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Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/D3z4577hkq +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D3z4577hkq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":1846,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":2364°Ӻ,"quote":"By this I mean that, as particular users of the word become more proficient, they no longer need to actually produce the associated conceptual structures as a completely implemented re-presentation, but can simply register the occurrence of the word as a kind of “pointer” to be followed if needed at a later moment. I see this as analogous to the capability of recognizing objects on the basis of a partial perceptual construction. In the context of symbolic activities, this capability is both subtle and important.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":" By this I mean that, as particular users of the word become more proficient, they no longer need to actually produce the associated conceptual structures as a completely implemented re-presentation, but can simply register the occurrence of the word as a kind of “pointer” to be followed if needed at a later moment. I see this as analogous to the capability of recognizing objects on the basis of a partial perceptual construction. In the context of symbolic activities, this capability is both subtle and important.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869155481°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Earusgwepw +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Earusgwepw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1846°Ӻ,"quote":"Re-presentations can be activated by many things. Any element in the present stream of experience may bring forth the re-presentation of a past situation, state, activity, or other construct. This experiential fact was called associaion by Hume and used by Freud for his analyses of neuroses. The ability to associate is systematically exploited by language. To possess a word is to have associated it with a representation of which one believes that it is similar to the re-presentations the word brings forth in other users of the language.(Only naive linguists claim that these re-presentations are shared, in the sense that they are the same for all users of the given word.) In my terminology, a word is used as a symbol,Ӷ10Ӻ only when it brings forth in the user an abstracted generalized re-presentation, not merely a response to a particular situation (cf. von Glasersfeld,1974). Several things, therefore, are indispensable for a word to function as a symbol: (1) the phonemes that compose the word in speech, or the graphic marks that constitute it in writing, must be recognized as that particular item of one’s vocabulary. This ability to recognize, as I suggested earlier, is preliminary to the ability to re-present and produce the word spontaneously. (2) The word/symbol must be associated with a conceptual structure that was abstracted from experience and, at least to some extent, generalized. Here, again, the ability to recognize (i.e. to build up the conceptual structure from available perceptual material) precedes the ability to re-present the structure to oneself spontaneously. Once a word has become operative as a symbol and calls forth the associated meaning as re-presentations chunks of experience that have been isolated (abstracted) and to some extent generalized, its power can be further expanded.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869162666°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ko73n1c8n3 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ko73n1c8n3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":2417°Ӻ,"quote":"The distinction between form and content has a history as long as Western philosophy and the terms have been used in many different ways. Piaget’s use of the distinction is complicated by the fact that he links it with his use of “observables” (content) and “coordinations” (forms). “The functions of form and content are relative, since every form becomes content for another that comprises it” (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.319). This will make sense, only if one recalls that, for Piaget, percepts, observables, and any knowledge of objects, are all the result of a subject’s action and not externally caused effects registered by a passive receiver. In his theory, to perceive, to remember, to re- present, and to coordinate are all dynamic, in the sense that they are activities carried out by a subject that operates on internally available material and produces certain results. A term such as “exogenous”, therefore, must not be interpreted as referring to a physical outside relative to a physical organism, but rather as referring to something that is external relative to the process in which it becomes involved. Observation and re-presentation have two things in common: (1) they operate on items which, relative to the process at hand, are considered given. The present process takes them as elements and coordinates them as “content” into a new “form” or “structure”; and (2) the resulting new products can be taken as initial “givens” by a future process of structuring, relative to which they then become “content”. Thus, once a process is achieved, its results may be considered “observables” or “exogenous” relative to a subsequent process of coordination or a higher level of analysis. As Piaget saw, this might seem to lead to an infinite regress (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.306), but he put forth at least two arguments to counter this notion. One of them emerges from his conception of scientific analysis. Very early in his career, he saw this analysis as a cyclical program in which certain elements abstracted by one branch of science become the “givens” for coordination and abstraction in another. In an early paper (Piaget, 1929) and almost forty years later in his “classification of the sciences” (Piaget, 1967), he formulated this mutual interdependence of the scientific disciplines as a circle: Biology—Psychology—Mathematics—Physics, and looping back to Biology.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869425631°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Lt82ojh4wl +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lt82ojh4wl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":242,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":972°Ӻ,"quote":"That is, instead of specific particulars it must contain variables. Yet it is clear that, in order to “imagine” for instance an apple, we have to decide what color it is to be, because we cannot possibly visualize it red or green or yellow at one and the same time. Berkeley, therefore, was right when he observed that whenever we re-present a concept to ourselves, we find that it is a particular thing and not a general idea. What he did not realize was that the abstraction necessary to recognize things of a kind, does not automatically turn into an image that can be re-presented. The situation, however, is somewhat complicated by our ability to use symbols, but before considering this I want to deal with re- presentation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867452407°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ndkqy9lz7e +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ndkqy9lz7e","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":900,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":976°Ӻ,"quote":"Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563866684834°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Nge0d0b7ts +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nge0d0b7ts","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":199,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":900°Ӻ,"quote":"Indeed, we would take it for granted that under these circumstances any normal person could make a relevant judgment. We cannot observe how such a judgment is made. But we can hypothesize some of the steps that seem necessary to make it. The sensations that accompanied the eating of the first apple would have to be remembered, at least until the question is heard.