Search by property

Jump to: navigation, search

This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

Search by property

A list of all pages that have property "AnnotationComment" with value "Infragestellung der allgemein gültigen Annahmen und Sichtweisen". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

Showing below up to 126 results starting with #1.

View (previous 250 | next 250) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)

    

List of results

  • Annotation:Annotationen:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/Eergdxo8a1  + (Insofar as we remember these structures, we can recall them—and then they are Re-Presentations. I write this with a hyphen, to indicate that they are pieces of experience we have had and are now reviewing. They are not pieces of an external reality.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Why Constructivism Must be Radical/I8famzt2en  + (Instead of “truth.” constructivism speaks of viability and compatibility with previously constructed models. In other words, scientific models are tools.)
  • Annotation:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Axy8ns9hny  + (Irreführungen aufzeigen)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Ddnyagkamn  + (It allows us to proceed much as a bricklay … It allows us to proceed much as a bricklayer, who can devote all his energy and attention to the creation of a wall or an arch, without ever stopping to ask where the bricks he is using came from or how they were made. And just as the characteristics of the bricks (e.g., shape and size) make it impossible for the bricklayer to build certain structures, so the ready-made conceptual building blocks impose constraints on any future construction.se constraints on any future construction.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Uqsfc6c3s2  + (It concerns experience alone, experience segmented into chunks, if you will, but not items that exist in their own right, independently of the experiencer.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Eyxb6dpfzt  + (It is analogous to asking, say, what the magnification of a telescope might be if nothing that is seen through the telescope can be seen or measured in any other way.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/Hqbpcwl9qc  + (It is easy to see that a bricklayer is to … It is easy to see that a bricklayer is to some extent constrained in his building by certain basic characteristics that are inherent in the bricks he uses. In much the same way, I believe, the representation we construct of our adult experiential world is constrained by certain basic characteristics of the building blocks we are using, which is to say, the building blocks which we created during the sensorimotor period.we created during the sensorimotor period.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:On the Concept of Interpretation/Rpj5obhbh1  + (It is important to realize that the compatibility of two items does not entail their identity.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior/Joziuyyrdi  + (It is in this sense that communication must be considered “instrumental”, “goal-directed”, and therefore “purposive”.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Yabi7ix5fk  + (It is the same trick that the statistician … It is the same trick that the statistician performs quite openly: when something has recurred a sufficient number of times, it is considered “significant”—which is to say, it is considered probable enough to be taken as a “fact.” The good statistician, of course, does not forget that it was he or she who decided the level of recurrence beyond which things were to be considered “significant.” Like the good modern physicist, he does not argue that, just because the sun has risen every morning for as long as we can remember or have records, we have the right to assume that it must continue to do so in the future. With David Hume, they know that there is no conceivable logical reason why the future should resemble the past. But, for practical reasons, we tend to assume that it will. If we did not make that assumption, we could not draw any inferences at all from past experience, and our attempts at predicting and controlling future experience could not even get started.ure experience could not even get started.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Construction of Knowledge/Wm8c66fbki  + (It is therefore unwarranted to maintain that we distinguish things because we receive “information” from what we usually call the outside world.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/O8h5mfjw3o  + (It seems, then, that there is simply no wa … It seems, then, that there is simply no way around the assumption that organisms construct their representations of their world, their environment, or whatever one chooses to call what is outside them. In other words, an activity of construction has to be assumed regardless of whether one wants to be a constructivist or not.r one wants to be a constructivist or not.)
  • Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/V4sisdqamt  + (Jede Konstruktion, ob physisch oder mental, unterliegt bestimmten Einschränkungen, die sich aus dem Material ergeben, das der Konstrukteur verwendet)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/Ixp7nizbil  + (Jede Sprechergruppe hat für sich eine "richtige" Weise, auf die Welt zu blicken, es gibt aber keine Richtigkeit außerhalb von Sprechergruppen.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Ejuf8dv6qw  + (Just a the environment places constraints … Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures).ound for our ideas (cognitive structures).)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Conceptual Models in Educational Research and Practice/Wn9qz8ed09  + (Just as the interpretation of a piece of language is always guided by the individual interpreter’s experience and expectations, so the interpretation of what one observes is always governed by some theory one has in mind and a goal one has chosen.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics/H4w2btqhvp  + (Just as, for instance, the Morse code links short and long experiences of beeps to re-presentations of letters of the alphabet, so in language, sound images are linked to concepts, that is, to re-presentations of experiential units.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/R51gk0jcsu  + (Knowledge was no longer expected to provide a “true” picture of an absolute reality – something the sceptics of all ages had shown to be impossible. Instead, it was to be seen as a means towards the organism’s equilibration.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Aspects of Constructivism/Eitjn1doih  + (Knowledge, then, could be treated, not as a more or less accurate representation of external things, situations, and events, but rather as a mapping of actions and conceptual operations that had proven viable in the knowing subject’s experience.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Y8edpp9u4p  + (Knowledge, therefore, was knowledge of the things that caused one’s experiences, the things that were given, the data, and it could all be put together as a picture of Reality.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Brsz38tooa  + (Knowledge, thus, is usually assumed to be knowledge of the environment.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/X8f74stx0o  + (Kommunikation ist als "instrumental", "zielorientiert" und damit "zielgerichtet" zu betrachten.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/R0k8c782nv  + (Kommunikation ist ein Werkzeug)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/Qnx8s2knfn  + (Kommunikationsverhalten entwickelt sich in Situationen, in denen die Zusammenarbeit nicht nur die additive Aktivität mehrerer Personen erfordert, sondern auch eine Organisation im Sinne der Aufgabenteilung)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Cdgz89aatp  + (Konklusion: Die Koordination in komplexen operativen Systemen kann nicht der natürlichen Selektion zugeschrieben werden, sondern ist Ergebnis des Lernens)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Q11yok691f  + (Konklusion: Ein Organismus lernt, was zu zufriedenstellenden Ergebnissen führt)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Pui85bouz3  + (Konklusion: In der Ontologie hat Selektion nicht Eliminierung zur Folge, sondern erfolglose Versuche)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/U74jy5vhph  + (Konklusion: Neue Verhaltensweisen entstehen, wie Mutationen, ohne biologischen Grund und werden von Generation zu Generation aufrecht erhalten, sofern sie die Lebensfähigkeit nicht beinträchtigen)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Ykactjanqj  + (Konklusion: Um eine bestimmte Sittuation oder Veränderung der Unmwelt zu überleben, muss ein Organismus die erforderlichen Eigenschaften durch Mutation bereits vorher erworben haben.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Amy5j5prop  + (Kurz, alles, was überlebt. war schon im Vorhinein an die Bedingungen und Beschränkungen angepaßt, durch die die natürliche Auslese nun das Nichtangepaßte vernichtet.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Iv70iak5ec  + (Kurz, man kann die allgemeine Regel formulieren, daß Akkommodationen und somit Lernen dann zustande kommen, wenn ein gewohntes Schema ein unerwartetes Resultat hervorbringt.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Ubaxm0s76d  + (Language does not transport pieces of one person’s reality into another’s – it merely prods and prompts the other to build up conceptual structures which, to this other, seem compatible with the words and actions the speaker or writer has used)
  • Annotation:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/G2chvzdbr5  + (Lernen ist eine bewusssteoder unbewusst gesteuerte Aktivität wärhrend Anpassung in seiner grundlegenden Bedeutung keine Aktivität des Organismus ist.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/L9ijfjpwid  + (Lernen, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, entspringt immer derselben Wurzel: einem mehr oder weniger regelmäßigen Wieederauftreten in vergangener Erfahrung.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Adaptation and Viability/Gu6abzpjqn  + (Let me cite one example that is particular … Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for “evolutionary explanation.” But such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation.he benefit of an evolutionary explanation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Homage to Jean Piaget (1896–1980)/N2w7shbk55  + (Let me give you a very simple example. It … Let me give you a very simple example. It is a charming anecdote I read, but cannot remember where. A little girl is walking, and every now and then she pushes her ball to roll ahead. As the path begins to go up a hill, the ball, to her surprise, comes rolling back. And she asks: “How does the ball know where I am?.” The little girl’s question demonstrates that she is at least to some extent aware of her experience and can reflect upon it. Only a reflective mind, a mind that is looking for order in the baffling world of experience, could formulate such a question. It is the kind of question that, after innumerable further trials and untenable assumptions, would lead an imaginative thinker with the stamina of Galilei, to an explanatory principle such as ‘gravitation’.planatory principle such as ‘gravitation’.