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Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Oluafsqlrw +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oluafsqlrw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1230°Ӻ,"quote":"n our century, it was Jean Piaget who vigorously defended and expanded the notion of reflection. He lost no opportunity to distance himself from empiricists who denied the mind and its operations and wanted to reduce all knowing to a passive reception of objective “sense data”. Yet, he should not have found it difficult to agree with Locke’s division of ideas because it is not too different from his own division between figurative and operative knowledge. Similarly, I feel, Locke would have had a certain respect for Piaget’s effort to set understanding at a distance and to make it the object of investigation. And both men, I have no doubt, would have agreed with Dewey about the risk of deceiving oneself by taking mental experiences as given. It is therefore with caution that I shall proceed to discuss, in the pages that follow, first my own view of reflection, abstraction, re-presentation, and the use of symbols, and then a tentative interpretation of Piaget’s position. If, at times, I may sound assertive, I would beg the reader to keep in mind that I am fully aware of the fact that I am merely offering conjectures—but they are conjectures which I have found useful in constructing a model of mental operations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argumentation2","data_creacio":1560691473120°
Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vh3q1xxocb +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vh3q1xxocb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ3Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":371°Ӻ,"quote":"The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. (John Locke, 1690)Ӷ2Ӻ\nAs adults we are constantly deceiving ourselves in regard to the nature and genesis of our mental experiences. (John Dewey, 1895)Ӷ3Ӻ\nOne of the remarkable features of the Behaviorist era in American psychology is that so many leaders and followers of that creed could claim to be Empiricists, cite John Locke as their forefather, and get away with it. Had they read the first chapter of “Book II”Ӷ4Ӻ of his major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, they would have found, among many others, the following enlightening statements. Paragraph 2 has the heading: “All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.” Paragraph 4 has the heading “The operations of our Minds”, and it is there that Locke explains what he means by “reflection”:\n\nThis source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°,^"jQuery321070378687677002822":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"WissenschaftlicheReferenz2","data_creacio":1560691457042°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bb5ru3rc91","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":1042,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1123°Ӻ,"quote":"This, of course, immediately raises the question as to why such behaviors arise.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551957902317°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cdgz89aatp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system. In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Die Koordination in komplexen operativen Systemen kann nicht der natürlichen Selektion zugeschrieben werden, sondern ist Ergebnis des Lernens","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551957551355°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cz2zt51w88","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1321,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551956630385°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dz5gvl6lhi","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1013,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":2249°Ӻ,"quote":"Although I certainly do not believe that computers are like brains, computers are a useful metaphor in the context of genetic determination. When a computer comes from the manufacturer it has wired-in as hardware a small number of very basic operations. If one looks closely, there are only three operations; to record, to read, and to compare items of a certain form. At that point that is all the computer can do, and one may consider these three operations its genetically determined operational repertoire.5 Now comes the programmer, who designs software in the form of compilers and programs, all of which are, in fact, nothing but intricate variations of combinations of the basic operations—and suddenly the computer can handle numbers, from plain arithmetic to the most abstruse forms of Calculus; it can monitor bank accounts and inventories; it can control the start and splash-down of spaceships; and it can even play all sorts of games. It is difficult to see why and how anyone should want to maintain that these accomplishments, as well as all those that a future programmer might implement, are hardware-determined or must be considered the result of the same selective processes that led to the computer’s manufacture.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Metapher","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551957052449°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"E4yvmpuf9x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":516,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550607195633°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ep7v5g4inh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":743,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1041°Ӻ,"quote":"From an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957766966°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eyokmu59on","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":501°Ӻ,"quote":"At the end of the introductory chapter to his Sociobiology, Wilson (1975, p. 6) says that the cannibalization of comparative psychology “seems to be indicated both by the extrapolation of current events and by considerations of the logical relationship behavioral biology holds with the remainder of science.” My colleagues on this panel are more competent than I to examine extrapolations from current events. I shall focus on certain logical relationships that seem to be relevant to Wilson’s claim.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Narrativ","data_creacio":1550604980359°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"F9biv20md4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.3 The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550605810188°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hflp6y2df4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":516°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°,^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1550607161406°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jhk7hon5tx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1759,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2348°Ӻ,"quote":"In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other accident.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1550605820424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lnr923y61m","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":510°Ӻ,"quote":"A rather more serious trap is the misconception of selection as an ordinary causative process. David Chiszar (in this symposium) has drawn attention to the difference among investigations searching for explanations in terms of one or another of the four Aristotelian causes. When we speak of natural selection, it is crucial to remain aware of the fact that we are referring to a conceptual situation that does not involve efficient causation in the same way as do the explanatory concepts of other sciences.2","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1550605539570°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lrdpl4i5z8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1116°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957514356°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M12vslb6fd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957657297°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mie50bmpi7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":1116,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1376°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551957506397°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oybmbzou49","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1183,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1320°Ӻ,"quote":"That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551956659643°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pui85bouz3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":684°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions. Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: In der Ontologie hat Selektion nicht Eliminierung zur Folge, sondern erfolglose Versuche","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956447053°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q11yok691f","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":685,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1387°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation. \nOn the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability. What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results. That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form: If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Ein Organismus lernt, was zu zufriedenstellenden Ergebnissen führt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551956782357°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q44osehrbh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":650,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1774°Ӻ,"quote":"Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551957699768°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qwhzl16st6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":178°Ӻ,"quote":"Most, if not all, of the heated debates about sociobiology have concerned the question of how much of the behavior of living organisms is susceptible to evolutionary explanation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1550605037967°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tma0ivz7a1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":685,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1087°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation. \nOn the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551956650772°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"U74jy5vhph","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1041°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify. Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”\nBut such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation. Who is to say how many quite generally exhibited behaviors in the repertoire of more or less sophisticated organisms have arisen in the same spontaneous, selection-independent way? The proposal of radical sociobiologists to reduce the origin of all behaviors to the “mechanistic” process of natural selection seems doomed from the start. The reason, I believe, is again the misconception of selection as a mechanistic, i.e., efficient cause. \nFrom an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°,^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Neue Verhaltensweisen entstehen, wie Mutationen, ohne biologischen Grund und werden von Generation zu Generation aufrecht erhalten, sofern sie die Lebensfähigkeit nicht beinträchtigen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551957878842°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wt3hz3yh9o","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":198°Ӻ,"quote":"The term natural selection has been around for so long that, as a rule, we take its meaning for granted and are quite ready to accept it as one of the established explanatory principles of science.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Infragestellung der allgemein gültigen Annahmen und Sichtweisen","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1550605085694°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xvma2lsnp4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1087,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1182°Ӻ,"quote":"What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551956642536°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ykactjanqj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2346°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.Ӷ4Ӻ The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms. In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other acciden","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°,^"jQuery321098009481201200522":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Konklusion: Um eine bestimmte Sittuation oder Veränderung der Unmwelt zu überleben, muss ein Organismus die erforderlichen Eigenschaften durch Mutation bereits vorher erworben haben. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1550605834607°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Z6b9k4uwl6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":741°Ӻ,"quote":"But such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation. Who is to say how many quite generally exhibited behaviors in the repertoire of more or less sophisticated organisms have arisen in the same spontaneous, selection-independent way? The proposal of radical sociobiologists to reduce the origin of all behaviors to the “mechanistic” process of natural selection seems doomed from the start. The reason, I believe, is again the misconception of selection as a mechanistic, i.e., efficient cause.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321094791363713064372":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551957743972°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Z86dv5yms9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":679°Ӻ,"quote":"“Sociobiology,” says Wilson (1975, p. 4), “is defined as the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.” In the study of behavior, as Wilson sees it, explanations must be formulated in terms of evolutionary biology—that is, “the Modern Synthesis … in which each phenomenon is weighed for its adaptive significance and then related to the basic principles of population genetics” (p. 4). Within the theory of evolution, adaptation is the outcome of natural selection, and “natural selection is the process whereby certain genes gain representation in the following generations superior to that of other genes located at the same chromosome positions” (p. 3).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321073766502845175832":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1550605234245°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"A8suhxi8m5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1055,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1586°Ӻ,"quote":"Indeed, one need not enter very far into constructivist thought to realize that it inevitably leads to the contention that man – and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, therefore, also for what he does. Today, when behaviorists are still intent on pushing all responsibility into the environment, and sociobiologists are trying to place much of it into genes, a doctrine may well seem uncomfortable if it suggests that we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which we appear to be living.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Erkenntnisse, die schockieren","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171207559°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ahkgpchgv7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":612,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":899°Ӻ,"quote":"The organisms that we find alive at any particular moment of evolutionary history, and their ways of behaving, are the result of cumulative accidental variations, and the influence of the environment was and is, under all circumstances, limited to the elimination of non-viable variants.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551173047438°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Axy8ns9hny","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":433,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":973°Ӻ,"quote":"The epistemological problem – how we acquire knowledge of reality, and how reliable and “true” that knowledge might be – occupies contemporary philosophy no less than it occupied Plato. The ways and means of the search for solutions have, of course, become more varied and complicated, but the basic question has, almost without exception, remained the same. The way that question was put at the very beginning made it impossible to answer, and the attempts that have since been made could not get anywhere near a solution to the problem.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Irreführungen aufzeigen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171299161°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"B4fsul6wwd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":426,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":630°Ӻ,"quote":"“natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551960660389°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bdffpm325q","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","startOffset":800,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":358°Ӻ,"quote":"In these cases, as in all conceivable ones, it should be clear that the criteria by means of which sameness or difference is established are criteria that are created and chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world. \nFor an understanding of radical constructivism it is even more important to appreciate the subject’s active operating that gives rise to regularities and invariances in the experiential world. Both regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a comparison that yields a judgment of sameness.