolve a fit or, as I prefer to say, their physical characteristics and their ways of behaving have so far proven viable in their environment. \nPiaget took the notion of adaptation out of the biological context and turned it into the cornerstone of his “genetic epistemology.” He had realized early on that whatever knowledge was, it was not a “copy” of reality. The relationship of viable biological organisms to their environment provided a means to reformulate the relationship between the cognitive subject’s conceptual structures and that subject’s experiential world. Knowledge, then, could be treated, not as a more or less accurate representation of external things, situations, and events, but rather as a mapping of actions and conceptual operations that had proven viable in the knowing subject’s experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°,^"jQuery321058358424761581242":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Wissen ist weniger eine genaue Darstellung externer Dinge, Situationen und Ereignisse, sondern mehr eine Abbildung von Handlungen und konzeptionellen Operationen, die sich in der Erfahrung des wissenden Subjekts bewährt haben.","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1555523765485°
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