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Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Oluafsqlrw +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oluafsqlrw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1230°Ӻ,"quote":"n our century, it was Jean Piaget who vigorously defended and expanded the notion of reflection. He lost no opportunity to distance himself from empiricists who denied the mind and its operations and wanted to reduce all knowing to a passive reception of objective “sense data”. Yet, he should not have found it difficult to agree with Locke’s division of ideas because it is not too different from his own division between figurative and operative knowledge. Similarly, I feel, Locke would have had a certain respect for Piaget’s effort to set understanding at a distance and to make it the object of investigation. And both men, I have no doubt, would have agreed with Dewey about the risk of deceiving oneself by taking mental experiences as given. It is therefore with caution that I shall proceed to discuss, in the pages that follow, first my own view of reflection, abstraction, re-presentation, and the use of symbols, and then a tentative interpretation of Piaget’s position. If, at times, I may sound assertive, I would beg the reader to keep in mind that I am fully aware of the fact that I am merely offering conjectures—but they are conjectures which I have found useful in constructing a model of mental operations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560691473120°
Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vh3q1xxocb +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vh3q1xxocb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ3Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":371°Ӻ,"quote":"The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. (John Locke, 1690)Ӷ2Ӻ\nAs adults we are constantly deceiving ourselves in regard to the nature and genesis of our mental experiences. (John Dewey, 1895)Ӷ3Ӻ\nOne of the remarkable features of the Behaviorist era in American psychology is that so many leaders and followers of that creed could claim to be Empiricists, cite John Locke as their forefather, and get away with it. Had they read the first chapter of “Book II”Ӷ4Ӻ of his major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, they would have found, among many others, the following enlightening statements. Paragraph 2 has the heading: “All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.” Paragraph 4 has the heading “The operations of our Minds”, and it is there that Locke explains what he means by “reflection”:\n\nThis source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1560691457042°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bb5ru3rc91","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":1042,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1123°Ӻ,"quote":"This, of course, immediately raises the question as to why such behaviors arise.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551957902317°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cdgz89aatp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system. In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Die Koordination in komplexen operativen Systemen kann nicht der natürlichen Selektion zugeschrieben werden, sondern ist Ergebnis des Lernens","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551957551355°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cz2zt51w88","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1321,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551956630385°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dz5gvl6lhi","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1013,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":2249°Ӻ,"quote":"Although I certainly do not believe that computers are like brains, computers are a useful metaphor in the context of genetic determination. When a computer comes from the manufacturer it has wired-in as hardware a small number of very basic operations. If one looks closely, there are only three operations; to record, to read, and to compare items of a certain form. At that point that is all the computer can do, and one may consider these three operations its genetically determined operational repertoire.5 Now comes the programmer, who designs software in the form of compilers and programs, all of which are, in fact, nothing but intricate variations of combinations of the basic operations—and suddenly the computer can handle numbers, from plain arithmetic to the most abstruse forms of Calculus; it can monitor bank accounts and inventories; it can control the start and splash-down of spaceships; and it can even play all sorts of games. It is difficult to see why and how anyone should want to maintain that these accomplishments, as well as all those that a future programmer might implement, are hardware-determined or must be considered the result of the same selective processes that led to the computer’s manufacture.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Metapher","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551957052449°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"E4yvmpuf9x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":516,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550607195633°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ep7v5g4inh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":743,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1041°Ӻ,"quote":"From an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957766966°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eyokmu59on","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":501°Ӻ,"quote":"At the end of the introductory chapter to his Sociobiology, Wilson (1975, p. 6) says that the cannibalization of comparative psychology “seems to be indicated both by the extrapolation of current events and by considerations of the logical relationship behavioral biology holds with the remainder of science.” My colleagues on this panel are more competent than I to examine extrapolations from current events. I shall focus on certain logical relationships that seem to be relevant to Wilson’s claim.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Narrativ","data_creacio":1550604980359°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"F9biv20md4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.3 The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550605810188°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hflp6y2df4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":516°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550607161406°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jhk7hon5tx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1759,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other accident.