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Construction of Knowledge/S4pp73v9fl  + (Let us assume that I was here yesterday a … Let us assume that I was here yesterday and, just as now, had a glass of water in front of me. I come in today and say: “Oh, this is the same glass, the identical glass that stood here yesterday.” If someone asked me, how I can tell that it is the identical glass, I should have to look for a particular that distinguishes this glass from all others. This may turn out to be impossible.thers. This may turn out to be impossible.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Constructivist View of Communication/Edohi93gyj  + (Let us assume that your attention is caugh … Let us assume that your attention is caught by the color red. As such the redness is not confined, has not yet a specific shape in your visual field, and is not a discrete thing. But as you focus on it, you are able to fit the color into the pattern you have learned to call “house”. If you were asked to describe what you see, you would most likely say: “there is a red house”. You choose the adjectival connection because the color and the thing were produced in a continuous application of attention. If, on the other hand, you recognize in your visual field a pattern that fits your concept of “house” and only then, scanning it more closely, you focus attention on its color, you would most likely say: “the house is red”. This syntactic structure clearly expresses that the concept of “house” was brought forth independently of the color that was subsequently attributed to it.or that was subsequently attributed to it.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/Omso6tefg9  + (Let us look at the example more closely. I … Let us look at the example more closely. I am thirsty, and there is a glass of water in front of me on the table. From past experience I have learned (by induction and abstraction) that water is a means to quench my thirst. This is the ‘voluntary purpose’ I have chosen at the moment. In other words, I am anticipating that water will do again what it did in the past. But to achieve my purpose, I have to drink the water. There, again, I am relying on past experience, in the sense that I carry out the ‘specific movements’ which I expect (anticipate) to bring the glass to my lips. It is these movements that are controlled and guided by negative feedback. When I reflect upon this sequence of decisions and actions, it becomes clear that the notion of causality plays an important role in the event.lity plays an important role in the event.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Gn8rwmbam5  + (Man braucht mindestens zwei, zwischen dene … Man braucht mindestens zwei, zwischen denen man einen Unterschied feststellt. Nehmen wir an, ich sehe, daß der Apfel, den meine Frau mir vor zwei Tagen auf den Schreibtisch gelegt hat, nun angefault ist. Das Diagramm dieser Änderung sieht so aus: ((53)) Um zu sagen, daß der Apfel „X“ sich verändert hat, muß ich annehmen, daß er in beiden Beobachtungen derselbe war; wäre er es nicht, so müßte ich ‘Austausch’ denken, nicht ‘Veränderung’. Ist der Apfel an eine andere Stelle des Schreibtischs gerollt, so setzte ich statt der Eigenschaften im Diagramm die zwei verschiedenen Ortsbestimmungen ein, und dann zeigt es die ‘Ortsveränderung’ an. ((54)) Wenn ein Objekt im Laufe mehrerer Erlebnisse in gewisser Hinsicht unverändert bleibt, so kann ich die Fortdauer seines Zustands durch zwei einander folgende, aber ansonsten gleiche Momentaufnahmen anzeigen und so den Begriff der Dauer nahelegen. Verbinde ich das Element der Fortdauer an einem Ort mit der Beobachtung des identischen Individuums an einem anderen, so erhalte ich den Begriff der räumlichen ‘Ausdehnung’. ((55)) Daß die in diesen Diagrammen angedeuteten mentalen Operationen zumeist nicht bewußt registriert werden, läßt sich mit Hilfe von zwei ganz banalen Aussagen zeigen. Einmal sage ich zu einem Besucher: „Der Zug geht direkt von hier nach Boston“, ein andermal,.Diese Straße geht nach Boston.“ Normalerweise wird weder mir noch ihm dabei bewußt, daß der Zug nur jeweils an einem Ort sein kann, während die Straße als an beiden Orten zugleich gedacht wird.als an beiden Orten zugleich gedacht wird.)
  • Annotation:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/Nzrw03dgo4  + (Metapher)
  • Annotation:Adaptation and Viability/Dz5gvl6lhi  + (Metapher)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Vc8cvn18ir  + (More often than not, this will do the trick, because the possession of specific memories is accepted as unquestionable proof of individual continuity.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Q32xrhbg0q  + (Mount Etna towers over Sicily regardless o … Mount Etna towers over Sicily regardless of any Sicilians, the Monalisa smiles whether the Louvre is open to the public or not, and the river Inn flows down the Engadin even when no one dangles a toe in its icy water. All that (and more) is what we hold to be reality. The mountain, the painted smile, and – in spite of what Heraclitus said – even the flowing river, are supposed to have their place and to remain what they are.e their place and to remain what they are.)
  • Annotation:Aspects of Constructivism/Byuqywxnma  + (Nach Piaget bedeutet Interaktion nicht, dass ein Organismus mit Objekten interagiert, wie sie „wirklich“ sind, sondern dass ein kognitives Subjekt sich mit zuvor konstruierten Wahrnehmungs- und Konzeptstrukturen auseinandersetzt.)
  • Annotation:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/P7qg84omqx  + (Neue Erkentnisse, die schockieren)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/P55yeeak0x  + (No act of mental re-presentation, which in … No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.eft some mark to guide its reconstruction.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Plr2bjld4g  + (No one uses these conceptual possibilities … No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece.d – produces once more as one whole piece.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Fb6tslteaz  + (Now, if the invariant can be used on the r … Now, if the invariant can be used on the representational level, without an activity, it becomes like a program or a subroutine that is invariant in that it is stored somewhere in a memory from which it can be retrieved. It is this change of status that gives rise to the concepts of permanence and of identity, a further step in the construction of permanent objects. in the construction of permanent objects.)