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551175798227°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bgxhqrc31a","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity. This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself. Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ372475,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ372237,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Wissen kann nicht das Ergebnis eines passiven Empfanges sein, sondern ist das Produkt einer aktiven Subjektivität. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174617950°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bi6lbmgz68","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ26Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ26Ӻ","endOffset":362°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico’s battle cry “Verum ipsum factum” – the truth is the same as the made (factum and “fact” both come from the Latin facere, to make!) – has been quoted quite frequently since Vico was rediscovered in our century as a cultural historian and a philosopher of history. His revolutionary epistemological ideas, however, are rarely mentioned, let alone explicated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Ideen, die nicht beachtet werden","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551174138295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"C90m7tt348","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":796,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1122°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, Vico’s position is in that respect similar to that of Kant, who says; “Nature, therefore … is the collective conception of all objects of experience.”23 For Kant, it is the “raw material of sensory impression” which “the mind’s activity ... processes so that it becomes knowledge of objects that we call experience.” 24","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174330811°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cbpbl0so14","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others. The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ438298,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ437799,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Produkte bewusster kognitiver Aktivität haben immer einen Zweck und werden danach bewertet, wie gut sie diesen Zweck erfüllen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174804943°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D613lsnbc0","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ28Ӻ","startOffset":356,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ29Ӻ","endOffset":578°Ӻ,"quote":"Though Berkeley says “that all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, their being is to be perceived or known,”21 and thus presupposes the activity of the intellect, his accent always lies on the being, whereas Vico invariably stresses human knowledge and its construction. \nThere can be no doubt that Vico’s explicit use of facere, his constant reference to the composing, the putting together and, in short, the active construction of all knowledge and experience come very much closer to Piaget’s genetic epistemology and to modern constructivism in general, than did Berkeley. Nowhere does that become clearer than in a statement with which Vico anticipated the epistemological attitude of some of today’s philosophers of science: “Human knowledge is nothing else but the endeavor to make things correspond to one another in shapely proportion.”22","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551962739605°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Osp0t2wuti","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1004°Ӻ,"quote":"In this one respect the basic principle of radical constructivist epistemology coincides with that of the theory of evolution: Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures). That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ97880,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ89996,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Weil die Erlebniswelt genauso wie die Umwelt dem Organismen Grenzen setzt, werden im Lichte der Erfahrung Regelmäßigkeiten, Faustregeln und Theorien entweder als zuverlässig oder nicht zuverlässig eingestuft. \n","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551171573973°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Et2a69rrc7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":901,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":997°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173057855°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Filz8w2g1p","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":756°Ӻ,"quote":"On the whole, even after Kant, the situation did not change. There were some who tried to take his Critique of Pure Reason seriously, but the pressure of philosophical tradition was overwhelming. In spite of Kant’s thesis that our mind does not derive laws from nature, but imposes them on it,5 most scientists today still consider themselves “discoverers” who unveil nature’s secrets and slowly but steadily expand the range of human knowledge; and countless philosophers have dedicated themselves to the task of ascribing to that laboriously acquired knowledge the unquestionable certainty which the rest of the world expects of genuine truth. Now as ever, there reigns the conviction that knowledge is knowledge only if it reflects the world as it is.6","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551171327784°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gf3f8cp9w5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ32Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ32Ӻ","endOffset":272°Ӻ,"quote":"As elegant as his system is, it still leaves open two questions. First, what are the conditions under which a new construct will be considered compatible with what has already been constructed? Second, why should any organism undertake the task of cognitive construction?","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551174546698°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ggav31h7bl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":444,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":496°Ӻ,"quote":"From the radical constructivist point of view, all of us – scientists, philosophers, laymen, school children, animals, indeed any kind of living organism - face our environment as the burglar faces a lock that he has to unlock in order to get at the loot.\nThis is the sense in which the word “fit” applies to Darwin’s and neo-Darwinist theories of evolution. Unfortunately, Darwin himself used the expression “survival of the fittest.” In doing that, he prepared the way or the misguided notion that, on the basis of his theory, one could consider certain things fitter than fit, and that among those there could even be a fittest.7 But in a theory in which survival is the only criterion for the selection of species, there are only two possibilities:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960140804°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ha7iediqym","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":821,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":1162°Ӻ,"quote":"Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.16","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551173624168°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hwdhrz42pt","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":486,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":650°Ӻ,"quote":"The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174773450°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"I8efujzxtp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","startOffset":359,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":552°Ӻ,"quote":"Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551175817555°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ifqj66kork","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":470,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":644°Ӻ,"quote":"because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551965337146°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jeek5zyvsv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ38Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ38Ӻ","endOffset":222°Ӻ,"quote":"As Piaget has shown, the concepts of equivalence and individual identity are not given a priori (innate) but have to be built up; and every “normal” child does, in fact, build them up within the first two years of life.30","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551175564073°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jvbbeq0ddy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1861,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":2246°Ӻ,"quote":"“A priori” is tantamount to “built-in” or “innate,” and Kant’s justification of it leads, albeit in a roundabout fashion, to God and to a Platonic mythology of ideas. In that respect, Vico is more modern and more prosaic. Of the category of causality, for instance, he says: “If true means to have been made, then to prove something by means of its cause is the same as causing it.”25","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551174526878°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kau6mzf6nq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ21Ӻ","startOffset":140,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ21Ӻ","endOffset":495°Ӻ,"quote":"Already Xenophanes, one of the earliest of the pre-Socratics, said that no man has ever seen certain truth, nor will there ever be one who knows about the gods and the things of the world, “for if he succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is, nevertheless, unaware of it; opinion (seeming) is fixed by fate upon all things.”14","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173486194°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"L0fc4ds4mj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":470°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551965327427°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lq8qrfv45i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":178,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself. Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174590008°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ls36qph8h8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ31Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"Causes thus originate in the putting together of individual elements; that is, they originate from an experiencer’s active operating, such that, for instance, “the determinate (i.e., causally determined) form of the object springs from the order and the composition of elements.”26","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551174537006°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Luw055wkng","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1054°Ӻ,"quote":"Within the limits of one chapter, an unconventional way of thinking can certainly not be thoroughly justified, but it can, perhaps, be presented in its most characteristic features anchored here and there in single points. There is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. In the case of constructivism, there is the additional risk that it will be discarded at first sight because, like skepticism – with which it has a certain amount in common – it might seem too cool and critical, or simply incompatible with ordinary common sense. The proponents of an idea, as a rule, explain its non-acceptance differently than do the critics and opponents. Being myself much involved, it seems to me that the resistance met in the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, the first true constructivist, and by Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget in the more recent past, is not so much due to inconsistencies or gaps in their argumentation, as to the justifiable suspicion that constructivism intends to undermine too large a part of the traditional view of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Schwächen und die Möglichkeit der Missinterpretation der eigenen Theorie aufzeigen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551171138644°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M30crhx4in","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ34Ӻ","endOffset":178°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174580104°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mukx7wqy5i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":235,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ322836,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ316580,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Welt, die konstruiert ist, ist eine erfahrene Welt, die keinerlei Anspruch auf \"Wahrheit\" im Sinne der Übereinstimmung mit einer ontologischen Welt","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551174454424°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N8vvmji8uv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":155°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210162914505684703452":^°,"sizzle1560439090281":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ21658,31,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"","category":"Innovationsdiskurs2","data_creacio":1551172618735°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nlpplg3gzh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":630°Ӻ,"quote":"In the history of knowledge, as in the theory of evolution, people have spoken of “adaptation” and, in doing so, a colossal misunderstanding was generated. If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas, “natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°,"sizzle1552300422037":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ57681,31,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"\"Durch \"Natürliche Selektion\" werden nicht die Stärksten und Fittesten selektiert, sondern die aussortiert, die den Test der Überlebensfähigkeit nicht überstehen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551960671111°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nt0esta93s","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","startOffset":731,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":893°Ӻ,"quote":"By taking for granted that knowledge must reflect reality traditional epistemology has created for itself a dilemma that was as inevitable as it was unsolvable.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Dilemma der klassischen Sichtweise ","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551173513426°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Numzp44srj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","endOffset":1372°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece. \nA similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images. The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551175704169°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"O62gbw673y","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","startOffset":825,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":1407°Ӻ,"quote":". Donald Campbell, who has provided an excellent survey of proponents of “evolutionary epistemology” since Darwin, writes: “The controversial issue is the conceptual inclusion of the real world, defining the problem of knowledge as the fit of data and theory to that real world.”12 In his conclusion he then declares that the evolutionary epistemology, which he and Karl Popper represent, “is fully compatible with an advocacy of the goals of realism and objectivity in science.” But the theory of which he provided an extremely lucid exposition, points in the opposite direction.13","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173464998°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ohygf3hivn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":234°Ӻ,"quote":"Our main question was how it might come about that we experience a relatively stable and reliable world in spite of the fact that we are unable to ascribe stability, regularity, or any other perceived property to an objective reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551174209939°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oo2fdu92ea","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ35Ӻ","endOffset":644°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one: because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Der Erfolg eines Schlüssels hängt nicht davon ab, ob ein Schloss gefunden wird, in das er passt, sonndern nur davon, ob er den Weg zu einem bestimmten Ziel öffnet. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551966076341°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ow2des8aoy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":608,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174242322°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P2rwrijst5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1408°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551962178265°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P9zxwcufnk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.16 \nThe question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ298099,253,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°,"sizzle1551958107468":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ297797,253,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"Wir können unsere Wahrnehmung nur durch den Vergleich mit anderen Wahrnehmungen prüfen, aber nie mit dem Objekt wie es sein könnte, bevor wir es wahrnehmen","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551173653295°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pughfc3e56","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":474°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.8 The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Es gibt keinen Zusammenhang zwischen den \"objektiven\" Welt und der Überlebensfähigkeit biologischer Strukturen und Verhaltensweisen. