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A list of all pages that have property "AnnotationComment" with value "Prämisse". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

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  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Iv70iak5ec  + (Kurz, man kann die allgemeine Regel formulieren, daß Akkommodationen und somit Lernen dann zustande kommen, wenn ein gewohntes Schema ein unerwartetes Resultat hervorbringt.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Ubaxm0s76d  + (Language does not transport pieces of one person’s reality into another’s – it merely prods and prompts the other to build up conceptual structures which, to this other, seem compatible with the words and actions the speaker or writer has used)
  • Annotation:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/G2chvzdbr5  + (Lernen ist eine bewusssteoder unbewusst gesteuerte Aktivität wärhrend Anpassung in seiner grundlegenden Bedeutung keine Aktivität des Organismus ist.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/L9ijfjpwid  + (Lernen, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, entspringt immer derselben Wurzel: einem mehr oder weniger regelmäßigen Wieederauftreten in vergangener Erfahrung.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Adaptation and Viability/Gu6abzpjqn  + (Let me cite one example that is particularLet me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for “evolutionary explanation.” But such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation.he benefit of an evolutionary explanation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Homage to Jean Piaget (1896–1980)/N2w7shbk55  + (Let me give you a very simple example. It Let me give you a very simple example. It is a charming anecdote I read, but cannot remember where. A little girl is walking, and every now and then she pushes her ball to roll ahead. As the path begins to go up a hill, the ball, to her surprise, comes rolling back. And she asks: “How does the ball know where I am?.” The little girl’s question demonstrates that she is at least to some extent aware of her experience and can reflect upon it. Only a reflective mind, a mind that is looking for order in the baffling world of experience, could formulate such a question. It is the kind of question that, after innumerable further trials and untenable assumptions, would lead an imaginative thinker with the stamina of Galilei, to an explanatory principle such as ‘gravitation’.planatory principle such as ‘gravitation’.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Construction of Knowledge/S4pp73v9fl  + (Let us assume that I was here yesterday aLet us assume that I was here yesterday and, just as now, had a glass of water in front of me. I come in today and say: “Oh, this is the same glass, the identical glass that stood here yesterday.” If someone asked me, how I can tell that it is the identical glass, I should have to look for a particular that distinguishes this glass from all others. This may turn out to be impossible.thers. This may turn out to be impossible.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Constructivist View of Communication/Edohi93gyj  + (Let us assume that your attention is caughLet us assume that your attention is caught by the color red. As such the redness is not confined, has not yet a specific shape in your visual field, and is not a discrete thing. But as you focus on it, you are able to fit the color into the pattern you have learned to call “house”. If you were asked to describe what you see, you would most likely say: “there is a red house”. You choose the adjectival connection because the color and the thing were produced in a continuous application of attention. If, on the other hand, you recognize in your visual field a pattern that fits your concept of “house” and only then, scanning it more closely, you focus attention on its color, you would most likely say: “the house is red”. This syntactic structure clearly expresses that the concept of “house” was brought forth independently of the color that was subsequently attributed to it.or that was subsequently attributed to it.