  • Annotation:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/Lhkld42o67  + (Obwohl reflexive Handlungsmuster "verkablet" sind und für eine gewisse Zeit fixiert bleiben, können sie durch Erfahrung des Organismus verändert oder sogar abgebaut werden.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Why I Consider Myself a Cybernetician/Iftsmuex46  + (On the strength of all this, I came to bel … On the strength of all this, I came to believe that the meanings we attribute to words and phrases, and to whole speeches and texts, are meanings, or built up of meanings, that we ourselves have generated in our own experience. They are the result of “self-regulation” – and the study of self-regulation is an integral part of cybernetics.lation is an integral part of cybernetics.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Spl40hlv6t  + (One can say that such an organism will lea … One can say that such an organism will learn only as a result of disturbance, and it will give up or modify something it has learned only when this again leads to disturbance. This mode of functioning, as we shall see later, fits very well into the Piagetian conception of the complementary processes of assimilation and accommodation.ocesses of assimilation and accommodation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/K3oyc0qges  + (One can therefore say: in perception, sensory signals call up a concept, in re-presentation, on the other hand, a concept calls up sensory impressions. In neither case is the experience caused by what philosophers want to call “reality”.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Csbic9bgys  + (Prediction, in one form or another, permeates our living, and the expectation that the efficient causes we have isolated in the past will have their effects also in the future, is the key to whatever success we have in managing our experience.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Feuye9k6by  + (Prescriptive purposes, therefore, are there prior to their embodiment, which then has the particular purpose in it.)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/R436ky3mmt  + (Prämisse)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Cczrua7jsz  + (Pyrrho and his followers had successfully … Pyrrho and his followers had successfully argued that if, say, an apple appears to have a certain color and a certain smell, feels smooth and tastes sweet to us, this cannot give us the knowledge that a real apple possesses these properties, because we have no way of examining the apple other than by seeing, smelling, tasting, and feeling it again., smelling, tasting, and feeling it again.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/I1w826em8p  + (Pyrrho, a little later, formulated the arg … Pyrrho, a little later, formulated the argument that quickly became and still remains the cornerstone of all kinds of philosophical scepticism. How, he asked, could we ever tell whether or not the pictures our senses “convey” are accurate and true, if the only way they can be checked is again through our senses? The question is, indeed, unanswerable.es? The question is, indeed, unanswerable.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Wejx8rywia  + (Quite generally, that means that the world which we experience is, and must be as it is, because we have put it together that way.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ndkqy9lz7e  + (Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Wsnqs105li  + (Relations, therefore, are not “perceived” but fictitious)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/X2zg4cjqwc  + (Rhetorische Figur: Irreführungen aufzeigen)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Jcx3h525gq  + (Sameness, however, as we have seen, is alw … Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison. Hence, an experience that consists, for instance, of the elements a, b, and c, can be considered the same as an experience consisting of a, b, c, and x, as long as x is not taken into account.x, as long as x is not taken into account.)
  • Annotation:The Construction of Knowledge/Rqb3mx02zu  + (Schlussfolgerung)
  • Annotation:The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge/C4a5k9dyme  + (Schock)
  • Annotation:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Bbv4rsyxwl  + (Schockierende Erkenntnis)
  • Annotation:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Luw055wkng  + (Schwächen und die Möglichkeit der Missinterpretation der eigenen Theorie aufzeigen)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing in Self-Regulating Organisms (A Constructivist Approach)/Uonkg7x2bd  + (Scientific knowledge, then, does not and c … Scientific knowledge, then, does not and could not yield a picture of the “real” world; it provides more or less reliable ways of dealing with experience. Hence it may be viable, but it can make no claim to “Truth”, if “Truth” is to be understood as a correspondence to the ontologically real world. On the other hand, this way of looking at knowledge, be it scientific or other, makes it immune against the sceptics’ perennial argument. Since this constructivist notion of knowledge does not claim to provide a picture of something beyond experience, the fact that one cannot compare it with such a something, does not detract from this kind of knowledge - it is either viable or it is not. Indeed, as a constructivist, I tend to go one step further: Since we have access only to experience and cannot get outside the experiential field, there is no way one could show that one’s experiences are the effects of causes that lie outside the experiential world.s that lie outside the experiential world.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Logic of Scientific Fallibility/M5nkqqbbg1  + (Seen in this way, the scientific method does not refer to, nor does it need, the assumption of an “objective” ontological reality—it concerns exclusively the experiential world of observers.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Erlmg3yhji  + (Selbst wenn die fürsorgliche Mutter eine T … Selbst wenn die fürsorgliche Mutter eine Tasse vom Tisch hebt und zur einjährigen Tochter sagt: „Schau, Marie, das ist eine Tasse, eine Tasse.“, muß Marie zuerst den Gegenstand in ihrem Gesichtsfeld isolieren und den Wortlaut von anderen gleichzeitigen Geräuschen trennen, bevor sie zwischen beiden eine semantische Verbindung hersteilen kann.ne semantische Verbindung hersteilen kann.