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551961059877°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q7cxrlzqk8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ36Ӻ","endOffset":486°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174758386°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Q9czaceqbg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":700°Ӻ,"quote":"In everyday English, that conceptual opposition can be brought out quite clearly by pitting the words “match” and “fit” against one another in certain contexts. The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that matches reality in the same sense as you might look for paint to match the color that is already on the wall that you have to repair. In the epistemologist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns him, but he is, nevertheless, concerned with some kind of “homomorphism,” which is to say, an equivalence of relations, sequence, or characteristic structure – something, in other words, that he can consider the same, because only then could he say that his knowledge is of the world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551959610705°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qgaf10vi1r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":38,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":188°Ӻ,"quote":"no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173635785°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qihsu8gwui","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":369,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":477°Ӻ,"quote":"there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551173004272°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"R7f8zluj3o","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":973,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1643°Ӻ,"quote":"The philosopher of science, Hilary Putnam, has recently formulated it like this: “It is impossible to find a philosopher before Kant (and after the pre-Socratics) who was not a metaphysical realist, at least about what he took to be basic or unreducible assertions.”3 Putnam explains that statement by saying that, during those 2,000 years, philosophers certainly disagreed in their views about what really exists, but their conception of truth was always the same, in that it was tied to the notion of objective validity. A metaphysical realist, thus, is one who insists that we may call something “true” only if it corresponds to an independent, “objective” reality.4","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551171310091°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rah03neh8r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":127,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":472°Ӻ,"quote":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1552301208460°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rnndq00iqs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":443°Ӻ,"quote":"If, on the other hand, we say that something fits, we have in mind a different relation. A key fits if it opens the lock. The fit describes a capacity of the key, not of the lock. Thanks to professional burglars, we know only too well that there are many keys that are shaped quite differently from ours but nevertheless unlock our doors. The metaphor is crude, but it serves quite well to bring into relief the difference I want to explicate.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Metapher","data_creacio":1551959648794°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sa3tq5rvyh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":623°Ӻ,"quote":"This is the sense in which the word “fit” applies to Darwin’s and neo-Darwinist theories of evolution. Unfortunately, Darwin himself used the expression “survival of the fittest.” In doing that, he prepared the way or the misguided notion that, on the basis of his theory, one could consider certain things fitter than fit, and that among those there could even be a fittest.7 But in a theory in which survival is the only criterion for the selection of species, there are only two possibilities: either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Entweder eine Art passt zu ihrer Umgebung oder sie passt nicht, d.h. sie überlebt entweder, oder sie stirbt. ","order":"Ggav31h7bl","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1552301053236°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Syb25gtvgg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1517°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience. The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Der einzige Aspekt der \"realen\" Welt, der tatsächlich in den Bereich der Erfahrung eintritt, sind die Einschränkungen dieser Welt. ","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551962281000°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"T7vq8ir48k","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":499,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":625°Ӻ,"quote":"either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551171466395°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tf2mdlposf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1126,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1377°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551174354093°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uchl82iy4v","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":473,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1146°Ӻ,"quote":"That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not (unless we introduce the concept of probability – in which case we are explicitly relinquishing the condition that knowledge must be certain).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1552301220042°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uhvvo93086","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","startOffset":209,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ41Ӻ","endOffset":799°Ӻ,"quote":"Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel","data_creacio":1551175774138°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ul5vmn52ua","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ33Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ33Ӻ","endOffset":678°Ӻ,"quote":"In traditional theories of knowledge, the activity of “knowing” is taken as a matter of course, an activity that requires no justification and functions as an initial constituent. The knowing subject is conceived of as a “pure” entity in the sense that it is essentially unimpeded by biological or psychological conditions. The radical constructivist epistemology quite deliberately breaks that conventional framework and commits what professional philosophers, more or less disparagingly, dismiss as “psychologism.” The deliberations that have led me to this somewhat iconoclastic step derive from what was said in the first two sections as soon as one considers them jointly.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Ablösen klassischer Denkweisen","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Rethorische Figur","data_creacio":1551174570911°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Um550kiapu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":820°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551173613824°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uy0jz8j8jj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":1377,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1596°Ӻ,"quote":"The processing of the raw material in Kant’s system is governed automatically by space and time (without which no experience would be possible) and the other categories which, for that very reason, are called a priori.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174373144°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vnu6kddzd3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":235,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":608°Ӻ,"quote":"Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°,^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551174232251°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vywz07foug","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","startOffset":796,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ30Ӻ","endOffset":1592°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, Vico’s position is in that respect similar to that of Kant, who says; “Nature, therefore … is the collective conception of all objects of experience.”23 For Kant, it is the “raw material of sensory impression” which “the mind’s activity ... processes so that it becomes knowledge of objects that we call experience.” 24 In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these. The processing of the raw material in Kant’s system is governed automatically by space and time (without which no experience would be possible) and the other categories which, for that very reason, are called a priori.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Erfahrungen und alle Objekte der Erfahrung sind unter allen Umständen das Resultat unserer Wege und Mittel des Erlebens","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551964319124°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"W0hci79pef","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","startOffset":127,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ14Ӻ","endOffset":1146°Ӻ,"quote":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures). That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not (unless we introduce the concept of probability – in which case we are explicitly relinquishing the condition that knowledge must be certain).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°,^"jQuery321079842167204943542":^°°Ӻ,"text":"So wie Umwelt dem lebenden Organismus Grenzen setzt und beseitigt, was die Grenze überschreitet, so bildet die Erfahrungswelt die Grenzen für unsere Ideen (kognitiven Strukturen) ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1552301507420°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wkqtj3ja46","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ2Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/blockquoteӶ2Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":276°Ӻ,"quote":"As God’s truth is what God comes to know as he creates and assembles it, so human truth is what man comes to know as he builds it shaping it by his actions. Therefore science (scientia) is the knowledge (cognitio) of origins, of the ways and the manner how things are made.19","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173755689°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wqabhguxqj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":115,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ25Ӻ","endOffset":647°Ӻ,"quote":"it undermines any representation of objective structure in the real world and, thus, inevitably raises the question why and, above all, how it comes about that we search for and can also find a structure in our experiential world, when such a structure may not be given by reality. In other words, if Kant’s statement is correct and our experience can teach us nothing about the nature of things in themselves,Ӷ18Ӻ how, then, can we explain that we nevertheless experience a world that is in many respects quite stable and reliable?","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Fragestellung","data_creacio":1551173724384°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wqc64cmhap","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":366°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.8 The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960957163°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"X8ecdaba5d","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":156,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":425°Ӻ,"quote":"If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas,","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse","data_creacio":1551960638734°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xa2garp97h","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ40Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ42Ӻ","endOffset":552°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece. \nA similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images. The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion. \nNo less constructed are the judgments of sameness and difference in the realm of perceptual objects. As I indicated above, “sameness” is always the result of an examination with regard to specific properties. Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience. In these cases, as in all conceivable ones, it should be clear that the criteria by means of which sameness or difference is established are criteria that are created and chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world. \nFor an understanding of radical constructivism it is even more important to appreciate the subject’s active operating that gives rise to regularities and invariances in the experiential world. Both regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a comparison that yields a judgment of sameness. Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Gleichheit ist immer relativ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551968695671°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Xrm4s8l4d2","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":613,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":997°Ӻ,"quote":"The organisms that we find alive at any particular moment of evolutionary history, and their ways of behaving, are the result of cumulative accidental variations, and the influence of the environment was and is, under all circumstances, limited to the elimination of non-viable variants. Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°,^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Die Umwelt kann bestenfalls für das Aussterben verantwortlich gemacht werden, aber nie für das Überleben","order":"Ahkgpchgv7","category":"Argument","data_creacio":1551961334443°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Yrlpe36f87","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","startOffset":524,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ22Ӻ","endOffset":729°Ӻ,"quote":"As Maturana has made particularly clear; “The a priori assumption that objective knowledge constitutes a description of that which is known … begs the questions, ‘What is to know? and How do we know?’.”15","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321054842665956511262":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Wissenschaftliche Referenz","data_creacio":1551173498519°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zgid70c2rs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":1409,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":1517°Ӻ,"quote":"The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321028761460178685332":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung","data_creacio":1551962168405°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/B7j8rehn9c +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"B7j8rehn9c","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":907,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1230°Ӻ,"quote":"A familiar motor pattern is once more a good example: we may be well able to re-present to ourselves a tennis stroke or a golf swing, but few, if any, would claim to have a “conceptualized understanding” of the sequence of elementary motor acts that are involved in such an abstraction of a delicately coordinated activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563869531271°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bfg3odrse4 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bfg3odrse4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":282,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":503°Ӻ,"quote":"In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes a Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ117981,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119700,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119608,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ119430,29,trueӺ°°°Ӻ,"text":"In this requirement, representation is similar to recognition. Both often work hand in hand, e.g., when one recognizes\na Volkswagen though one can see only part of its back but is nevertheless able to visualize the whole.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867746990°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bgvvdmhivy +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bgvvdmhivy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1260,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1590°Ӻ,"quote":"Berkeley, I would say, was quite right when he maintained that every time we imagine an apple, it has to have a specific color, but he was wrong to claim that we could, therefore, not have a general idea in our heads that allows us to recognize as apples items that differ in some respects, but nevertheless belong to that class.