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Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Oluafsqlrw +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oluafsqlrw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1230°Ӻ,"quote":"n our century, it was Jean Piaget who vigorously defended and expanded the notion of reflection. He lost no opportunity to distance himself from empiricists who denied the mind and its operations and wanted to reduce all knowing to a passive reception of objective “sense data”. Yet, he should not have found it difficult to agree with Locke’s division of ideas because it is not too different from his own division between figurative and operative knowledge. Similarly, I feel, Locke would have had a certain respect for Piaget’s effort to set understanding at a distance and to make it the object of investigation. And both men, I have no doubt, would have agreed with Dewey about the risk of deceiving oneself by taking mental experiences as given. It is therefore with caution that I shall proceed to discuss, in the pages that follow, first my own view of reflection, abstraction, re-presentation, and the use of symbols, and then a tentative interpretation of Piaget’s position. If, at times, I may sound assertive, I would beg the reader to keep in mind that I am fully aware of the fact that I am merely offering conjectures—but they are conjectures which I have found useful in constructing a model of mental operations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560691473120°
Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vh3q1xxocb +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vh3q1xxocb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ3Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":371°Ӻ,"quote":"The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. (John Locke, 1690)Ӷ2Ӻ\nAs adults we are constantly deceiving ourselves in regard to the nature and genesis of our mental experiences. (John Dewey, 1895)Ӷ3Ӻ\nOne of the remarkable features of the Behaviorist era in American psychology is that so many leaders and followers of that creed could claim to be Empiricists, cite John Locke as their forefather, and get away with it. Had they read the first chapter of “Book II”Ӷ4Ӻ of his major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, they would have found, among many others, the following enlightening statements. Paragraph 2 has the heading: “All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.” Paragraph 4 has the heading “The operations of our Minds”, and it is there that Locke explains what he means by “reflection”:\n\nThis source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1560691457042°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bb5ru3rc91","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":1042,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1123°Ӻ,"quote":"This, of course, immediately raises the question as to why such behaviors arise.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551957902317°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cdgz89aatp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system. In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Die Koordination in komplexen operativen Systemen kann nicht der natürlichen Selektion zugeschrieben werden, sondern ist Ergebnis des Lernens","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551957551355°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cz2zt51w88","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1321,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551956630385°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dz5gvl6lhi","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1013,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":2249°Ӻ,"quote":"Although I certainly do not believe that computers are like brains, computers are a useful metaphor in the context of genetic determination. When a computer comes from the manufacturer it has wired-in as hardware a small number of very basic operations. If one looks closely, there are only three operations; to record, to read, and to compare items of a certain form. At that point that is all the computer can do, and one may consider these three operations its genetically determined operational repertoire.5 Now comes the programmer, who designs software in the form of compilers and programs, all of which are, in fact, nothing but intricate variations of combinations of the basic operations—and suddenly the computer can handle numbers, from plain arithmetic to the most abstruse forms of Calculus; it can monitor bank accounts and inventories; it can control the start and splash-down of spaceships; and it can even play all sorts of games. It is difficult to see why and how anyone should want to maintain that these accomplishments, as well as all those that a future programmer might implement, are hardware-determined or must be considered the result of the same selective processes that led to the computer’s manufacture.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Metapher","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551957052449°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"E4yvmpuf9x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":516,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550607195633°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ep7v5g4inh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":743,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1041°Ӻ,"quote":"From an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957766966°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eyokmu59on","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":501°Ӻ,"quote":"At the end of the introductory chapter to his Sociobiology, Wilson (1975, p. 6) says that the cannibalization of comparative psychology “seems to be indicated both by the extrapolation of current events and by considerations of the logical relationship behavioral biology holds with the remainder of science.” My colleagues on this panel are more competent than I to examine extrapolations from current events. I shall focus on certain logical relationships that seem to be relevant to Wilson’s claim.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Narrativ","data_creacio":1550604980359°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"F9biv20md4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.3 The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550605810188°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hflp6y2df4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":516°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550607161406°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jhk7hon5tx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1759,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other accident.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550605820424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lnr923y61m","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":510°Ӻ,"quote":"A rather more serious trap is the misconception of selection as an ordinary causative process. David Chiszar (in this symposium) has drawn attention to the difference among investigations searching for explanations in terms of one or another of the four Aristotelian causes. When we speak of natural selection, it is crucial to remain aware of the fact that we are referring to a conceptual situation that does not involve efficient causation in the same way as do the explanatory concepts of other sciences.2","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1550605539570°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lrdpl4i5z8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1116°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957514356°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M12vslb6fd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957657297°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mie50bmpi7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":1116,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957506397°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oybmbzou49","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1183,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1320°Ӻ,"quote":"That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551956659643°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pui85bouz3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions. Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: In der Ontologie hat Selektion nicht Eliminierung zur Folge, sondern erfolglose Versuche","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956447053°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q11yok691f","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":685,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation. \nOn the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability. What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results. That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form: If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Ein Organismus lernt, was zu zufriedenstellenden Ergebnissen führt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956782357°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q44osehrbh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":650,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1774°Ӻ,"quote":"Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551957699768°