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550605820424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lnr923y61m","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":510°Ӻ,"quote":"A rather more serious trap is the misconception of selection as an ordinary causative process. David Chiszar (in this symposium) has drawn attention to the difference among investigations searching for explanations in terms of one or another of the four Aristotelian causes. When we speak of natural selection, it is crucial to remain aware of the fact that we are referring to a conceptual situation that does not involve efficient causation in the same way as do the explanatory concepts of other sciences.2","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1550605539570°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lrdpl4i5z8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1116°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957514356°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M12vslb6fd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957657297°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mie50bmpi7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":1116,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957506397°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oybmbzou49","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1183,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1320°Ӻ,"quote":"That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551956659643°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pui85bouz3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions. Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: In der Ontologie hat Selektion nicht Eliminierung zur Folge, sondern erfolglose Versuche","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956447053°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q11yok691f","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":685,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation. \nOn the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability. What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results. That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form: If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Ein Organismus lernt, was zu zufriedenstellenden Ergebnissen führt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956782357°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q44osehrbh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":650,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1774°Ӻ,"quote":"Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551957699768°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qwhzl16st6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":178°Ӻ,"quote":"Most, if not all, of the heated debates about sociobiology have concerned the question of how much of the behavior of living organisms is susceptible to evolutionary explanation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1550605037967°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tma0ivz7a1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":685,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1087°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation. \nOn the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551956650772°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U74jy5vhph","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1041°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify. Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”\nBut such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation. Who is to say how many quite generally exhibited behaviors in the repertoire of more or less sophisticated organisms have arisen in the same spontaneous, selection-independent way? The proposal of radical sociobiologists to reduce the origin of all behaviors to the “mechanistic” process of natural selection seems doomed from the start. The reason, I believe, is again the misconception of selection as a mechanistic, i.e., efficient cause. \nFrom an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Neue Verhaltensweisen entstehen, wie Mutationen, ohne biologischen Grund und werden von Generation zu Generation aufrecht erhalten, sofern sie die Lebensfähigkeit nicht beinträchtigen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551957878842°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wt3hz3yh9o","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":198°Ӻ,"quote":"The term natural selection has been around for so long that, as a rule, we take its meaning for granted and are quite ready to accept it as one of the established explanatory principles of science.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Infragestellung der allgemein gültigen Annahmen und Sichtweisen","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1550605085694°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xvma2lsnp4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1087,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1182°Ӻ,"quote":"What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551956642536°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ykactjanqj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2346°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.Ӷ4Ӻ The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms. In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other acciden","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Um eine bestimmte Sittuation oder Veränderung der Unmwelt zu überleben, muss ein Organismus die erforderlichen Eigenschaften durch Mutation bereits vorher erworben haben. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1550605834607°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Z6b9k4uwl6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":741°Ӻ,"quote":"But such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation. Who is to say how many quite generally exhibited behaviors in the repertoire of more or less sophisticated organisms have arisen in the same spontaneous, selection-independent way? The proposal of radical sociobiologists to reduce the origin of all behaviors to the “mechanistic” process of natural selection seems doomed from the start. The reason, I believe, is again the misconception of selection as a mechanistic, i.e., efficient cause.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957743972°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Z86dv5yms9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":679°Ӻ,"quote":"“Sociobiology,” says Wilson (1975, p. 4), “is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.” In the study of behavior, as Wilson sees it, explanations must be formulated in terms of evolutionary biology—that is, “the Modern Synthesis … in which each phenomenon is weighed for its adaptive significance and then related to the basic principles of population genetics” (p. 4). Within the theory of evolution, adaptation is the outcome of natural selection, and “natural selection is the process whereby certain genes gain representation in the following generations superior to that of other genes located at the same chromosome positions” (p. 3).