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/Omso6tefg9  + (Let us look at the example more closely. ILet us look at the example more closely. I am thirsty, and there is a glass of water in front of me on the table. From past experience I have learned (by induction and abstraction) that water is a means to quench my thirst. This is the ‘voluntary purpose’ I have chosen at the moment. In other words, I am anticipating that water will do again what it did in the past. But to achieve my purpose, I have to drink the water. There, again, I am relying on past experience, in the sense that I carry out the ‘specific movements’ which I expect (anticipate) to bring the glass to my lips. It is these movements that are controlled and guided by negative feedback. When I reflect upon this sequence of decisions and actions, it becomes clear that the notion of causality plays an important role in the event.lity plays an important role in the event.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Gn8rwmbam5  + (Man braucht mindestens zwei, zwischen deneMan braucht mindestens zwei, zwischen denen man einen Unterschied feststellt. Nehmen wir an, ich sehe, daß der Apfel, den meine Frau mir vor zwei Tagen auf den Schreibtisch gelegt hat, nun angefault ist. Das Diagramm dieser Änderung sieht so aus: ((53)) Um zu sagen, daß der Apfel „X“ sich verändert hat, muß ich annehmen, daß er in beiden Beobachtungen derselbe war; wäre er es nicht, so müßte ich ‘Austausch’ denken, nicht ‘Veränderung’. Ist der Apfel an eine andere Stelle des Schreibtischs gerollt, so setzte ich statt der Eigenschaften im Diagramm die zwei verschiedenen Ortsbestimmungen ein, und dann zeigt es die ‘Ortsveränderung’ an. ((54)) Wenn ein Objekt im Laufe mehrerer Erlebnisse in gewisser Hinsicht unverändert bleibt, so kann ich die Fortdauer seines Zustands durch zwei einander folgende, aber ansonsten gleiche Momentaufnahmen anzeigen und so den Begriff der Dauer nahelegen. Verbinde ich das Element der Fortdauer an einem Ort mit der Beobachtung des identischen Individuums an einem anderen, so erhalte ich den Begriff der räumlichen ‘Ausdehnung’. ((55)) Daß die in diesen Diagrammen angedeuteten mentalen Operationen zumeist nicht bewußt registriert werden, läßt sich mit Hilfe von zwei ganz banalen Aussagen zeigen. Einmal sage ich zu einem Besucher: „Der Zug geht direkt von hier nach Boston“, ein andermal,.Diese Straße geht nach Boston.“ Normalerweise wird weder mir noch ihm dabei bewußt, daß der Zug nur jeweils an einem Ort sein kann, während die Straße als an beiden Orten zugleich gedacht wird.als an beiden Orten zugleich gedacht wird.)
  • Annotation:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/Nzrw03dgo4  + (Metapher)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Dz5gvl6lhi  + (Metapher)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Vc8cvn18ir  + (More often than not, this will do the trick, because the possession of specific memories is accepted as unquestionable proof of individual continuity.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Q32xrhbg0q  + (Mount Etna towers over Sicily regardless oMount Etna towers over Sicily regardless of any Sicilians, the Monalisa smiles whether the Louvre is open to the public or not, and the river Inn flows down the Engadin even when no one dangles a toe in its icy water. All that (and more) is what we hold to be reality. The mountain, the painted smile, and – in spite of what Heraclitus said – even the flowing river, are supposed to have their place and to remain what they are.e their place and to remain what they are.)
  • Annotation:Aspects of Constructivism/Byuqywxnma  + (Nach Piaget bedeutet Interaktion nicht, dass ein Organismus mit Objekten interagiert, wie sie „wirklich“ sind, sondern dass ein kognitives Subjekt sich mit zuvor konstruierten Wahrnehmungs- und Konzeptstrukturen auseinandersetzt.)
  • Annotation:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/P7qg84omqx  + (Neue Erkentnisse, die schockieren)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/P55yeeak0x  + (No act of mental re-presentation, which inNo act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.eft some mark to guide its reconstruction.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Plr2bjld4g  + (No one uses these conceptual possibilitiesNo one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece.d – produces once more as one whole piece.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Fb6tslteaz  + (Now, if the invariant can be used on the rNow, if the invariant can be used on the representational level, without an activity, it becomes like a program or a subroutine that is invariant in that it is stored somewhere in a memory from which it can be retrieved. It is this change of status that gives rise to the concepts of permanence and of identity, a further step in the construction of permanent objects. in the construction of permanent objects.)