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867889995°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Bsgnvh5vo1 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bsgnvh5vo1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":2365,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":3064°Ӻ,"quote":"An example may help to clarify what I am trying to say. If, in someone’s account of a European journey, you read or hear the name “Paris”, you may register it as a pointer to a variety of experiential “referents” with which you hapen to have associated it—e.g., a particular point on the map of Europe, your first glimpse of the Eiffel Tower, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre— but if the account of the journey immediately moves to London, you would be unlikely to implement fully any one of them as an actual re-presentation. At any subsequent moment, however, if the context or the conversation required it, you could return to the mention of “Paris” and develop one of the associated re-presentations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"An example may help to clarify what I am trying to say. If, in someone’s account of a European journey, you read or hear the name “Paris”, you may register it as a pointer to a variety of experiential “referents” with which you hapen to have associated it—e.g., a particular point on the map of Europe, your first glimpse of the Eiffel Tower, the Mona Lisa in the Louvre— but if the account of the journey immediately moves to London, you would be unlikely to implement fully any one of them as an actual re-presentation. At any subsequent moment, however, if the context or the conversation required it, you could return to the mention of “Paris” and develop one of the associated re-presentations.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868820483°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Butixz00kz +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Butixz00kz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":396°Ӻ,"quote":"The cumulative result of the minute investigations contained in these two volumes enabled Piaget to come up with an extremely sophisticated description of the mutual interaction between the construction of successful schemes and the construction of abstracted understandings, an interaction that eventually leads to accommodations and to finding solutions to problems in the re-presentational mode, i.e., without having to have run into them on the level of sensory-motor experience. In this context, one further thing must be added. In the earlier sections, I discussed the fact that re-presentation follows upon recognition and that the “pointing” function of symbols follows as the result of familiarity with the symbols’ power to bring forth re- presentations that are based on empirical abstractions. As the examples I gave of abstracted motor patterns should make clear, symbols can be used, simply to point to such patterns, in which case the re-presentation of action can be curtailed, provided the subject has consciously conceptualized the action and knows how to re-present it. I now want to emphasize that this pointing function of symbols makes possible a way of mental operating that requires conscious conceptualization and, as a result, gives more power to the symbols. Once reflective thought can be applied to the kind of abstraction Piaget ascribed to Aristotle (cf. passage quoted above), there will be awareness not only of what is being operated on but also of the operations that are being carried out. Piaget suggested this in an earlier context:\nA form is indissociable from its content in perception but can be manipulated independently of its content in the realm of operations, in which even forms devoid of content can be constructed and manipulated. ...logico-mathematical operations allow the construction of arrangements which are independent of content ... pure forms ... simply based on symbols. (Piaget, 1969; p. 288; my emphasis.)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869643205°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Camouqfaz8 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Camouqfaz8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":4330,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":5100°Ӻ,"quote":"Any re-presentation, be it of an experiential “thing” or of a program of actions or operations, requires some sensory material for its execution. That basic condition, I believe, is what confirmed Berkeley in his argument against the “existence” of abstracted general ideas, for it is indeed the case that every time we re-present to ourselves such a general idea, it turns into a particular one because its implementation requires the kind of material from which it was abstracted. This last condition could be reformulated by saying that there has to be some isomorphism between the present construct and what it is intended to reconstruct. Clearly, this isomorphism does not concern a “thing-in-itself” but precisely those aspects one wants to or happens to focus on.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Any re-presentation, be it of an experiential “thing” or of a program of actions or operations, requires some sensory material for its execution. That basic condition, I believe, is what confirmed Berkeley in his argument against the “existence” of abstracted general ideas, for it is indeed the case that every time we re-present to ourselves such a general idea, it turns into a particular one because its implementation requires the kind of material from which it was abstracted. This last condition could be reformulated by saying that there has to be some isomorphism between the present construct and what it is intended to reconstruct. Clearly, this isomorphism does not concern a “thing-in-itself” but precisely those aspects one wants to or happens to focus on.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867546874°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/D3z4577hkq +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D3z4577hkq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":1846,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":2364°Ӻ,"quote":"By this I mean that, as particular users of the word become more proficient, they no longer need to actually produce the associated conceptual structures as a completely implemented re-presentation, but can simply register the occurrence of the word as a kind of “pointer” to be followed if needed at a later moment. I see this as analogous to the capability of recognizing objects on the basis of a partial perceptual construction. In the context of symbolic activities, this capability is both subtle and important.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":" By this I mean that, as particular users of the word become more proficient, they no longer need to actually produce the associated conceptual structures as a completely implemented re-presentation, but can simply register the occurrence of the word as a kind of “pointer” to be followed if needed at a later moment. I see this as analogous to the capability of recognizing objects on the basis of a partial perceptual construction. In the context of symbolic activities, this capability is both subtle and important.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869155481°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Earusgwepw +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Earusgwepw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1846°Ӻ,"quote":"Re-presentations can be activated by many things. Any element in the present stream of experience may bring forth the re-presentation of a past situation, state, activity, or other construct. This experiential fact was called associaion by Hume and used by Freud for his analyses of neuroses. The ability to associate is systematically exploited by language. To possess a word is to have associated it with a representation of which one believes that it is similar to the re-presentations the word brings forth in other users of the language.(Only naive linguists claim that these re-presentations are shared, in the sense that they are the same for all users of the given word.) In my terminology, a word is used as a symbol,Ӷ10Ӻ only when it brings forth in the user an abstracted generalized re-presentation, not merely a response to a particular situation (cf. von Glasersfeld,1974). Several things, therefore, are indispensable for a word to function as a symbol: (1) the phonemes that compose the word in speech, or the graphic marks that constitute it in writing, must be recognized as that particular item of one’s vocabulary. This ability to recognize, as I suggested earlier, is preliminary to the ability to re-present and produce the word spontaneously. (2) The word/symbol must be associated with a conceptual structure that was abstracted from experience and, at least to some extent, generalized. Here, again, the ability to recognize (i.e. to build up the conceptual structure from available perceptual material) precedes the ability to re-present the structure to oneself spontaneously. Once a word has become operative as a symbol and calls forth the associated meaning as re-presentations chunks of experience that have been isolated (abstracted) and to some extent generalized, its power can be further expanded.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869162666°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ko73n1c8n3 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ko73n1c8n3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":2417°Ӻ,"quote":"The distinction between form and content has a history as long as Western philosophy and the terms have been used in many different ways. Piaget’s use of the distinction is complicated by the fact that he links it with his use of “observables” (content) and “coordinations” (forms). “The functions of form and content are relative, since every form becomes content for another that comprises it” (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.319). This will make sense, only if one recalls that, for Piaget, percepts, observables, and any knowledge of objects, are all the result of a subject’s action and not externally caused effects registered by a passive receiver. In his theory, to perceive, to remember, to re- present, and to coordinate are all dynamic, in the sense that they are activities carried out by a subject that operates on internally available material and produces certain results. A term such as “exogenous”, therefore, must not be interpreted as referring to a physical outside relative to a physical organism, but rather as referring to something that is external relative to the process in which it becomes involved. Observation and re-presentation have two things in common: (1) they operate on items which, relative to the process at hand, are considered given. The present process takes them as elements and coordinates them as “content” into a new “form” or “structure”; and (2) the resulting new products can be taken as initial “givens” by a future process of structuring, relative to which they then become “content”. Thus, once a process is achieved, its results may be considered “observables” or “exogenous” relative to a subsequent process of coordination or a higher level of analysis. As Piaget saw, this might seem to lead to an infinite regress (Piaget et al., 1977, Vol.II; p.306), but he put forth at least two arguments to counter this notion. One of them emerges from his conception of scientific analysis. Very early in his career, he saw this analysis as a cyclical program in which certain elements abstracted by one branch of science become the “givens” for coordination and abstraction in another. In an early paper (Piaget, 1929) and almost forty years later in his “classification of the sciences” (Piaget, 1967), he formulated this mutual interdependence of the scientific disciplines as a circle: Biology—Psychology—Mathematics—Physics, and looping back to Biology.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869425631°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Lt82ojh4wl +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lt82ojh4wl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":242,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":972°Ӻ,"quote":"That is, instead of specific particulars it must contain variables. Yet it is clear that, in order to “imagine” for instance an apple, we have to decide what color it is to be, because we cannot possibly visualize it red or green or yellow at one and the same time. Berkeley, therefore, was right when he observed that whenever we re-present a concept to ourselves, we find that it is a particular thing and not a general idea. What he did not realize was that the abstraction necessary to recognize things of a kind, does not automatically turn into an image that can be re-presented. The situation, however, is somewhat complicated by our ability to use symbols, but before considering this I want to deal with re- presentation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867452407°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Ndkqy9lz7e +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ndkqy9lz7e","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":900,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":976°Ӻ,"quote":"Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563866684834°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Nge0d0b7ts +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nge0d0b7ts","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":199,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":900°Ӻ,"quote":"Indeed, we would take it for granted that under these circumstances any normal person could make a relevant judgment. We cannot observe how such a judgment is made. But we can hypothesize some of the steps that seem necessary to make it. The sensations that accompanied the eating of the first apple would have to be remembered, at least until the question is heard.Ӷ5Ӻ Then they would have to be re- presented and compared (in regard to whatever the person called “sweetness”) with the sensations accompanying the later bite from the second apple. This re-presenting and comparing is a way of operating that is different from the processes of sensation that supplied the material for the comparison.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867994957°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/P55yeeak0x +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P55yeeak0x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"No act of mental re-presentation, which in this context of conceptual analysis means neither less nor more than the re-generation of a prior experience, would be possible if the original generation of the experience had not left some mark to guide its reconstruction.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867644656°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Qfb05d1191 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qfb05d1191","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":504,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1746°Ӻ,"quote":"The ability to recognize a thing in one’s perceptual field, however, does not necessarily bring with it the ability to re-present it spontaneously. We have all had occasion to notice this. Our experiential world contains many things which, although we recognize them when we see them, are not available to us when we want to visualize them. There are, for instance, people whom we would recognize as acquaintances when we meet them, but were we asked to describe them when they are not in our visual field, we would be unable to recall an adequate image of their appearance. The fact that recognition developmentally precedes the ability to re-present an experiential item spontaneously, has been observed in many areas. It is probably best known and documented as the difference between what linguists call “passive” and “active” vocabulary. The difference is conspicuous in second-language learners but it is noticeable also in anyone’s first language: a good many words one knows when one hears or reads them are not available when one is speaking or writing. This lag suggests that having abstracted a concept that may serve to recognize and categorize a perceptual item is not sufficient to re-present the item to oneself in its absence.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867813253°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Rqiu69ztol +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rqiu69ztol","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1214°Ӻ,"quote":"In this context, the metaphor of “program” may be useful. A program is the fixed itinerary of an activity that can guide and govern the sequence of its re-enactment. But there are two points to be stressed. First, a program may specify the material on which to act, but it does not supply the material; second, a program may specify what acts are to be performed, but it supplies neither the acting agent nor the action. The first of these limitations, I suggest, may account for the fact that to recognize an experiential item requires less effort than to re-present it spontaneously. This would be so, because in re-presentation not only a program of composition is needed, but also the specific sensory components, which must be expressly generated. In recognition, the perceiver merely has to isolate the sensory elements in the sensory manifold. As Berkeley observed, sensory elements are “not creatures of the will” (1710; p.29). Because there are always vastly more sensory elements than the perceiving agent can attend to and use,Ӷ8Ӻ recognition requires the attentional selecting, grouping, and coordinating of sensory material that fits the composition program of the item to be recognized.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In this context, the metaphor of “program” may be useful. A program is the fixed itinerary of an activity that can guide and govern the sequence of its re-enactment. But there are two points to be stressed. First, a program may specify the material on which to act, but it does not supply the material; second, a program may specify what acts are to be performed, but it supplies neither the acting agent nor the action. The first of these limitations, I suggest, may account for the fact that to recognize an experiential item requires less effort than to re-present it spontaneously. This would be so, because in re-presentation not only a program of composition is needed, but also the specific sensory components, which must be expressly generated. In recognition, the perceiver merely has to isolate the sensory elements in the sensory manifold. As Berkeley observed, sensory elements are “not creatures of the will” (1710; p.29). Because there are always vastly more sensory elements than the perceiving agent can attend to and use,Ӷ8Ӻ recognition requires the attentional selecting, grouping, and coordinating of sensory material that fits the composition program of the item to be recognized.