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/X3553l47nw  + (Similarly, the problem-solver attempts to … Similarly, the problem-solver attempts to conceive a method that will successfully open a path to his or her goal. Any method that does this will serve as well as any other, and to the extent that the problem-solver is successful, his or her know-how is functionally adapted to the constraints of unknowable ontic reality. Note that considerations as to how well a method serves its purpose are secondary in that they require reflection on what has been done as well as the introduction of ulterior values, such as speed, economy, ease of execution, compatibility with the methods used for other problems, etc. the methods used for other problems, etc.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Die Radikal-Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie/Onut2fruoj  + (So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freun … So kann zum Beispiel eine Frau ihrer Freundin entrüstet von einer Party berichten: „Stell Dir vor, die Irmgard kam in demselben Kleid wie ich!“; und der Sohn kann der Familie auf einer Ferienfahrt erklären: „Das ist das gleiche Auto, das uns schon vor dem Mittagessen vorgefahren ist.“ - Im ersten Fall sind es zwei Kleider, die sich in Bezug auf die Eigenschaften, die da maßgebend sind, nicht unterscheiden; im zweiten Fall hingegen handelt es sich um ein und dasselbe Auto. Anders ausgedrückt: Im ersten Fall wird auf Grund eines Vergleichs die Zugehörigkeit zweier Gegenstände zu einer bestimmten Klasse behauptet, im zweiten wird dem Gegenstand zweier zeitlich getrennter Erlebnisse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben.isse individuelle Identität zugeschrieben.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Construction of Knowledge/T32kgxwkn8  + (So we are trapped in a paradox. We want to believe that we can know something of the outside world, but we can never tell whether this knowledge is true.)
  • Annotation:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/W0hci79pef  + (So wie Umwelt dem lebenden Organismus Grenzen setzt und beseitigt, was die Grenze überschreitet, so bildet die Erfahrungswelt die Grenzen für unsere Ideen (kognitiven Strukturen))
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Reluctance to Change a Way of Thinking/Onvo8k214n  + (Solutions, from the constructivist perspec … Solutions, from the constructivist perspective, are always relative — and this, in turn, makes clear that problems are not entities that lie about in the universe, independent of any experiencer. Instead, problems arise when obstacles block the way to a subject’s goal.stacles block the way to a subject’s goal.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/S11y3eyx2r  + (Space is the medium in which things maintain or, as the case may be, change their location; time is the medium in which they must conserve their identity lest they disappear qua “things” and be reduced to momentary apparitions.)
  • Annotation:The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior*/C5m9y02ijk  + (Sprache erlaubt uns zu Sprechen, nich nur über Dinge, die räumlich oder zeitlich entfernt sind, sindern auch über Dinge, nirgendwo sind und nie passieren.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Gv92fgoj8x  + (Suppose a very young child applies the wor … Suppose a very young child applies the word dog to every four-legged creature he sees. He may have abstracted a limited set of attributes and created a large category, but his abstraction will now show up in his vocabulary. Parents will not provide him with a conventional name for his category, e.g., quadruped, but instead will require him to narrow his use of dog to its proper range... The child who spontaneously hits on the category four-legged animals will be required to give it up in favor of dogs, cats, horses, cows, and the like ... The schoolboy who learns the word quadruped has abstracted from differentiated and named subor- dinates. The child he was abstracted through a failure to differentiate. Abstraction after differentiation may be the mature process, and abstraction from a failure to differentiate the primitive. a failure to differentiate the primitive.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Rejukma2yn  + (Take a finger of your right hand and run i … Take a finger of your right hand and run it along your left forearm: the tactual signals originating in your finger will be a homogeneous “continuous” succession because the receptors from which they come remain the same; the tactual signals originating in your left arm, instead, will constitute a sequence of different signals because they come from different receptors. If you consider this second set of signals as a sequence of different locations with which your finger establishes and terminates contact, you will conceive of your finger as moving. If you consider them equivalent units linked into sequence by the continuous signals from your finger, you will conceive of them as points or “moments” in time. In this second case, the finger of your right hand supplies what is perhaps the closest sensory-motor analogy to the continuity of the experiencing subject that we call our ““self.”riencing subject that we call our ““self.”)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Srf747xbx0  + (Take, for example, the two statements: “Th … Take, for example, the two statements: “This is the same girl I saw yesterday” and “She bought the same dress as her sister.” The girl is one and the same individual, seen twice; the dresses are two, considered equivalent in every respect that one chose to take into account when comparing them. to take into account when comparing them.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Conceptual Models in Educational Research and Practice/Ygtpo8ulgm  + (Teachers, therefore, need an at least part … Teachers, therefore, need an at least partially generalized theory and a model of the learner that is general enough to serve as a basis for the establishment of more than one individual model. Ideally, then, the teachers’ models of individual students will be instantiations of the educational scientists’ more general model of mathematics learning; and conversely, the individual models the teachers construct for individual students will be a continuous testing ground for the theoretical assumptions the scientists have incorporated in the more general model.ve incorporated in the more general model.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/P45fqlsyeq  + (That is to say, neither of these two basic elements in the construction of our experiential world is conceivable unless we segment experience into separate discrete frames and then focus attention on similarities or differences between the segments.