Ӷ5Ӻ Then they would have to be re- presented and compared (in regard to whatever the person called “sweetness”) with the sensations accompanying the later bite from the second apple. This re-presenting and comparing is a way of operating that is different from the processes of sensation that supplied the material for the comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867994957°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/P55yeeak0x +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P55yeeak0x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867644656°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Qfb05d1191 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qfb05d1191","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":504,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1746°Ӻ,"quote":"The ability to recognize a thing in one’s perceptual field, however, does not necessarily bring with it the ability to re-present it spontaneously. We have all had occasion to notice this. Our experiential world contains many things which, although we recognize them when we see them, are not available to us when we want to visualize them. There are, for instance, people whom we would recognize as acquaintances when we meet them, but were we asked to describe them when they are not in our visual field, we would be unable to recall an adequate image of their appearance. The fact that recognition developmentally precedes the ability to re-present an experiential item spontaneously, has been observed in many areas. It is probably best known and documented as the difference between what linguists call “passive” and “active” vocabulary. The difference is conspicuous in second-language learners but it is noticeable also in anyone’s first language: a good many words one knows when one hears or reads them are not available when one is speaking or writing. This lag suggests that having abstracted a concept that may serve to recognize and categorize a perceptual item is not sufficient to re-present the item to oneself in its absence.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867813253°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Rqiu69ztol +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rqiu69ztol","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1214°Ӻ,"quote":"In this context, the metaphor of “program” may be useful. A program is the fixed itinerary of an activity that can guide and govern the sequence of its re-enactment. But there are two points to be stressed. First, a program may specify the material on which to act, but it does not supply the material; second, a program may specify what acts are to be performed, but it supplies neither the acting agent nor the action. The first of these limitations, I suggest, may account for the fact that to recognize an experiential item requires less effort than to re-present it spontaneously. This would be so, because in re-presentation not only a program of composition is needed, but also the specific sensory components, which must be expressly generated. In recognition, the perceiver merely has to isolate the sensory elements in the sensory manifold. As Berkeley observed, sensory elements are “not creatures of the will” (1710; p.29). Because there are always vastly more sensory elements than the perceiving agent can attend to and use,Ӷ8Ӻ recognition requires the attentional selecting, grouping, and coordinating of sensory material that fits the composition program of the item to be recognized.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In this context, the metaphor of “program” may be useful. A program is the fixed itinerary of an activity that can guide and govern the sequence of its re-enactment. But there are two points to be stressed. First, a program may specify the material on which to act, but it does not supply the material; second, a program may specify what acts are to be performed, but it supplies neither the acting agent nor the action. The first of these limitations, I suggest, may account for the fact that to recognize an experiential item requires less effort than to re-present it spontaneously. This would be so, because in re-presentation not only a program of composition is needed, but also the specific sensory components, which must be expressly generated. In recognition, the perceiver merely has to isolate the sensory elements in the sensory manifold. As Berkeley observed, sensory elements are “not creatures of the will” (1710; p.29). Because there are always vastly more sensory elements than the perceiving agent can attend to and use,Ӷ8Ӻ recognition requires the attentional selecting, grouping, and coordinating of sensory material that fits the composition program of the item to be recognized.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868469024°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Sktb6xjmvl +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sktb6xjmvl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1590,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1869°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563866721745°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Souryl0w4r +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Souryl0w4r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":2477,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":4330°Ӻ,"quote":"(Note that this abstracting and transforming is by no means an easy task for those unaccustomed to map reading.) A program, however, differs from a map in that it explicitly provides instructions about actions and implicitly indicates changes of location through the conventional sequence in which the instructions must be read. (But in the program, too, it is the user’s focus of attention, while reading or implementing the program, that supplies the progressive motion.) Also, unlike a map, a program may contain embedded “subroutines” for walking and turning (i.e. instructions how to act), but no matter how detailed these subroutines might be, they can contain only instructions to act, not the actions themselves. In other words, irrespective of how minutely a program’s instructions have decomposed an activity, they remain static until some agent implements them and adds the dynamics.\nIn carrying out a program in an experiential situation, just as in following a map through an actual landscape, the sensory material in the agent’s perceptual field can supply cues as to the action required at a given point of the procedure. In the re-presentational mode, however, attention cannot focus on actual perceptual material and pick from it cues about what to do next, because the sensory material itself has to be re-presented. A re-presentation—at least when it is a spontaneous one—is wholly self-generated (which is one reason why it is usually easier to find one’s way through a landscape than to draw a reliable map of it.) The increase of difficulty and the concomitant increase of effort involved in the production of conceptual structures when the required sensory material is not available in the present perceptual field, shows itself in all forms of re-presentation and especially in the re-enactment of abstracted programs of action.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563868600085°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Tb4vyjiobf +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tb4vyjiobf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1735,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":2476°Ӻ,"quote":"With regard to the need for an acting agent, a program is similar to a map. If someone draws a simple map to show you how to get to his house, he essentially indicates a potential path from a place you are presumed to know to the unknown location. The drawing of the path is a graphic representation of the turns that have to be made to accomplish that itinerary, but it does not and could not show what it is to move and what it is to turn right or left. Any user of the map, must supply the motion and the changes of direction with the focus of visual attention while reading the map. Only if one manages to abstract this sequence of motions from the reading activity, can one transform it into physical movement through the mapped region.