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868469024°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Sktb6xjmvl +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sktb6xjmvl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1590,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1869°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563866721745°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Souryl0w4r +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Souryl0w4r","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":2477,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":4330°Ӻ,"quote":"(Note that this abstracting and transforming is by no means an easy task for those unaccustomed to map reading.) A program, however, differs from a map in that it explicitly provides instructions about actions and implicitly indicates changes of location through the conventional sequence in which the instructions must be read. (But in the program, too, it is the user’s focus of attention, while reading or implementing the program, that supplies the progressive motion.) Also, unlike a map, a program may contain embedded “subroutines” for walking and turning (i.e. instructions how to act), but no matter how detailed these subroutines might be, they can contain only instructions to act, not the actions themselves. In other words, irrespective of how minutely a program’s instructions have decomposed an activity, they remain static until some agent implements them and adds the dynamics.\nIn carrying out a program in an experiential situation, just as in following a map through an actual landscape, the sensory material in the agent’s perceptual field can supply cues as to the action required at a given point of the procedure. In the re-presentational mode, however, attention cannot focus on actual perceptual material and pick from it cues about what to do next, because the sensory material itself has to be re-presented. A re-presentation—at least when it is a spontaneous one—is wholly self-generated (which is one reason why it is usually easier to find one’s way through a landscape than to draw a reliable map of it.) The increase of difficulty and the concomitant increase of effort involved in the production of conceptual structures when the required sensory material is not available in the present perceptual field, shows itself in all forms of re-presentation and especially in the re-enactment of abstracted programs of action.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563868600085°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Tb4vyjiobf +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tb4vyjiobf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1735,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":2476°Ӻ,"quote":"With regard to the need for an acting agent, a program is similar to a map. If someone draws a simple map to show you how to get to his house, he essentially indicates a potential path from a place you are presumed to know to the unknown location. The drawing of the path is a graphic representation of the turns that have to be made to accomplish that itinerary, but it does not and could not show what it is to move and what it is to turn right or left. Any user of the map, must supply the motion and the changes of direction with the focus of visual attention while reading the map. Only if one manages to abstract this sequence of motions from the reading activity, can one transform it into physical movement through the mapped region.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"With regard to the need for an acting agent, a program is similar to a map. If someone draws a simple map to show you how to get to his house, he essentially indicates a potential path from a place you are presumed to know to the unknown location. The drawing of the path is a graphic representation of the turns that have to be made to accomplish that itinerary, but it does not and could not show what it is to move and what it is to turn right or left. Any user of the map, must supply the motion and the changes of direction with the focus of visual attention while reading the map. Only if one manages to abstract this sequence of motions from the reading activity, can one transform it into physical movement through the mapped region.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563868586322°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Tm9j7422k1 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tm9j7422k1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":198°Ӻ,"quote":"If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°,"sizzle1563866641689":^"undefined":^"parentNode":Ӷ174441,29,trueӺ°°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867969807°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vhyqe3fw79 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vhyqe3fw79","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":485°Ӻ,"quote":"Berkeley, of course, was aware of the fact that he would apply the name “apple” not only to one unique “thing”, but to countless others that fitted his description in terms of “colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence”, but to him this arose from the association of the word and it seems that he took the ensuing generalization simply for granted. Had he analysed it the way he analysed other conceptual operations, he might have changed his view about abstraction.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563867882975°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Vop5onvlls +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vop5onvlls","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":241°Ӻ,"quote":"In short, in order to recognize several particular experiential items, in spite of differences they may manifest, as belonging to the same kind, we must have a concept that is flexible enough to allow for a certain variability.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence I suggest that, pace Berkeley, we are quite able to abstract general ideas from experience and that we do this by substituting a kind of place-holder or variable for some of the properties in the sensory complex we have abstracted from our experiences of particular things.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563867432260°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Wpt5k6ohg9 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wpt5k6ohg9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":485,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1259°Ӻ,"quote":"I hope to make this clear with the help of an example. A child growing up in a region where apples are red would neessarily and quite correctly associate the idea of redness with the name “apple”. A distant relative arriving from another part of the country, bringing a basket of yellow apples, would cause a major perturbation for the child, who might want to insist that yellow things should not be called “apples”. However, the social pressure of the family’s usage of the word will soon force the child to accept the fact that the things people call “apple” come in different colors. The child might then be told that apples can also be green, which would enable the child to recognize such a particular green thing as an apple the first time it is brought to the house.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°,^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"I hope to make this clear with the help of an example. A child growing up in a region where apples are red would neessarily and quite correctly associate the idea of redness with the name “apple”. A distant relative arriving from another part of the country, bringing a basket of yellow apples, would cause a major perturbation for the child, who might want to insist that yellow things should not be called “apples”. However, the social pressure of the family’s usage of the word will soon force the child to accept the fact that the things people call “apple” come in different colors. The child might then be told that apples can also be green, which would enable the child to recognize such a particular green thing as an apple the first time it is brought to the house.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563867858887°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Wx44xz9bju +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wx44xz9bju","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1231,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":249°Ӻ,"quote":"Yet it is clear that, insofar as such understanding is possible, it can be built up only as a “retroactive thematization”, that is, after the whole pattern has been empirically abstracted from the experience of enacting it.\nIn Piaget’s theory, the situation is similar in the first type of reflective abstraction: he maintains that it, too, may or may not involve the subject’s awareness.\nThroughout history, thinkers have used thought structures without having grasped them consciously. A classic example: Aristotle used the logic of relations, yet ignored it entirely in the construction of his own logic. (Piaget & Garcia, 1983; p.37)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°,^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869547313°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/X5rk7w03k3 +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"X5rk7w03k3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1215,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1735°Ӻ,"quote":"In re-presentation, on the other hand, some substitute for the sensory raw material must be generated. (As the example of the Volkswagen indicates, the re- generation of sensory material is much easier when parts of it are supplied by perception, a fact that was well known to the proponents of Gestalt psychology.) A difference analogous to that between acting on actually present perceptual material, as opposed to acting on material that must itself be generated, arises from the second limiting feature I mentioned.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321099300528189935382":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563868616929°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Y3m0svglur +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Y3m0svglur","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":1982,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":2217°Ӻ,"quote":"In my terms this means, symbols can be associated with operations and, once the operations have become quite familiar, the symbols can be used to point to them without the need to produce an actual re-presentation of carrying them out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In my terms this means, symbols can be associated with operations and, once the operations have become quite familiar, the symbols can be used to point to them without the need to produce an actual re-presentation of carrying them out.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869607597°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Y3qt2ii27x +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Y3qt2ii27x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":906°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that conscious conceptualized knowledge of a given situation developmentally lags behind the knowledge of how to act in the situation, is commonplace on the sensorymotor level. In my view, as I mentioned earlier, this is analogous to the temporal lag of the ability to re-present a given item relative to the ability to recognize it. But the ability spontaneously to re-present to oneself a sensory- motor image of, say, an apple, still falls short of what Piaget in the above passage called “conceptualized understanding”. This would involve awareness of the characteristics inherent in the concept of apple or whatever one is re-presenting to oneself, and this kind of awareness constitutes a higher level of mental functioning. This further step requires a good deal more of what Locke called the mind’s “art and pains to set (something) at a distance and make it its own object.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563869539663°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Zibsapwn7j +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zibsapwn7j","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1870,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":2008°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, one can be quite aware of what one is cognitively operating on, without being aware of the operations one is carrying out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In other words, one can be quite aware of what one is cognitively operating on, without being aware of the operations one is carrying out.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869477892°
Annotationen:Abstraction, Re-Presentation, and Reflection: An Interpretation of Experience and of Piaget’s Approach/Zvvv0kffkv +
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zvvv0kffkv","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":2418,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":2744°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, from his perspective, there is no linear progression without end, but simply development of method and concepts in one discipline leading to novel conceptualization and coordination in another. The recent impact of the physics of molecules and particles on the conceptual framework of biology would seem a good example.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321049788301677932092":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, from his perspective, there is no linear progression without end, but simply development of method and concepts in one discipline leading to novel conceptualization and coordination in another. The recent impact of the physics of molecules and particles on the conceptual framework of biology would seem a good example.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563869379966°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ax7ozflvhm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":1773,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":2362°Ӻ,"quote":"In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other accident.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078922152425233932":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In order to survive a particular situation or change in the environment, an organism must have the required characteristics before the situation or change in the environment occurs that makes these characteristics necessary. In other words, surviving organisms are adapted before the event and it would make no sense whatever to say that they did or could change because of the event. There simply is no causal connection between the selecting event or environmental pressure and the properties the surviving organisms have acquired at a prior time through mutation or some other accident.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563872685604°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dkvqwd8cv5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":2533,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":2831°Ӻ,"quote":"From an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"From an evolutionary point of view, it would be far more consistent to say that, like mutations, novel behaviors may arise for no biological reason at all and may be perpetuated from generation to generation, provided they do not diminish the organisms’ biological viability below a critical point.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563873283671°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gu6abzpjqn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":664,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":327°Ӻ,"quote":"Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for \n“evolutionary explanation.”\nBut such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°,^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Let me cite one example that is particularly well-documented and well-known: the Japanese macaque Imo on Koshima Islet that started washing her sweet potatoes (Kawai, 1965). Within 10 years the entire population, with the exception of a few old males who were too conservative, practiced potato washing. There was no time for a mutation or some other genetic accident to increase or decrease anyone’s viability. Nor, indeed, is there any evidence that potato washing has increased anyone’s genetic fitness. But as the new activity quickly created exceptional familiarity with water, it led to yet another novel behavior: swimming. Since all this has taken place in a country where earthquakes and tectonic disasters are not at all impossible, it might be tempting to conjecture that if Koshima Islet should one day sink into the sea, the swimming skill might yet become the crucial feature that allows these macaques to reach a safe shore while the macaques in other sinking regions perish. Subsequent generations of sociobiologists could then use the swimming macaques as a textbook example for “evolutionary explanation.” But such a scenario in which swimming might become an important asset toward the survival of macaques or macaque genes has not yet happened. Yet the washing of food and swimming have become part of the behavioral repertoire of a macaque population without the benefit of an evolutionary explanation.