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1550605234245°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"A8suhxi8m5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1055,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1586°Ӻ,"quote":"Indeed, one need not enter very far into constructivist thought to realize that it inevitably leads to the contention that man – and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, therefore, also for what he does. Today, when behaviorists are still intent on pushing all responsibility into the environment, and sociobiologists are trying to place much of it into genes, a doctrine may well seem uncomfortable if it suggests that we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which we appear to be living.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Erkenntnisse, die schockieren","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171207559°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ahkgpchgv7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":612,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":899°Ӻ,"quote":"The organisms that we find alive at any particular moment of evolutionary history, and their ways of behaving, are the result of cumulative accidental variations, and the influence of the environment was and is, under all circumstances, limited to the elimination of non-viable variants.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551173047438°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Axy8ns9hny","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":433,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":973°Ӻ,"quote":"The epistemological problem – how we acquire knowledge of reality, and how reliable and “true” that knowledge might be – occupies contemporary philosophy no less than it occupied Plato. The ways and means of the search for solutions have, of course, become more varied and complicated, but the basic question has, almost without exception, remained the same. The way that question was put at the very beginning made it impossible to answer, and the attempts that have since been made could not get anywhere near a solution to the problem.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Irreführungen aufzeigen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171299161°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"B4fsul6wwd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":426,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":630°Ӻ,"quote":"“natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551960660389°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bdffpm325q","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","startOffset":800,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":358°Ӻ,"quote":"In these cases, as in all conceivable ones, it should be clear that the criteria by means of which sameness or difference is established are criteria that are created and chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world. \nFor an understanding of radical constructivism it is even more important to appreciate the subject’s active operating that gives rise to regularities and invariances in the experiential world. Both regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a comparison that yields a judgment of sameness.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551175798227°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bgxhqrc31a","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity. This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself. Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ372475,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ372237,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Wissen kann nicht das Ergebnis eines passiven Empfanges sein, sondern ist das Produkt einer aktiven Subjektivität. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174617950°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bi6lbmgz68","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ26Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ26Ӻ","endOffset":362°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico’s battle cry “Verum ipsum factum” – the truth is the same as the made (factum and “fact” both come from the Latin facere, to make!) – has been quoted quite frequently since Vico was rediscovered in our century as a cultural historian and a philosopher of history. His revolutionary epistemological ideas, however, are rarely mentioned, let alone explicated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Ideen, die nicht beachtet werden","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551174138295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"C90m7tt348","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":796,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1122°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, Vico’s position is in that respect similar to that of Kant, who says; “Nature, therefore … is the collective conception of all objects of experience.”23 For Kant, it is the “raw material of sensory impression” which “the mind’s activity ... processes so that it becomes knowledge of objects that we call experience.” 24","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174330811°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cbpbl0so14","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others. The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ438298,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ437799,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Produkte bewusster kognitiver Aktivität haben immer einen Zweck und werden danach bewertet, wie gut sie diesen Zweck erfüllen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174804943°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D613lsnbc0","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ28Ӻ","startOffset":356,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ29Ӻ","endOffset":578°Ӻ,"quote":"Though Berkeley says “that all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, their being is to be perceived or known,”21 and thus presupposes the activity of the intellect, his accent always lies on the being, whereas Vico invariably stresses human knowledge and its construction. \nThere can be no doubt that Vico’s explicit use of facere, his constant reference to the composing, the putting together and, in short, the active construction of all knowledge and experience come very much closer to Piaget’s genetic epistemology and to modern constructivism in general, than did Berkeley. Nowhere does that become clearer than in a statement with which Vico anticipated the epistemological attitude of some of today’s philosophers of science: “Human knowledge is nothing else but the endeavor to make things correspond to one another in shapely proportion.”22","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551962739605°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Osp0t2wuti","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1004°Ӻ,"quote":"In this one respect the basic principle of radical constructivist epistemology coincides with that of the theory of evolution: Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures). That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ97880,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ89996,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Weil