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Conceptual Models in Educational Research and Practice/Frhb3rw86n  + (That is to say, no matter how hard investi … That is to say, no matter how hard investigators try to adapt their analyses to the “foreign” ways of children, the model they build up will always be a model constructed out of concepts that are necessarily the investigators’. Because children’s ways of thinking are never directly accessible, the investigators’ model can never be compared to a child’s thought in order to determine whether there is or is not a perfect match. The most one can hope for is that the model fits whatever observations one has made and, more importantly, that it remains viable in the face of new observations.ns viable in the face of new observations.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Logic of Scientific Fallibility/Ua9u5cntbi  + (That is to say, one must define certain experiences so that one can recognize them when one experiences them again. There can hardly be regularity before one has noticed repetition.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Faufc0pgou  + (That is to say, teachers must try to infer … That is to say, teachers must try to infer, from what they can observe, what the students’ concepts are and how they operate with them. Only on the basis of some such hypothesis can teachers devise ways and means to orient, direct, or modify the students’ mental operating. This is a context in which the constructivist approach and its analysis of conceptual development seemed promising.f conceptual development seemed promising.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Reluctance to Change a Way of Thinking/Fy4315bj08  + (That is to say, the proponents of a theory will assimilate new experiences as long as they possibly can, even in the face of considerable perturbations.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Jvbbgirs3v  + (That notion, in fact, is no less an ontolo … That notion, in fact, is no less an ontological assumption than the realist’s assumption that the experiencer-independent ontic reality should have a knowable structure. The character of experiential reality will have to be explained, not as a result of preordained ways of experiencing (Kant’s Anschauungsformen), but as a result of the experiencer’s coordinatory and conceptual operations.’s coordinatory and conceptual operations.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Zyymiew3sa  + (The analogy, of course, does not stretch t … The analogy, of course, does not stretch to include the sculptor. The natural environment that carries out the selective process has no more a vision of the forms that are left than the sculptor’s chisel has a vision of the statue it helps to peel out of the marble. Such a vision may be attributed to the sculptor. It would constitute a telos or goal, which will be discussed when we come to final causes.be discussed when we come to final causes.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Piaget’s Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity/W0er5ff75u  + (The argument that our concepts, which we abstract from experience, cannot grasp anything that lies beyond our experiential interface, applies not only to the divine but also to any ontological reality posited as independent of the human experiencer.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Homage to Jean Piaget (1896–1980)/G365xnoeih  + (The case of the mollusks may serve as an e … The case of the mollusks may serve as an example. It is as though a growing mollusk could notice that the water around it flows quickly, and that the shell it is building had therefore better be flat, so that it offers less resistance. From an evolutionary point of view, such a notion is even worse than the Lamarckian heresy. is even worse than the Lamarckian heresy.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Nsr28z6iul  + (The child who stands in front of a looking … The child who stands in front of a looking glass, sticks out his tongue, and contorts his face into all sorts of grimaces gets a constant confirmation of this causal link. The mirror image is as obedient as his own limbs and can, thus, be integrated with the body percept, expanding it by providing visual access to otherwise invisible aspects. And like the body image, it is a visual percept, an item that is experienced not the item that does the experiencing.d not the item that does the experiencing.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:On the Concept of Interpretation/X30bxs5up8  + (The constraints within which it attempts to achieve viability are set by the text alone and not by any external area of experience. Hence, the quest for the interpretation of a text turns out to be a futile undertaking.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Of Knowing, Telling, and Showing/Y3a08kbbyn  + (The crucial difference, for me, is this: W … The crucial difference, for me, is this: Whatever is called forth by the piece of language, the items it refers to, are items that have been abstracted from experience. They may, but need not, have any immediate link with sensory-motor experience that is going on, nor any link with present or future manifest behavior. Yet, what is said or heard is not without effect. But the effect is on the language users’ acts of representation.he language users’ acts of representation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Th8cbc3vq6  + (The example of the bronze statue again off … The example of the bronze statue again offers a useful image. The shape of the statue is quite literally ‘defined’ by the mold, in the sense that the mold constrains and delimits where the liquid metal can flow. Analogously, the ‘parts of a definition’ constrain and delimit both conceptual construction and the application of concepts.struction and the application of concepts.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Rr6ajt0u6w  + (The experiential environment in which an i … The experiential environment in which an individual’s constructs and schemes must prove viable is always a social environment as well as a physical one. Though one’s concepts, one’s ways of operating, and one’s knowledge cannot be constructed by any other subject than oneself, it is their viability, their adequate functioning in one’s physical and social environment, that furnishes the key to the solidification of the individual’s experiential reality (von Glasersfeld, 1985).eriential reality (von Glasersfeld, 1985).)