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563873380201°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jvfpzhm9vy","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1130°Ӻ,"quote":"There is a wealth of recent work in psychology that illustrates the very same phenomenon: the novel and wholly heterodox exploitation of basic, genetically determined behavioral elements in activities and skills for which no prior natural selection is conceivable. The remarkable success chimpanzees have scored in the various linguistic communication experiments is a case in point. There is no doubt that, in order to do what they are doing now, Washoe, Sarah, Lana, Lucy, and all the other linguistic chimps had to have some phylogenetically established potentialities. There had to be certain capabilities of memory, pattern recognition, cross-modal association and, above all, certain basic inductive processes. The experiments would, presumably, have had much less success with earthworms or lobsters. On the other hand, there is nothing whatsoever to warrant the assumption that any of the combinations of these phylogenetically evolved elements were genetically predisposed in the various ways in which they are now manifest in the chimpanzees’ use of American Sign Language, Yerkish, or the Premack system.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563873233493°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kgfby5twlm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":664°Ӻ,"quote":"Finally, when we come to the genesis of culture, we have to take into account a phenomenon that is radically different from anything that occurs in biological evolution: the rapid propagation, within a population of organisms, of novel behaviors that, at the time of their spread, have nothing whatever to do with the organisms’ survival or their genetic fitness in terms of the perpetuation of their genes. We have, today, enough observational material to say that there are indeed behaviors that spread in a population without the help of genetic processes or natural selection. They spread for reasons that many of us may be reluctant to specify.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563873410798°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Khbllgt3t8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1026,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1335°Ӻ,"quote":"On the other hand, the result of ontogenetic adaptation is again viability. What an organism learns is retained for the very reason that it leads to satisfactory results. That is what Thorndike’s law of effect tells us, and it is also what the principle of inductive inference expresses in its simplest form:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563873177054°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Obrmbqyrkf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":1335,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1399°Ӻ,"quote":"If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°,^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"If something has been found to work, it is likely to work again.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563873167427°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pqhlw7iuii","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":699,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1024°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence one may also introduce the concept of reinforcement which, in phylogeny, would remain vacuous, since the only thing that could count as reinforcement on that level (i.e., survival) is not contingent upon the organism’s modification of its behavior but upon its past and therefore immutable history of genetic variation.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563873088687°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Szworve5xb","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":698°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is quite different in ontogeny, where we can, indeed, speak meaningfully of an individual organism’s adaptation to environmental circumstances. The changes an organism shows in its behavior can to a large extent be conceived of as learning, and learning can always be considered as selection from a variety of possibilities. There is the variation or generation of a stock of different behaviors, and there is the operational triad of trial, error, and the inductive retention of successful solutions. Unlike what happens on the evolutionary scale, selection in ontogeny does not, as a rule, eliminate organisms but only an organism’s unsuccessful attempts or responses.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°,^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563873065159°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Umq8ebiubf","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1130,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1390°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In other words, the basic operational elements were there, but their coordination into complex operational systems cannot be ascribed to natural selection, since it is demonstrably the result of learning in a very peculiar and highly sophisticated environment.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563873203782°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Waj7oz7sov","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1773°Ӻ,"quote":"An “efficient” cause is an item to which we attribute the power to create a change, and the resulting change is then considered its effect. The agent in natural selection is the environment, or Nature, if you will—conspecifics and everything except the organism itself—and the change it creates is on the negative side alone: It eliminates. Insofar as it selects, Nature neither fosters nor encourages, it merely kills off. What does it kill? It kills those organisms that do not manage to overcome the difficulties, the obstacles, the pitfalls that it presents to them. Hence it is thoroughly misleading to speak of selection for—selection is always against. In other words, Nature places constraints in the path of survival and reproduction. That, however, still does not fully explain selection. If all organisms were exactly the same, there could be no selection and no differential reproduction. Facing an obstacle, they would either all perish or all survive. But there is variability, and organisms are never all the same. This is due partly to mutations and partly to the imperfection of their procedures for reproduction and replication.Ӷ4Ӻ The variations that constitute the stock within which selection can operate are wholly accidental. There must be no suggestion of evolutionary design or of environmental pressure toward survival mechanisms, for the moment we allow any such idea of directed change, the theory of evolution collapses into a teleological myth. On the other hand, if all variation is accidental, and if selection operates on what is there, by setting up constraints that eliminate some variants while others pass, it should be clear that the word “adaptation” cannot refer to any activity on the part of the surviving organisms.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321078922152425233932":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563872736586°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wz1cnlo3b4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":328,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":771°Ӻ,"quote":"Who is to say how many quite generally exhibited behaviors in the repertoire of more or less sophisticated organisms have arisen in the same spontaneous, selection-independent way? The proposal of radical sociobiologists to reduce the origin of all behaviors to the “mechanistic” process of natural selection seems doomed from the start. The reason, I believe, is again the misconception of selection as a mechanistic, i.e., efficient cause.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321050562481707757452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563873421438°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D4a5o8h3yn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":641,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":810°Ӻ,"quote":"Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Epistemology thus becomes the study of how the mind operates, of the ways and means it employs to construct a relatively regular world out of the flow of its experience.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876445982°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D8ioavey6m","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":792,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1382°Ӻ,"quote":"Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°,^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Two eggs may be considered the same because of their shape, size, or color, or because they come from the same hen; but there will be a pungent difference between them if one was laid yesterday and the other six weeks ago. A fieldmouse and an elephant are different in many ways, but they will be considered the same whenever we want to distinguish mammals from other animals. Finally, all eggs, all animals, and indeed all objects that I have ever seen or imagined, are the same in that one respect that I have isolated them as bounded, unitary objects in the total field of my experience.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563876662266°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dplt7s04u8","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":464°Ӻ,"quote":"A similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"A similar, often cited example, is the movie film which, depending on the conditions of perception, we see as a sequence of individually different images or as one continuously moving image. Irrespective of any “real” horse that may or may not have trotted somewhere at some time and been filmed while doing so, when the film is presented to us, we ourselves must construct the motion by constituting a continuous change of one horse from the succession of images.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563876736430°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ejuf8dv6qw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":359°Ӻ,"quote":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Just a the environment places constraints on the living organism (biological structures) and eliminates all variants that in some way transgress the limits within which they are possible or “viable,” so the experiential world, be it that of everyday life or of the laboratory, constitutes the testing ground for our ideas (cognitive structures).","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563875790098°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gv8fsjs8m9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1423,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1531°Ӻ,"quote":"The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The only aspect of that “real” world that actually enters into the realm of experience, are its constraints;","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876189943°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hr46f5ns5g","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":484°Ӻ,"quote":"If, however, as Alcmaeon already suggested, the human activity of knowing cannot lead to a certain and true picture of the world but only to conjectural interpretation, then that activity can be viewed as the creating of keys with whose help man unlocks paths towards the goals he chooses. That means that the second question we asked at the end of the preceding section, namely, why a cognitive activity should take place, is inextricably connected with the first one:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°,^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876525726°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hu8t7ivxxd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":1178,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1365°Ӻ,"quote":"The question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The question is unanswerable, because no matter what we do, we can check our perceptions only by means of other perceptions, but never with the apple as it might be before we perceive it.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876261562°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J5co3p0yi1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":444,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1915°Ӻ,"quote":"From the radical constructivist point of view, all of us – scientists, philosophers, laymen, school children, animals, indeed any kind of living organism - face our environment as the burglar faces a lock that he has to unlock in order to get at the loot.\n\nThis is the sense in which the word “fit” applies to Darwin’s and neo-Darwinist theories of evolution. Unfortunately, Darwin himself used the expression “survival of the fittest.” In doing that, he prepared the way or the misguided notion that, on the basis of his theory, one could consider certain things fitter than fit, and that among those there could even be a fittest.Ӷ7Ӻ But in a theory in which survival is the only criterion for the selection of species, there are only two possibilities:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°,^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563875735827°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jcx3h525gq","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":2824,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":3209°Ӻ,"quote":"Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison. Hence, an experience that consists, for instance, of the elements a, b, and c, can be considered the same as an experience consisting of a, b, c, and x, as long as x is not taken into account.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Sameness, however, as we have seen, is always relative: Objects, and experiences in general, are the “same” with respect to the properties or components that have been checked in a comparison. Hence, an experience that consists, for instance, of the elements a, b, and c, can be considered the same as an experience consisting of a, b, c, and x, as long as x is not taken into account.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876600510°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jscl4gi3cs","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":484,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":658°Ӻ,"quote":"because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"because the success of a key does not depend on finding a lock into which it might fit, but solely on whether or not it opens the way to the particular goal we want to reach.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876502307°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Lxhbugq5yp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1139°Ӻ,"quote":"Our main question was how it might come about that we experience a relatively stable and reliable world in spite of the fact that we are unable to ascribe stability, regularity, or any other perceived property to an objective reality. Vico does not answer that question; rather, he makes it superfluous and meaningless. If, as he says, the world that we experience and get to know is necessarily constructed by ourselves, it should not surprise us that it seems relatively stable. To appreciate this, it is necessary to keep in mind that the most fundamental trait of constructivist epistemology, i.e., that the world that is constructed is an experiential world that consists of experiences and makes no claim whatsoever about “truth” in the sense of correspondence with an ontological reality. Hence, Vico’s position is in that respect similar to that of Kant, who says; “Nature, therefore … is the collective conception of all objects of experience.”Ӷ23Ӻ For Kant, it is the “raw material of sensory impression” which “the mind’s activity ... processes so that it becomes knowledge of objects that we call experience.”Ӷ24Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876332082°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mulzzgf0vh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":1383,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":2824°Ӻ,"quote":"In these cases, as in all conceivable ones, it should be clear that the criteria by means of which sameness or difference is established are criteria that are created and chosen by the judging, experiencing subject and cannot be ascribed to an experiencer-independent world. \n\nFor an understanding of radical constructivism it is even more important to appreciate the subject’s active operating that gives rise to regularities and invariances in the experiential world. Both regularity and constancy presuppose repeated experience, and repetition can be established only on the basis of a comparison that yields a judgment of sameness.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°,^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°,^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°,^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876754662°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N9ris827xd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":500°Ӻ,"quote":"Constructivism necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a goal-directed consciousness. Goal-directedness, in this context has, of course, nothing to do with goals in an “external” reality. The goals that are involved here arise for no other reason than this: a cognitive organism evaluates its experiences, and because it evaluates them, it tends to repeat certain ones and to avoid others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876560677°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nnvl495h6o","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":1139,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1389°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":" In other words, experience as well as all objects of experience are under all circumstances the result of our ways and means of experiencing, and are necessarily structured and determined by space and time and the other categories derived from these","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876317998°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oj53uotm4g","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":284,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":488°Ӻ,"quote":"“natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"“natural selection” does not in any positive sense select the fittest, the sturdiest, the best, or the truest, but it functions negatively, in that it simply lets go under whatever does not pass the test.