die Erlebniswelt genauso wie die Umwelt dem Organismen Grenzen setzt, werden im Lichte der Erfahrung Regelmäßigkeiten, Faustregeln und Theorien entweder als zuverlässig oder nicht zuverlässig eingestuft. \n","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551171573973°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Et2a69rrc7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":901,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":997°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173057855°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Filz8w2g1p","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":756°Ӻ,"quote":"On the whole, even after Kant, the situation did not change. There were some who tried to take his Critique of Pure Reason seriously, but the pressure of philosophical tradition was overwhelming. In spite of Kant’s thesis that our mind does not derive laws from nature, but imposes them on it,5 most scientists today still consider themselves “discoverers” who unveil nature’s secrets and slowly but steadily expand the range of human knowledge; and countless philosophers have dedicated themselves to the task of ascribing to that laboriously acquired knowledge the unquestionable certainty which the rest of the world expects of genuine truth. Now as ever, there reigns the conviction that knowledge is knowledge only if it reflects the world as it is.6","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551171327784°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gf3f8cp9w5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ32Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ32Ӻ","endOffset":272°Ӻ,"quote":"As elegant as his system is, it still leaves open two questions. First, what are the conditions under which a new construct will be considered compatible with what has already been constructed? Second, why should any organism undertake the task of cognitive construction?","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551174546698°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ggav31h7bl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":444,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":496°Ӻ,"quote":"From the radical constructivist point of view, all of us – scientists, philosophers, laymen, school children, animals, indeed any kind of living organism - face our environment as the burglar faces a lock that he has to unlock in order to get at the loot.\nThis is the sense in which the word “fit” applies to Darwin’s and neo-Darwinist theories of evolution. Unfortunately, Darwin himself used the expression “survival of the fittest.” In doing that, he prepared the way or the misguided notion that, on the basis of his theory, one could consider certain things fitter than fit, and that among those there could even be a fittest.7 But in a theory in which survival is the only criterion for the selection of species, there are only two possibilities:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960140804°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ha7iediqym","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":821,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":1162°Ӻ,"quote":"Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.16","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551173624168°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hwdhrz42pt","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":486,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174773450°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"I8efujzxtp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","startOffset":359,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":552°Ӻ,"quote":"Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551175817555°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ifqj66kork","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":470,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":644°Ӻ,"quote":"because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551965337146°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jeek5zyvsv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ38Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ38Ӻ","endOffset":222°Ӻ,"quote":"As Piaget has shown, the concepts of equivalence and individual identity are not given a priori (innate) but have to be built up; and every “normal” child does, in fact, build them up within the first two years of life.30","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551175564073°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jvbbeq0ddy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1861,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":2246°Ӻ,"quote":"“A priori” is tantamount to “built-in” or “innate,” and Kant’s justification of it leads, albeit in a roundabout fashion, to God and to a Platonic mythology of ideas. In that respect, Vico is more modern and more prosaic. Of the category of causality, for instance, he says: “If true means to have been made, then to prove something by means of its cause is the same as causing it.”25","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551174526878°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kau6mzf6nq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ21Ӻ","startOffset":140,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ21Ӻ","endOffset":495°Ӻ,"quote":"Already Xenophanes, one of the earliest of the pre-Socratics, said that no man has ever seen certain truth, nor will there ever be one who knows about the gods and the things of the world, “for if he succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is, nevertheless, unaware of it; opinion (seeming) is fixed by fate upon all things.”14","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173486194°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"L0fc4ds4mj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":470°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551965327427°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lq8qrfv45i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":178,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself. Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174590008°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ls36qph8h8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"Causes thus originate in the putting together of individual elements; that is, they originate from an experiencer’s active operating, such that, for instance, “the determinate (i.e., causally determined) form of the object springs from the order and the composition of elements.”26","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551174537006°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Luw055wkng","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1054°Ӻ,"quote":"Within the limits of one chapter, an unconventional way of thinking can certainly not be thoroughly justified, but it can, perhaps, be presented in its most characteristic features anchored here and there in single points. There is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. In the case of constructivism, there is the additional risk that it will be discarded at first sight because, like skepticism – with which it has a certain amount in common – it might seem too cool and critical, or simply incompatible with ordinary common sense. The proponents of an idea, as a rule, explain its non-acceptance differently than do the critics and opponents. Being myself much involved, it seems to me that the resistance met in the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, the first true constructivist, and by Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget in the more recent past, is not so much due to inconsistencies or gaps in their argumentation, as to the justifiable suspicion that constructivism intends to undermine too large a part of the traditional view of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Schwächen und die Möglichkeit der Missinterpretation der eigenen Theorie aufzeigen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171138644°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M30crhx4in","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":178°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174580104°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mukx7wqy5i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":235,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ322836,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ316580,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Welt, die konstruiert ist, ist eine erfahrene Welt, die keinerlei Anspruch auf \"Wahrheit\" im Sinne der Übereinstimmung mit einer ontologischen Welt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174454424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N8vvmji8uv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":155°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210162914505684703452":^°,"sizzle1560439090281":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ21658,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1551172618735°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nlpplg3gzh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":630°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated. If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas, “natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°,"sizzle1552300422037":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ57681,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"\"Durch \"Natürliche Selektion\" werden nicht die Stärksten und Fittesten selektiert, sondern die aussortiert, die den Test der Überlebensfähigkeit nicht überstehen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551960671111°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nt0esta93s","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","startOffset":731,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":893°Ӻ,"quote":"By taking for granted that knowledge must reflect reality traditional epistemology has created for itself a dilemma that was as inevitable as it was unsolvable.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Dilemma der klassischen Sichtweise ","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551173513426°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Numzp44srj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","endOffset":1372°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece. \nA similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images. The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551175704169°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"O62gbw673y","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","startOffset":825,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":1407°Ӻ,"quote":". Donald Campbell, who has provided an excellent survey of proponents of “evolutionary epistemology” since Darwin, writes: “The controversial issue is the conceptual inclusion of the real world, defining the problem of knowledge as the fit of data and theory to that real world.”12 In his conclusion he then declares that the evolutionary epistemology, which he and Karl Popper represent, “is fully compatible with an advocacy of the goals of realism and objectivity in science.” But the theory of which he provided an extremely lucid exposition, points in the opposite direction.13","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173464998°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ohygf3hivn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":234°Ӻ,"quote":"Our main question was how it might come about that we experience a relatively stable and reliable world in spite of the fact that we are unable to ascribe stability, regularity, or any other perceived property to an objective reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551174209939°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oo2fdu92ea","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":644°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one: because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Der Erfolg eines Schlüssels hängt nicht davon ab, ob ein Schloss gefunden wird, in das er passt, sonndern nur davon, ob er den Weg zu einem bestimmten Ziel öffnet. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551966076341°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ow2des8aoy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":608,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174242322°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P2rwrijst5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1408°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551962178265°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P9zxwcufnk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.16 \nThe question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ298099,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ297797,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Wir können unsere Wahrnehmung nur durch den Vergleich mit anderen Wahrnehmungen prüfen, aber nie mit dem Objekt wie es sein könnte, bevor wir es wahrnehmen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551173653295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pughfc3e56","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":474°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.8 The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Es gibt keinen Zusammenhang zwischen den \"objektiven\" Welt und der Überlebensfähigkeit biologischer Strukturen und Verhaltensweisen. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551961059877°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q7cxrlzqk8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":486°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174758386°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q9czaceqbg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":700°Ӻ,"quote":"In everyday English, that conceptual opposition can be brought out quite clearly by pitting the words “match” and “fit” against one another in certain contexts. The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that matches reality in the same sense as you might look for paint to match the color that is already on the wall that you have to repair. In the epistemologist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns him, but he is, nevertheless, concerned with some kind of “homomorphism,” which is to say, an equivalence of relations, sequence, or characteristic structure – something, in other words, that he can consider the same, because only then could he say that his knowledge is of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551959610705°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qgaf10vi1r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":38,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173635785°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qihsu8gwui","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":369,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":477°Ӻ,"quote":"there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173004272°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"R7f8zluj3o","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":973,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1643°Ӻ,"quote":"The philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam, has recently formulated it like this: “It is impossible to find a philosopher before Kant (and after the pre-Socratics) who was not a metaphysical realist, at least about what he took to be basic or unreducible assertions.”3 Putnam explains that statement by saying that, during those 2,000 years, philosophers certainly disagreed in their views about what really exists, but their conception of truth was always the same, in that it was tied to the notion of objective validity. A metaphysical realist, thus, is one who insists that we may call something “true” only if it corresponds to an independent, “objective” reality.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551171310091°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rah03neh8r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":127,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":472°Ӻ,"quote":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1552301208460°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rnndq00iqs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":443°Ӻ,"quote":"If, on the other hand, we say that something fits, we have in mind a different relation. A key fits if it opens the lock. The fit describes a capacity of the key, not of the lock. Thanks to professional burglars, we know only too well that there are many keys that are shaped quite differently from ours but nevertheless unlock our doors. The metaphor is crude, but it serves quite well to bring into relief the difference I want to explicate.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Metapher","data_creacio":1551959648794°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sa3tq5rvyh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":623°Ӻ,"quote":"This is the sense in which the word “fit” applies to Darwin’s and neo-Darwinist theories of evolution. Unfortunately, Darwin himself used the expression “survival of the fittest.” In doing that, he prepared the way or the misguided notion that, on the basis of his theory, one could consider certain things fitter than fit, and that among those there could even be a fittest.7 But in a theory in which survival is the only criterion for the selection of species, there are only two possibilities: either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Entweder eine Art passt zu ihrer Umgebung oder sie passt nicht, d.h. sie überlebt entweder, oder sie stirbt. ","order":"Ggav31h7bl","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1552301053236°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Syb25gtvgg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1517°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience. The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Der einzige Aspekt der \"realen\" Welt, der tatsächlich in den Bereich der Erfahrung eintritt, sind die Einschränkungen dieser Welt. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551962281000°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"T7vq8ir48k","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":499,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":625°Ӻ,"quote":"either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551171466395°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tf2mdlposf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1126,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1377°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174354093°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uchl82iy4v","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":473,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1146°Ӻ,"quote":"That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not (unless we introduce the concept of probability – in which case we are explicitly relinquishing the condition that knowledge must be certain).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1552301220042°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uhvvo93086","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","startOffset":209,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","endOffset":799°Ӻ,"quote":"Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551175774138°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ul5vmn52ua","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ33Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ33Ӻ","endOffset":678°Ӻ,"quote":"In traditional theories of knowledge, the activity of “knowing” is taken as a matter of course, an activity that requires no justification and functions as an initial constituent. The knowing subject is conceived of as a “pure” entity in the sense that it is essentially unimpeded by biological or psychological conditions. The radical constructivist epistemology quite deliberately breaks that conventional framework and commits what professional philosophers, more or less disparagingly, dismiss as “psychologism.” The deliberations that have led me to this somewhat iconoclastic step derive from what was said in the first two sections as soon as one considers them jointly.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Ablösen klassischer Denkweisen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551174570911°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Um550kiapu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":820°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551173613824°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uy0jz8j8jj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1377,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1596°Ӻ,"quote":"The processing of the raw material in Kant’s system is governed automatically by space and time (without which no experience would be possible) and the other categories which, for that very reason, are called a priori.