  • Annotation:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/Lhkld42o67  + (Obwohl reflexive Handlungsmuster "verkablet" sind und für eine gewisse Zeit fixiert bleiben, können sie durch Erfahrung des Organismus verändert oder sogar abgebaut werden.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/Iftsmuex46  + (On the strength of all this, I came to belOn the strength of all this, I came to believe that the meanings we attribute to words and phrases, and to whole speeches and texts, are meanings, or built up of meanings, that we ourselves have generated in our own experience. They are the result of “self-regulation” – and the study of self-regulation is an integral part of cybernetics.lation is an integral part of cybernetics.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Spl40hlv6t  + (One can say that such an organism will leaOne can say that such an organism will learn only as a result of disturbance, and it will give up or modify something it has learned only when this again leads to disturbance. This mode of functioning, as we shall see later, fits very well into the Piagetian conception of the complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation.ocesses of assimilation and accommodation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/K3oyc0qges  + (One can therefore say: in perception, sensory signals call up a concept, in re-presentation, on the other hand, a concept calls up sensory impressions. In neither case is the experience caused by what philosophers want to call “reality”.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Csbic9bgys  + (Prediction, in one form or another, permeates our living, and the expectation that the efficient causes we have isolated in the past will have their effects also in the future, is the key to whatever success we have in managing our experience.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Feuye9k6by  + (Prescriptive purposes, therefore, are there prior to their embodiment, which then has the particular purpose in it.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Cczrua7jsz  + (Pyrrho and his followers had successfully Pyrrho and his followers had successfully argued that if, say, an apple appears to have a certain color and a certain smell, feels smooth and tastes sweet to us, this cannot give us the knowledge that a real apple possesses these properties, because we have no way of examining the apple other than by seeing, smelling, tasting, and feeling it again., smelling, tasting, and feeling it again.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/I1w826em8p  + (Pyrrho, a little later, formulated the argPyrrho, a little later, formulated the argument that quickly became and still remains the cornerstone of all kinds of philosophical scepticism. How, he asked, could we ever tell whether or not the pictures our senses “convey” are accurate and true, if the only way they can be checked is again through our senses? The question is, indeed, unanswerable.es? The question is, indeed, unanswerable.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Wejx8rywia  + (Quite generally, that means that the world which we experience is, and must be as it is, because we have put it together that way.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ndkqy9lz7e  + (Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Wsnqs105li  + (Relations, therefore, are not “perceived” but fictitious)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/X2zg4cjqwc  + (Rhetorische Figur: Irreführungen aufzeigen)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Jcx3h525gq  + (Sameness, however, as we have seen, is alwSameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison. Hence, an experience that consists, for instance, of the elements a, b, and c, can be considered the same as an experience consisting of a, b, c, and x, as long as x is not taken into account.x, as long as x is not taken into account.)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/Rqb3mx02zu  + (Schlussfolgerung)
  • Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/C4a5k9dyme  + (Schock)
  • Annotation:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Bbv4rsyxwl  + (Schockierende Erkenntnis)
  • Annotation:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Luw055wkng  + (Schwächen und die Möglichkeit der Missinterpretation der eigenen Theorie aufzeigen)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing in Self-Regulating Organisms (A Constructivist Approach)/Uonkg7x2bd  + (Scientific knowledge, then, does not and cScientific knowledge, then, does not and could not yield a picture of the “real” world; it provides more or less reliable ways of dealing with experience. Hence it may be viable, but it can make no claim to “Truth”, if “Truth” is to be understood as a correspondence to the ontologically real world. On the other hand, this way of looking at knowledge, be it scientific or other, makes it immune against the sceptics’ perennial argument. Since this constructivist notion of knowledge does not claim to provide a picture of something beyond experience, the fact that one cannot compare it with such a something, does not detract from this kind of knowledge - it is either viable or it is not. Indeed, as a constructivist, I tend to go one step further: Since we have access only to experience and cannot get outside the experiential field, there is no way one could show that one’s experiences are the effects of causes that lie outside the experiential world.s that lie outside the experiential world.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Logic of Scientific Fallibility/M5nkqqbbg1  + (Seen in this way, the scientific method does not refer to, nor does it need, the assumption of an “objective” ontological reality—it concerns exclusively the experiential world of observers.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Erlmg3yhji  + (Selbst wenn die fürsorgliche Mutter eine TSelbst wenn die fürsorgliche Mutter eine Tasse vom Tisch hebt und zur einjährigen Tochter sagt: „Schau, Marie, das ist eine Tasse, eine Tasse.“, muß Marie zuerst den Gegenstand in ihrem Gesichtsfeld isolieren und den Wortlaut von anderen gleichzeitigen Geräuschen trennen, bevor sie zwischen beiden eine semantische Verbindung hersteilen kann.ne semantische Verbindung hersteilen kann.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/X3553l47nw  + (Similarly, the problem-solver attempts to Similarly, the problem-solver attempts to conceive a method that will successfully open a path to his or her goal. Any method that does this will serve as well as any other, and to the extent that the problem-solver is successful, his or her know-how is functionally adapted to the constraints of unknowable ontic reality. Note that considerations as to how well a method serves its purpose are secondary in that they require reflection on what has been done as well as the introduction of ulterior values, such as speed, economy, ease of execution, compatibility with the methods used for other problems, etc. the methods used for other problems, etc.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Onut2fruoj  + (So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer FreunSo kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freundin entrüstet von einer Party berichten: „Stell Dir vor, die Irmgard kam in demselben Kleid wie ich!“; und der Sohn kann der Familie auf einer Ferienfahrt erklären: „Das ist das gleiche Auto, das uns schon vor dem Mittagessen vorgefahren ist.“ - Im ersten Fall sind es zwei Kleider, die sich in Bezug auf die Eigenschaften, die da maßgebend sind, nicht unterscheiden; im zweiten Fall hingegen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Auto. Anders ausgedrückt: Im ersten Fall wird auf Grund eines Vergleichs die Zugehörigkeit zweier Gegenstände zu einer bestimmten Klasse behauptet, im zweiten wird dem Gegenstand zweier zeitlich getrennter Erlebnisse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben.isse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Construction of Knowledge/T32kgxwkn8  + (So we are trapped in a paradox. We want to believe that we can know something of the outside world, but we can never tell whether this knowledge is true.)