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563875922769°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pet52dftig","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":360,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1033°Ӻ,"quote":"That applies to the very first regularities the infant establishes in its barely differentiated experience, it applies to the rules with whose help adults try to manage their common sense world, and it applies to the hypotheses, the theories, and the so-called “natural laws” that scientists formulate in their endeavor to glean lasting stability and order from the widest possible range of experiences. In the light of further experience, regularities, rules of thumb, and theories either prove themselves reliable or they do not (unless we introduce the concept of probability – in which case we are explicitly relinquishing the condition that knowledge must be certain).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563875800123°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pkei38jxuj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":284°Ӻ,"quote":"If we take seriously the evolutionary way of thinking, it could never be organisms or ideas that adapt to reality, but it is always reality which, by limiting what is possible, inexorably annihilates what is not fit to live. In phylogenesis, as in the history of ideas,","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563875931523°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Plr2bjld4g","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":0°Ӻ,"quote":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"No one uses these conceptual possibilities more skillfully than the professional magician. During a performance he may, for instance, request a spectator’s ring, toss another ring across the room to his assistant, and then let the stunned spectator find his ring in his own coat pocket. The magic consists in directing the spectators’ perception in such a way that they unwittingly construct an individual identity between the first experience of the ring and the experience of the thrown object. Once that has been done, it would, indeed, require magic to transfer the ring from the assistant to the spectator’s pocket. Another case is that of the red ribbon which the magician cuts into little pieces and then – literally with a flick of his hand – produces once more as one whole piece.\n\n","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563876692039°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Rzvf82meai","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":915,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1011°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, the environment can, at best, be held responsible for extinction, but never for survival.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876132390°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Siqwoam8h1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":1915,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":2041°Ӻ,"quote":"either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"either a species fits its environment (including the other species), or it does not; i.e., it either survives, or it dies out.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563875647388°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Snada3v81n","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":465,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":791°Ӻ,"quote":"The fact that we do that unconsciously can not alter the fact that we have to do it in order to perceive the motion. \nNo less constructed are the judgments of sameness and difference in the realm of perceptual objects. As I indicated above, “sameness” is always the result of an examination with regard to specific properties.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876743668°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Tcbgm4w3tr","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":89,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":443°Ӻ,"quote":"A key fits if it opens the lock. The fit describes a capacity of the key, not of the lock. Thanks to professional burglars, we know only too well that there are many keys that are shaped quite differently from ours but nevertheless unlock our doors. The metaphor is crude, but it serves quite well to bring into relief the difference I want to explicate.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"A key fits if it opens the lock. The fit describes a capacity of the key, not of the lock. Thanks to professional burglars, we know only too well that there are many keys that are shaped quite differently from ours but nevertheless unlock our doors. The metaphor is crude, but it serves quite well to bring into relief the difference I want to explicate.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563875707167°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ub3689yii4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":89°Ӻ,"quote":"In everyday English, that conceptual opposition can be brought out quite clearly by pitting the words “match” and “fit” against one another in certain contexts. The metaphysical realist looks for knowledge that matches reality in the same sense as you might look for paint to match the color that is already on the wall that you have to repair. In the epistemologist’s case it is, of course, not color that concerns him, but he is, nevertheless, concerned with some kind of “homomorphism,” which is to say, an equivalence of relations, sequence, or characteristic structure – something, in other words, that he can consider the same, because only then could he say that his knowledge is of the world.\nIf, on the other hand, we say that something fits, we have in mind a different relation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°,^"jQuery321060068213243419022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563875726429°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wa0fcv6npz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":641°Ӻ,"quote":"First, there is the realization that knowledge, i.e., what is “known,” cannot be the result of a passive receiving but originates as the product of an active subject’s activity. This activity is, of course, not a manipulating of “things in themselves,” i.e., of objects that could be thought to possess, prior to being experienced, the properties and the structure which the experiencer attributes to them. We therefore call the activity that builds up knowledge “operating,” and it is the operating of that cognitive entity which, as Piaget has so succinctly formulated, organizes its experiential world by organizing itself.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876459314°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wejx8rywia","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1360,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1490°Ӻ,"quote":"Quite generally, that means that the world which we experience is, and must be as it is, because we have put it together that way.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Quite generally, that means that the world which we experience is, and must be as it is, because we have put it together that way.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876391398°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wjaxx1wuhk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1360°Ӻ,"quote":"The processing of the raw material in Kant’s system is governed automatically by space and time (without which no experience would be possible) and the other categories which, for that very reason, are called a priori. The a priori, therefore, might be considered the technical description of the organism’s experiential capability. The a priori describes the framework within which such an organism operates, but it does not tell us what the organism does, let alone why it does it. “A priori” is tantamount to “built-in” or “innate,” and Kant’s justification of it leads, albeit in a roundabout fashion, to God and to a Platonic mythology of ideas. In that respect, Vico is more modern and more prosaic. Of the category of causality, for instance, he says: “If true means to have been made, then to prove something by means of its cause is the same as causing it.”Ӷ25Ӻ This notion (which has been rediscovered, no doubt without any knowledge of Vico, by the modern constructivist mathematicians) has, as Vico realized, a remarkably wide range of application. \nCauses thus originate in the putting together of individual elements; that is, they originate from an experiencer’s active operating, such that, for instance, “the determinate (i.e., causally determined) form of the object springs from the order and the composition of elements.”Ӷ26Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876415214°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ws2ok1u2g3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1423°Ӻ,"quote":"These considerations fit the basic problem of the theory of knowledge equally well. Quite generally, our knowledge is useful, relevant, viable, or however we want to call the positive end of the scale of evaluation, if it stands up to experience and enables us to make predictions and to bring about or avoid, as the case may be, certain phenomena (i.e., appearances, events, experiences). If knowledge does not serve that purpose, it becomes questionable, unreliable, useless, and is eventually devaluated as superstition. That is to say, from the pragmatic point of view, we consider ideas, theories, and “laws of nature” as structures which are constantly exposed to our experiential world (from which we derived them), and they either hold up or they do not. Any cognitive structure that serves its purpose in our time, therefore, proves no more and no less than just that – namely, given the circumstances we have experienced (and determined by experiencing them), it has done what was expected of it. Logically, that gives us no clue as to how the “objective” world might be; it merely means that we know one viable way to a goal that we have chosen under specific circumstances in our experiential world. It tells us nothing – and cannot tell us anything – about how many other ways there might be, or how that experience which we consider the goal might be connected to a world beyond our experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876223743°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Yuqkts2gic","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1178°Ӻ,"quote":"If knowledge is to be a description or image of the world as such, we need a criterion that might enable us to judge when our descriptions or images are “right” or “true.” Thus, with the scenario in which man is born into a ready-made independent world as a “discoverer” with the task of exploring and “knowing” that reality in the truest possible fashion, with this scenario the path of skepticism is there from the outset. The notion of “appearance” and “semblance” which, according to Xenophanes attaches to all human knowledge, was elaborated and applied above all to perception by Pyrrho’s school and, later, by Sextus Empiricus; and the unanswerable question whether, or to what extent, any picture our senses “convey” might correspond to the “objective” reality is still today the crux of all theory of knowledge. Sextus used, among other things, an apple as an example. To our senses it appears smooth, scented, sweet, and yellow – but it is far from self-evident that the real apple possesses these properties, just as it is not at all obvious that it does not possess other properties as well, properties that are simply not perceived by our senses.Ӷ16Ӻ","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876276136°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zrmagm8yfp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":500,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":664°Ӻ,"quote":"The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery32100363425842685938252":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The products of conscious cognitive activity, therefore, always have a purpose and are, at least originally, assessed according to how well they serve that purpose.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876547629°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ztzeq1fx2d","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":915°Ӻ,"quote":"More important still is the epistemological aspect of the analogy. In spite of the often misleading assertions of ethologists, the structure of behavior of living organisms can never serve as a basis for conclusions concerning an “objective” world, i.e., a world as it might be prior to experience.Ӷ8Ӻ The reason for this, according to the theory of evolution, is that there is no causal link between that world and the survival capacity of biological structures or behaviors. As Gregory Bateson has stressed, Darwin’s theory is based on the principle of constraints, not on the principle of cause and effect.Ӷ9Ӻ The organisms that we find alive at any particular moment of evolutionary history, and their ways of behaving, are the result of cumulative accidental variations, and the influence of the environment was and is, under all circumstances, limited to the elimination of non-viable variants.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321034722876891263812":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563876151039°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Boinfn2if1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":541,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1469°Ӻ,"quote":"To understand Piaget’s theoretical scaffolding it is indeed indispensable to remember that he began as a biologist. He knew full well that the biological, phylogenetic adaptation of organisms to their environment was not an activity carried out by individuals or by a species. It was the result of natural selection, and natural selection does nothing but eliminate those specimens that do not possess the physical properties and the behavioral capabilities that are necessary to survive under the conditions of the present environment. All organisms that are equipped with senses and the ability to remember sensory experiences can, of course, to some extent individually increase their chances of survival by practical learning. Traditionally this was considered a separate domain, and it was explained by association. Piaget, however, who focused on human development, connected it to the biological principle of the reflex.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321067858316304227512":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575649626664°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D87aoepwlz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":569°Ӻ,"quote":"The term ‘adaptation’ is the salient point. In many of his writings (he published over 80 books and several hundred articles) he reiterates that what we call knowledge cannot be a representation of an observer-independent reality. And every now and then, as in the passage I quoted, he says that the human activity of knowing is the highest form of adaptation. But he rarely put the two statements together – and this may have made it easier for both his followers and his critics to ignore the revolutionary conceptual change his theory was demanding.v","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096356891943976622":^°°,^"jQuery321096356891943976622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575649024351°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"E4dke75vc7","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":540°Ӻ,"quote":"The passage I quoted also indicates that there is more than one level of adaptation. On the sensorimotor level of perception and bodily action, it is avoidance of physical perturbation and the possibility of survival that matter. On the level of thought we are concerned with concepts, their connections, with theories and explanations. All these are only indirectly linked to the practice of living. On this higher level, viability is determined by the attainment of goals and the elimination of conceptual contradictions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321067858316304227512":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The passage I quoted also indicates that there is more than one level of adaptation. On the sensorimotor level of perception and bodily action, it is avoidance of physical perturbation and the possibility of survival that matter. On the level of thought we are concerned with concepts, their connections, with theories and explanations. All these are only indirectly linked to the practice of living. On this higher level, viability is determined by the attainment of goals and the elimination of conceptual contradictions.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575649616831°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Elrguxn0ti","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":527,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":758°Ӻ,"quote":"The pattern of learning, however, is the same as in Piaget’s scheme theory, and once we impute to an organism the capability of reflecting upon its experiences, we can say that the principle of induction arises in its own thinking.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321026107587663555942":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The pattern of learning, however, is the same as in Piaget’s scheme theory, and once we impute to an organism the capability of reflecting upon its experiences, we can say that the principle of induction arises in its own thinking.