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174373144°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vnu6kddzd3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":235,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":608°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174232251°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vywz07foug","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":796,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1592°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, Vico’s position is in that respect similar to that of Kant, who says; “Nature, therefore … is the collective conception of all objects of experience.”23 For Kant, it is the “raw material of sensory impression” which “the mind’s activity ... processes so that it becomes knowledge of objects that we call experience.” 24 In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these. The processing of the raw material in Kant’s system is governed automatically by space and time (without which no experience would be possible) and the other categories which, for that very reason, are called a priori.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Erfahrungen und alle Objekte der Erfahrung sind unter allen Umständen das Resultat unserer Wege und Mittel des Erlebens","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551964319124°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"W0hci79pef","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":127,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1146°Ӻ,"quote":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures). That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not (unless we introduce the concept of probability – in which case we are explicitly relinquishing the condition that knowledge must be certain).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"So wie Umwelt dem lebenden Organismus Grenzen setzt und beseitigt, was die Grenze überschreitet, so bildet die Erfahrungswelt die Grenzen für unsere Ideen (kognitiven Strukturen) ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1552301507420°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wkqtj3ja46","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ2Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ2Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":276°Ӻ,"quote":"As God’s truth is what God comes to know as he creates and assembles it, so human truth is what man comes to know as he builds it shaping it by his actions. Therefore science (scientia) is the knowledge (cognitio) of origins, of the ways and the manner how things are made.19","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173755689°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wqabhguxqj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":115,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","endOffset":647°Ӻ,"quote":"it undermines any representation of objective structure in the real world and, thus, inevitably raises the question why and, above all, how it comes about that we search for and can also find a structure in our experiential world, when such a structure may not be given by reality. In other words, if Kant’s statement is correct and our experience can teach us nothing about the nature of things in themselves,Ӷ18Ӻ how, then, can we explain that we nevertheless experience a world that is in many respects quite stable and reliable?","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551173724384°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wqc64cmhap","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":366°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.8 The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960957163°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"X8ecdaba5d","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":156,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":425°Ӻ,"quote":"If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas,","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960638734°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xa2garp97h","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":552°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece. \nA similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images. The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion. \nNo less constructed are the judgments of sameness and difference in the realm of perceptual objects. As I indicated above, “sameness” is always the result of an examination with regard to specific properties. Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience. In these cases, as in all conceivable ones, it should be clear that the criteria by means of which sameness or difference is established are criteria that are created and chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world. \nFor an understanding of radical constructivism it is even more important to appreciate the subject’s active operating that gives rise to regularities and invariances in the experiential world. Both regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a comparison that yields a judgment of sameness. Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Gleichheit ist immer relativ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551968695671°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xrm4s8l4d2","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":613,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":997°Ӻ,"quote":"The organisms that we find alive at any particular moment of evolutionary history, and their ways of behaving, are the result of cumulative accidental variations, and the influence of the environment was and is, under all circumstances, limited to the elimination of non-viable variants. Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Umwelt kann bestenfalls für das Aussterben verantwortlich gemacht werden, aber nie für das Überleben","order":"Ahkgpchgv7","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551961334443°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Yrlpe36f87","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","startOffset":524,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":729°Ӻ,"quote":"As Maturana has made particularly clear; “The a priori assumption that objective knowledge constitutes a description of that which is known … begs the questions, ‘What is to know? and How do we know?’