  • Annotation:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/W0hci79pef  + (So wie Umwelt dem lebenden Organismus Grenzen setzt und beseitigt, was die Grenze überschreitet, so bildet die Erfahrungswelt die Grenzen für unsere Ideen (kognitiven Strukturen))
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Reluctance to Change a Way of Thinking/Onvo8k214n  + (Solutions, from the constructivist perspecSolutions, from the constructivist perspective, are always relative — and this, in turn, makes clear that problems are not entities that lie about in the universe, independent of any experiencer. Instead, problems arise when obstacles block the way to a subject’s goal.stacles block the way to a subject’s goal.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/S11y3eyx2r  + (Space is the medium in which things maintain or, as the case may be, change their location; time is the medium in which they must conserve their identity lest they disappear qua “things” and be reduced to momentary apparitions.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/C5m9y02ijk  + (Sprache erlaubt uns zu Sprechen, nich nur über Dinge, die räumlich oder zeitlich entfernt sind, sindern auch über Dinge, nirgendwo sind und nie passieren.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Gv92fgoj8x  + (Suppose a very young child applies the worSuppose a very young child applies the word dog to every four-legged creature he sees. He may have abstracted a limited set of attributes and created a large category, but his abstraction will now show up in his vocabulary. Parents will not provide him with a conventional name for his category, e.g., quadruped, but instead will require him to narrow his use of dog to its proper range... The child who spontaneously hits on the category four-legged animals will be required to give it up in favor of dogs, cats, horses, cows, and the like ... The schoolboy who learns the word quadruped has abstracted from differentiated and named subor- dinates. The child he was abstracted through a failure to differentiate. Abstraction after differentiation may be the mature process, and abstraction from a failure to differentiate the primitive. a failure to differentiate the primitive.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Rejukma2yn  + (Take a finger of your right hand and run iTake a finger of your right hand and run it along your left forearm: the tactual signals originating in your finger will be a homogeneous “continuous” succession because the receptors from which they come remain the same; the tactual signals originating in your left arm, instead, will constitute a sequence of different signals because they come from different receptors. If you consider this second set of signals as a sequence of different locations with which your finger establishes and terminates contact, you will conceive of your finger as moving. If you consider them equivalent units linked into sequence by the continuous signals from your finger, you will conceive of them as points or “moments” in time. In this second case, the finger of your right hand supplies what is perhaps the closest sensory-motor analogy to the continuity of the experiencing subject that we call our ““self.”riencing subject that we call our ““self.”)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Srf747xbx0  + (Take, for example, the two statements: “ThTake, for example, the two statements: “This is the same girl I saw yesterday” and “She bought the same dress as her sister.” The girl is one and the same individual, seen twice; the dresses are two, considered equivalent in every respect that one chose to take into account when comparing them. to take into account when comparing them.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Conceptual Models in Educational Research and Practice/Ygtpo8ulgm  + (Teachers, therefore, need an at least partTeachers, therefore, need an at least partially generalized theory and a model of the learner that is general enough to serve as a basis for the establishment of more than one individual model. Ideally, then, the teachers’ models of individual students will be instantiations of the educational scientists’ more general model of mathematics learning; and conversely, the individual models the teachers construct for individual students will be a continuous testing ground for the theoretical assumptions the scientists have incorporated in the more general model.ve incorporated in the more general model.)