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Radical Constructivist View of Science/F9mjk3bynq  + (The first is usually intended as an item i … The first is usually intended as an item isolated as part of experience; e.g. the chair you sit on, the keyboard in front of you, the hand that does the typing, the deep breath you have just taken. In short, any item of the furniture of someone’s experiential world can be called an object.xperiential world can be called an object.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Reflections on Cybernetics/Wf4pa99zd7  + (The good old thermostat, the favorite exam … The good old thermostat, the favorite example in the early literature of cybernetics, is still a useful explanatory tool. In it a temperature is set as the goal-state the user desires for the room. The thermostat knows nothing of the room or of desirable temperatures. It is designed to eliminate any discrepancy between a set reference value and the feedback it receives from its sensory organ, namely the value indicated by its thermometer. If the sensed value is too low, it switches on the heater, if it is too high, it switches on the cooling system. Employing Gordon Pask’s clever distinction (Pask, 1969, p.23–24): from the user’s point of view, the thermostat has a purpose for, i.e. to maintain a desired temperature, whereas the purpose in the device is to eliminate a difference.n the device is to eliminate a difference.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Nrxlcbrcl4  + (The indispensable limitation of this hypot … The indispensable limitation of this hypothesizing is that the organism can operate only with its own proximal data, i.e., with signals that can be supposed to originate within it rather than with “information” originating in what from the observer’s point of view is the organism’s environment. I would also like to emphasize that this analysis is provisional and lays no claim to being definitive, let alone exhaustive.to being definitive, let alone exhaustive.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Y9pfk6yah9  + (The invariant the system achieves can, therefore, never be found or frozen in a single element because, by its very nature, it consists in one or more relationships—and relationships are not in things but between them.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:The Control of Perception and the Construction of Reality: Epistemological Aspects of the Feedback-Control System/K0ahsljmye  + (The key point is that we may be able to analyze the structure of our experience without making the unwarranted assumption that to perceive must be a process of passive reception rather than a process of construction)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Why Constructivism Must be Radical/Gutpr341qe  + (The meanings of words – and this also appl … The meanings of words – and this also applies to every sign and every symbol – must be constructed by each user of the language individually, and this construction is based solely on the subjective experience of the particular parson. Hence it stands to reason that the interpretation of a word or a text will always remain an essentially subjective operation.emain an essentially subjective operation.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing without Metaphysics: Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position/Mrkitz3yc3  + (The models of another’s conceptual operating that one can build on the basis of observable behavior, thus, are and remain hypothetical;)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Gv8fsjs8m9  + (The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/E4dke75vc7  + (The passage I quoted also indicates that t … The passage I quoted also indicates that there is more than one level of adaptation. On the sensorimotor level of perception and bodily action, it is avoidance of physical perturbation and the possibility of survival that matter. On the level of thought we are concerned with concepts, their connections, with theories and explanations. All these are only indirectly linked to the practice of living. On this higher level, viability is determined by the attainment of goals and the elimination of conceptual contradictions. elimination of conceptual contradictions.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/Elrguxn0ti  + (The pattern of learning, however, is the same as in Piaget’s scheme theory, and once we impute to an organism the capability of reflecting upon its experiences, we can say that the principle of induction arises in its own thinking.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Thoughts about Space, Time, and the Concept of Identity/Orsmj1g1z5  + (The pen I hold in my hand does not become … The pen I hold in my hand does not become another while you’re watching it. You are quite sure of that – at least until you’ve seen a sharper do a sleight of hand with cards. Then you suddenly realize that things can change their identity under your very eyes. It is a question of speed – and speed, after all, is the quotient of space an time. The conservation of individual identity may be more of a problem than it seemed.y may be more of a problem than it seemed.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics/Qyxq84o1xl  + (The point I want to make is that it is the … The point I want to make is that it is the experiencer who generates the image, the configuration that becomes the “representation”, and that this configuration is always one of several others that are equally possible within the constraints of the sensory material. This, I claim, goes for all the experiential units or things to which we give names, and it is the reason why I maintain that meanings are always subjective.ntain that meanings are always subjective.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics/Pht7smbl07  + (The point I want to make is that it is the … The point I want to make is that it is the experiencer who generates the image, the configuration that becomes the “representation”, and that this configuration is always one of several others that are equally possible within the constraints of the sensory material. This, I claim, goes for all the experiential units or things to which we give names, and it is the reason why I maintain that meanings are always subjective. They are subjective in the sense that they have to be constructed by the experiencer.have to be constructed by the experiencer.