.”15","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173498519°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zgid70c2rs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":1409,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1517°Ӻ,"quote":"The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551962168405°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/B7j8rehn9c +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"B7j8rehn9c","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":907,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1230°Ӻ,"quote":"A familiar motor pattern is once more a good example: we may be well able to re-present to ourselves a tennis stroke or a golf swing, but few, if any, would claim to have a “conceptualized understanding” of the sequence of elementary motor acts that are involved in such an abstraction of a delicately coordinated activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563869531271°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bfg3odrse4 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bfg3odrse4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":282,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":503°Ӻ,"quote":"In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes a Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ117981,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119700,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119608,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119430,29,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes\na Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867746990°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bgvvdmhivy +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bgvvdmhivy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1260,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1590°Ӻ,"quote":"Berkeley, I would say, was quite right when he maintained that every time we imagine an apple, it has to have a specific color, but he was wrong to claim that we could, therefore, not have a general idea in our heads that allows us to recognize as apples items that differ in some respects, but nevertheless belong to that class.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867889995°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bsgnvh5vo1 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bsgnvh5vo1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":2365,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":3064°Ӻ,"quote":"An example may help to clarify what I am trying to say. If, in someone’s account of a European journey, you read or hear the name “Paris”, you may register it as a pointer to a variety of experiential “referents” with which you hapen to have associated it—e.g., a particular point on the map of Europe, your first glimpse of the Eiffel Tower, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre— but if the account of the journey immediately moves to London, you would be unlikely to implement fully any one of them as an actual re-presentation. At any subsequent moment, however, if the context or the conversation required it, you could return to the mention of “Paris” and develop one of the associated re-presentations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"An example may help to clarify what I am trying to say. If, in someone’s account of a European journey, you read or hear the name “Paris”, you may register it as a pointer to a variety of experiential “referents” with which you hapen to have associated it—e.g., a particular point on the map of Europe, your first glimpse of the Eiffel Tower, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre— but if the account of the journey immediately moves to London, you would be unlikely to implement fully any one of them as an actual re-presentation. At any subsequent moment, however, if the context or the conversation required it, you could return to the mention of “Paris” and develop one of the associated re-presentations.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868820483°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Butixz00kz +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Butixz00kz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":396°Ӻ,"quote":"The cumulative result of the minute investigations contained in these two volumes enabled Piaget to come up with an extremely sophisticated description of the mutual interaction between the construction of successful schemes and the construction of abstracted understandings, an interaction that eventually leads to accommodations and to finding solutions to problems in the re-presentational mode, i.e., without having to have run into them on the level of sensory-motor experience. In this context, one further thing must be added. In the earlier sections, I discussed the fact that re-presentation follows upon recognition and that the “pointing” function of symbols follows as the result of familiarity with the symbols’ power to bring forth re- presentations that are based on empirical abstractions. As the examples I gave of abstracted motor patterns should make clear, symbols can be used, simply to point to such patterns, in which case the re-presentation of action can be curtailed, provided the subject has consciously conceptualized the action and knows how to re-present it. I now want to emphasize that this pointing function of symbols makes possible a way of mental operating that requires conscious conceptualization and, as a result, gives more power to the symbols. Once reflective thought can be applied to the kind of abstraction Piaget ascribed to Aristotle (cf. passage quoted above), there will be awareness not only of what is being operated on but also of the operations that are being carried out. Piaget suggested this in an earlier context:\nA form is indissociable from its content in perception but can be manipulated independently of its content in the realm of operations, in which even forms devoid of content can be constructed and manipulated. ...logico-mathematical operations allow the construction of arrangements which are independent of content ... pure forms ... simply based on symbols. (Piaget, 1969; p. 288; my emphasis.)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869643205°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Camouqfaz8 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Camouqfaz8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":4330,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":5100°Ӻ,"quote":"Any re-presentation, be it of an experiential “thing” or of a program of actions or operations, requires some sensory material for its execution. That basic condition, I believe, is what confirmed Berkeley in his argument against the “existence” of abstracted general ideas, for it is indeed the case that every time we re-present to ourselves such a general idea, it turns into a particular one because its implementation requires the kind of material from which it was abstracted. This last condition could be reformulated by saying that there has to be some isomorphism between the present construct and what it is intended to reconstruct. Clearly, this isomorphism does not concern a “thing-in-itself” but precisely those aspects one wants to or happens to focus on.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Any re-presentation, be it of an experiential “thing” or of a program of actions or operations, requires some sensory material for its execution. That basic condition, I believe, is what confirmed Berkeley in his argument against the “existence” of abstracted general ideas, for it is indeed the case that every time we re-present to ourselves such a general idea, it turns into a particular one because its implementation requires the kind of material from which it was abstracted. This last condition could be reformulated by saying that there has to be some isomorphism between the present construct and what it is intended to reconstruct. Clearly, this isomorphism does not concern a “thing-in-itself” but precisely those aspects one wants to or happens to focus on.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867546874°