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"With regard to the need for an acting agent, a program is similar to a map. If someone draws a simple map to show you how to get to his house, he essentially indicates a potential path from a place you are presumed to know to the unknown location. The drawing of the path is a graphic representation of the turns that have to be made to accomplish that itinerary, but it does not and could not show what it is to move and what it is to turn right or left. Any user of the map, must supply the motion and the changes of direction with the focus of visual attention while reading the map. Only if one manages to abstract this sequence of motions from the reading activity, can one transform it into physical movement through the mapped region.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868586322°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Tm9j7422k1 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tm9j7422k1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":198°Ӻ,"quote":"If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ174441,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867969807°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vhyqe3fw79 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vhyqe3fw79","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":485°Ӻ,"quote":"Berkeley, of course, was aware of the fact that he would apply the name “apple” not only to one unique “thing”, but to countless others that fitted his description in terms of “colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence”, but to him this arose from the association of the word and it seems that he took the ensuing generalization simply for granted. Had he analysed it the way he analysed other conceptual operations, he might have changed his view about abstraction.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867882975°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vop5onvlls +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vop5onvlls","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":241°Ӻ,"quote":"In short, in order to recognize several particular experiential items, in spite of differences they may manifest, as belonging to the same kind, we must have a concept that is flexible enough to allow for a certain variability.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867432260°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Wpt5k6ohg9 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wpt5k6ohg9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":485,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1259°Ӻ,"quote":"I hope to make this clear with the help of an example. A child growing up in a region where apples are red would neessarily and quite correctly associate the idea of redness with the name “apple”. A distant relative arriving from another part of the country, bringing a basket of yellow apples, would cause a major perturbation for the child, who might want to insist that yellow things should not be called “apples”. However, the social pressure of the family’s usage of the word will soon force the child to accept the fact that the things people call “apple” come in different colors. The child might then be told that apples can also be green, which would enable the child to recognize such a particular green thing as an apple the first time it is brought to the house.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"I hope to make this clear with the help of an example. A child growing up in a region where apples are red would neessarily and quite correctly associate the idea of redness with the name “apple”. A distant relative arriving from another part of the country, bringing a basket of yellow apples, would cause a major perturbation for the child, who might want to insist that yellow things should not be called “apples”. However, the social pressure of the family’s usage of the word will soon force the child to accept the fact that the things people call “apple” come in different colors. The child might then be told that apples can also be green, which would enable the child to recognize such a particular green thing as an apple the first time it is brought to the house.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867858887°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Wx44xz9bju +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wx44xz9bju","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1231,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":249°Ӻ,"quote":"Yet it is clear that, insofar as such understanding is possible, it can be built up only as a “retroactive thematization”, that is, after the whole pattern has been empirically abstracted from the experience of enacting it.\nIn Piaget’s theory, the situation is similar in the first type of reflective abstraction: he maintains that it, too, may or may not involve the subject’s awareness.\nThroughout history, thinkers have used thought structures without having grasped them consciously. A classic example: Aristotle used the logic of relations, yet ignored it entirely in the construction of his own logic. (Piaget & Garcia, 1983; p.37)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869547313°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/X5rk7w03k3 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"X5rk7w03k3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1215,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1735°Ӻ,"quote":"In re-presentation, on the other hand, some substitute for the sensory raw material must be generated. (As the example of the Volkswagen indicates, the re- generation of sensory material is much easier when parts of it are supplied by perception, a fact that was well known to the proponents of Gestalt psychology.) A difference analogous to that between acting on actually present perceptual material, as opposed to acting on material that must itself be generated, arises from the second limiting feature I mentioned.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563868616929°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Y3m0svglur +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Y3m0svglur","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":1982,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":2217°Ӻ,"quote":"In my terms this means, symbols can be associated with operations and, once the operations have become quite familiar, the symbols can be used to point to them without the need to produce an actual re-presentation of carrying them out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In my terms this means, symbols can be associated with operations and, once the operations have become quite familiar, the symbols can be used to point to them without the need to produce an actual re-presentation of carrying them out.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869607597°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Y3qt2ii27x +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Y3qt2ii27x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":906°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that conscious conceptualized knowledge of a given situation developmentally lags behind the knowledge of how to act in the situation, is commonplace on the sensorymotor level. In my view, as I mentioned earlier, this is analogous to the temporal lag of the ability to re-present a given item relative to the ability to recognize it. But the ability spontaneously to re-present to oneself a sensory- motor image of, say, an apple, still falls short of what Piaget in the above passage called “conceptualized understanding”. This would involve awareness of the characteristics inherent in the concept of apple or whatever one is re-presenting to oneself, and this kind of awareness constitutes a higher level of mental functioning. This further step requires a good deal more of what Locke called the mind’s “art and pains to set (something) at a distance and make it its own object.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869539663°