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics/Uigwach9pn  + (The point I want to stress is that from ou … The point I want to stress is that from our perspective it is attention and above all its movements that generate the conceptual structures and thus the things we talk about. These items, as I said before, cannot have an existence of their own but originate through the operations of an experiencer or observer. operations of an experiencer or observer.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:How Do We Mean A Constructivist Sketch of Semantics/Zkhy51itjb  + (The problem of meaning thus comes down to the problem of how we generate units in our experience such that we can associate them with words, and how we relate these units to form larger conceptual structures.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Zrmagm8yfp  + (The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:An Introduction to Radical Constructivism/Hu8t7ivxxd  + (The question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Ffnlniggh4  + (The radical constructivist, therefore, mus … The radical constructivist, therefore, must not be thought to do away with “objectivity”—he merely defines it in a different way. Any concept, event, theory, or model will be considered “objective” if and only if it has proved to be viable not only in one’s own organization of the experiential world, but also in the particular area of conceptual organization that proves to be a viable model for the experiential worlds one imputes to others.experiential worlds one imputes to others.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Jv9v5wdu9q  + (The rep- resentation, therefore, will have … The rep- resentation, therefore, will have to be no more and no less than a hypothetical model of functions, entities, and events that could “explain” regularities in the organism’s experience. And as a cyberneticist would expect, there is no way to match the model against the “real” structure of the black box.nst the “real” structure of the black box.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowing in Self-Regulating Organisms (A Constructivist Approach)/Rgsagcgxj3  + (The salient point in all this is that, since this “reality” manifests itself only in failures of our acting and/or thinking, we have no way of describing it except in terms of actions and thoughts that turned out to be unsuccessful.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Vz9cv6boae  + (The scenario, in which the knower is suppo … The scenario, in which the knower is supposed to acquire “true” pictures or representations of the real world, is thus inherently unsatisfactory. If the knower can never be sure that the picture of the world which he or she distills from experience is unquestionably a correct representation of a world that exists as such, the knower is cast in the role of a discoverer who has no possible access to what he or she is expected to discover.to what he or she is expected to discover.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Js950dj36j  + (The second development made possible by th … The second development made possible by the introduction of the representational use of invariants is that they can now be used as building blocks for conceptual constructions that move further and further away from the raw material of sensory or motor signals. This shift constitutes one of the salient characteristics of all the “higher,” more sophisticated mental operations and it has consequences for epistemology far beyond the scope of this chapter.logy far beyond the scope of this chapter.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Knowledge as Environmental Fit/Ny31x2tjef  + (The self, thus, is an experiential entity to which the experiencer attributes a number of specific properties, abilities, and functions.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Cybernetics, Experience, and the Concept of Self/Pngbtm20at  + (The simplest learning system, thus, will h … The simplest learning system, thus, will have a repertoire of several different activities and at least one sense organ and one comparator that generates an error signal whenever the sensory signals do not match the reference value. What it has to learn (i.e., what is not determined by fixed wiring), is to make the error signal trigger the particular activity that is likely to reduce it.ular activity that is likely to reduce it.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/V69skpy6zw  + (The urge to know thus becomes the urge to fit, on the sensorimotor level as well as in the conceptual domain, and learning and adaptation are seen as complementary phenomena.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Anticipation in the Constructivist Theory of Cognition/P519c13mit  + (The use of a cause-effect link in order to bring about a change is based on the belief that, since the cause has produced its effect in the past, it will produce it in the future.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:On the Concept of Interpretation/Go8jrkwg07  + (The viability of an interpretation, after all, can be assessed only from the interpreter’s point of view.)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Vh8ic6066z  + (The way the sculptor imposes form, is by c … The way the sculptor imposes form, is by chipping away the bits of marble that do not fit into his vision. The way form is imposed on the bronze, is by pouring it into a constraining mold. Potentially, the material could end up in innumerable other forms, but the procedure of statue-making, be it chipping or casting, eliminates all but one.ipping or casting, eliminates all but one.)
  • Annotation:Learning and Adaptation in the Theory of Constructivism/E8zvftzw99  + (Theorien, die missverstanden werden)
  • Annotation:Annotationen:Teleology and the Concepts of Causation/Xjnnfo8noa  + (There are, for instance, the conscious or … There are, for instance, the conscious or unconscious accommodations we have to make – and make quite successfully – in the thousands of trivial routines that are indispensable in our way of living, such as retrieving the toothpaste that has fallen behind the wash basin, looking up the telephone number of a person we want to meet, locating a book on a shelf, finding our misplaced car keys, negotiating the stairs to the garage during a power failure, etc., etc. garage during a power failure, etc., etc.)
Retrieved from "https://dbis-digivis.uibk.ac.at/mediawiki/index.php/Special:SearchByProperty/:AnnotationComment/Infragestellung-20der-20allgemein-20gültigen-20Annahmen-20und-20Sichtweisen"