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575651166287°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Exghx797kw","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":790°Ӻ,"quote":"In their seminal 1943 paper, Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow wrote: \nThe purpose of voluntary acts is not a matter of arbitrary interpretation but a physiological fact. When we perform a voluntary action, what we select voluntarily is a specific purpose, not a specific movement. (Rosenblueth et al., 1943, p.19) \nIn their discussion of purposeful behavior, they used the example of bringing a glass of water to one’s mouth in order to drink. The term negative feedback, they explained, signifies that “the behavior of an object is controlled by the margin of error at which the object stands at a given time with reference to a relatively specific goal” (ibid.). Such goal-directed behavior, however, has another indispensable component. In order to “control” the margin of error indicated by the feedback – in the given example this would be to reduce the distance that separates the glass from one’s mouth – the acting subject must decide to act in a way that will reduce the error. And nothing but inductive inferences from past experience can enable the subject to chose a suitable way of acting.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°,^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°,^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°,^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575652090247°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"H846yq7lyj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":1953,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":2036°Ӻ,"quote":"Without the conception of change there would be no use for the notion of causation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321045699912028685132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Without the conception of change there would be no use for the notion of causation.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575884155564°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J8tzjlulb4","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":1926,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":2063°Ӻ,"quote":"All my decisions to carry out specific actions are based on the expectation that they will bring about a change towards the desired goal.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"All my decisions to carry out specific actions are based on the expectation that they will bring about a change towards the desired goal.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575652167982°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kez1488djx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":527°Ӻ,"quote":"Humberto Maturana has characterized this by saying: \nA living system, due to its circular organization, is an inductive system and functions always in a predictive manner: what happened once will occur again. Its organization (genetic and otherwise) is conservative and repeats only that which works. (Maturana, 1970; p.15–16) \n\nThis was not intended to imply that primitive living organisms actually formulate expectations or make predictions. It was a sophisticated observer’s way of describing their behavior.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321026107587663555942":^°°,^"jQuery321026107587663555942":^°°,^"jQuery321026107587663555942":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575651153626°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kvc1m6pnqd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":1292°Ӻ,"quote":"I have suggested elsewhere that Aristotle, who provided the most valuable analysis of the concepts of causation, was well aware of the ambiguity. In his exposition, it becomes clear that what he called ‘final’ cause, i.e., the embodiment of a telos or goal, had two quite distinct applications (Glasersfeld, 1990). On the one hand, he saw the religious metaphysical belief that there was a telos, an ultimate, perfect state of the universe that draws the progress of the world we know towards itself. On the other, there was a second notion of the final cause, which he exemplified by saying that people go for walks for the sake of their health (Physics, Book II, ch.3, 194b195a). This was a practical explanatory principle for which there is, indeed, an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence. \n\nIn this practical manifestation of finality, no actual future state is involved, but a mental re-presentation of a state that has been experienced as the result of a particular action.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210471316184649266942":^°°,^"jQuery3210471316184649266942":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1579283025528°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Omso6tefg9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1925°Ӻ,"quote":"Let us look at the example more closely. I am thirsty, and there is a glass of water in front of me on the table. From past experience I have learned (by induction and abstraction) that water is a means to quench my thirst. This is the ‘voluntary purpose’ I have chosen at the moment. In other words, I am anticipating that water will do again what it did in the past. But to achieve my purpose, I have to drink the water. There, again, I am relying on past experience, in the sense that I carry out the ‘specific movements’ which I expect (anticipate) to bring the glass to my lips. It is these movements that are controlled and guided by negative feedback. \n\n\nWhen I reflect upon this sequence of decisions and actions, it becomes clear that the notion of causality plays an important role in the event.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°,^"jQuery321059785488485491732":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Let us look at the example more closely. I am thirsty, and there is a glass of water in front of me on the table. From past experience I have learned (by induction and abstraction) that water is a means to quench my thirst. This is the ‘voluntary purpose’ I have chosen at the moment. In other words, I am anticipating that water will do again what it did in the past. But to achieve my purpose, I have to drink the water. There, again, I am relying on past experience, in the sense that I carry out the ‘specific movements’ which I expect (anticipate) to bring the glass to my lips. It is these movements that are controlled and guided by negative feedback.\nWhen I reflect upon this sequence of decisions and actions, it becomes clear that the notion of causality plays an important role in the event.","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1575652121799°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"P519c13mit","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1382,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1561°Ӻ,"quote":"The use of a cause-effect link in order to bring about a change is based on the belief that, since the cause has produced its effect in the past, it will produce it in the future.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321016047641881360622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The use of a cause-effect link in order to bring about a change is based on the belief that, since the cause has produced its effect in the past, it will produce it in the future.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575889382978°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"S6xchbgg1w","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":1293,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":2027°Ӻ,"quote":"Even in Aristotle’s day, bright people had noticed that those who regularly took some physical exercise such as walking, had a better chance of staying healthy. They had observed this often enough to consider it a reliable rule. Given that they had Olympic games and were interested in the performances of athletes, they probably also had some plausible theory of why exercise made one feel better. Consequently, they were confident in believing that going for walks was an efficient cause that had the effect of maintaining and even improving your health. People who felt that their physical fitness was deteriorating could, therefore, reasonably decide to use walking as a tool to bring about a beneficial change in their condition.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210471316184649266942":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Even in Aristotle’s day, bright people had noticed that those who regularly took some physical exercise such as walking, had a better chance of staying healthy. They had observed this often enough to consider it a reliable rule. Given that they had Olympic games and were interested in the performances of athletes, they probably also had some plausible theory of why exercise made one feel better. Consequently, they were confident in believing that going for walks was an efficient cause that had the effect of maintaining and even improving your health. People who felt that their physical fitness was deteriorating could, therefore, reasonably decide to use walking as a tool to bring about a beneficial change in their condition.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1579283051117°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sdo9pndh63","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1560,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":2874°Ӻ,"quote":"Anyway, the more sophisticated view of the reflex enabled Piaget to take the tripartite pattern of perceived situation, action, and result as the basis for what he called ‘Action Scheme’. It provided a powerful model for a form of practical learning on the sensorimotor level that was the same, in principle, for animals and humans. \n\n\nStudies of animal behavior had shown that even the most primitive organisms tend to move towards situations that in the past provided agreeable experiences rather than towards those that proved unpleasant or painful.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210077353398160104782":^°°,^"jQuery3210077353398160104782":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Anyway, the more sophisticated view of the reflex enabled Piaget to take the tripartite pattern of perceived situation, action, and result as the basis for what he called ‘Action Scheme’. It provided a powerful model for a form of practical learning on the sensorimotor level that was the same, in principle, for animals and humans.\nStudies of animal behavior had shown that even the most primitive organisms tend to move towards situations that in the past provided agreeable experiences rather than towards those that proved unpleasant or painful.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575650828086°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Sv6u23dqzm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1450°Ӻ,"quote":"Many years ago, Silvio Ceccato, the first persistent practitioner of Bridgman’s operational analysis, devised a graphic method of mapping complex concepts by means of a sequence of frames (I have borrowed the term ‘frame’ from cinematography; Glasersfeld, 1974). Because no single observation can lead to the conclusion that something has changed, we need a sequence of at least two frames showing something that acquires a difference. Consequently, the mapping has the following form: \n \nwhere “X” represents an item that is considered to be the same individual in both frames (indicated by the identity symbol “=“). In short, we maintain an item’s individual identity throughout two or more observational frames, and, at the same time, we claim that in the later frame it has gained a property “A” that it did not have in the earlier one (or we claim that it lost a property it had before). \nThe condition of identity may seem too obvious to mention, but analytically it is important to make it explicit, because of the ambiguity of the expression “the same”. In English we say, “This is the same man who asked directions at the airport”, and we mean that it is the same individual; but we might also say to a new acquaintance, “Oh, we are driving the same car – I, too, have an old Beetle!” and now we are speaking of two cars. In the first case, we could add, “Look, the man has changed – he’s had a haircut!” In the second case, we cannot speak of change although our car is blue, and the other’s yellow. \nIn French, the ambiguity of “le même” is analogous, and in German and Italian, although two words would be available to mark the conceptual difference, their use is quite indiscriminate. In fact, the situation in all these languages is worse, because common usage has modified the meaning of “identical” so that it can refer to the similarity or equivalence of two objects as well as to the individual identity of one.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321045699912028685132":^°°,^"jQuery321045699912028685132":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575884166627°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"T3wyw2ffcp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ/pӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1560°Ӻ,"quote":"In most textbooks of behavioral biology, reflexes are described as automatic reactions to a stimulus. Piaget took into account two features that are usually not mentioned. The first was that the existence of heritable reflexes could be explained only by the fact that a fixed reaction, acquired through an accidental mutation, produced a result that gave the individuals who had it, an edge in the struggle for survival. \nIt is important to see that the specific property or capability that constitutes the evolutionary advantage has to be incorporated in the genome before the conditions arise relative to which it is considered adapted. \nRemaining aware of the role of its result, Piaget thought of a reflex, as consisting of three elements: \n\nThe addition of ‘expectation’ sprang from the second observation Piaget had made, namely that most if not all the reflexes manifested by the human infant disappear or are modified during the course of maturation. The ‘rooting reflex’, for instance, that causes the baby to turn its head and to begin to suck when something touches its cheek, goes into remission soon after nourishment through a nipple is replaced by the use of cups and spoons. \nPiaget also found that new ‘fixed action patterns’ can be developed. Such acquired reflexive behaviors are an integral part of our adult living. Among them are the way we move our feet when we go up or down stairs, the innumerable actions and reactions that have to become automatic if we want to be good at a sport, and, of course, the rituals of greeting an acquaintance and of small talk at a cocktail party. There are also reflexes that may lead to disaster – for example the way we stamp our foot on the brake pedal when an unexpected obstacle appears before us on the road. \nAn acquired reflex that impressed me much when I was young, was the one developed by the adolescent men and women of societies that prescribed skirts for females and trousers for males. In a sitting position, these women would unconsciously spread their skirt when something was thrown to them, whereas the men would clamp their knees together. (In those days, this was still used in the strictly male monasteries of Greece and Macedonia, in order to detect female intruders. \nToday, they have presumably thought of another test.)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210077353398160104782":^°°,^"jQuery3210077353398160104782":^°°,^"jQuery3210077353398160104782":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575650837355°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uox21p9i32","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":307°Ӻ,"quote":"To believe that the future affects the present is no doubt a superstition, but to declare that purpose and goal-directed action must be discarded because they are teleological notions is no better. It shows an abysmal ignorance of the difference between empirical and metaphysical teleology.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210471316184649266942":^°°Ӻ,"text":"To believe that the future affects the present is no doubt a superstition, but to declare that purpose and goal-directed action must be discarded because they are teleological notions is no better. It shows an abysmal ignorance of the difference between empirical and metaphysical teleology. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1579282988165°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Uvkospj4ha","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":569,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":946°Ӻ,"quote":"If you consider that in the context of the Darwinian theory of evolution, “to be adapted” means to survive by avoiding constraints, it becomes clear that, for Piaget, “to know” does not involve acquiring a picture of the world around us. Instead, it concerns the discovery of paths of action and of thought that are open to us, paths that are viable in the face of experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321096356891943976622":^°°,^"jQuery321096356891943976622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"If you consider that in the context of the Darwinian theory of evolution, “to be adapted” means to survive by avoiding constraints, it becomes clear that, for Piaget, “to know” does not involve acquiring a picture of the world around us. Instead, it concerns the discovery of paths of action and of thought that are open to us, paths that are viable in the face of experience.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1575649013530°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vnpn68pmsh","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1381°Ӻ,"quote":"If we really are scientists, we will run all sorts of experiments in order to construct a theoretical model that shows how the element “c” effects the change. If we are successful, we will proudly add “c” to the tools we use in attempts to modify the world. \nIn everyday living, we are not so meticulous. If we find that some element was present two or three times when a given X changed in a desirable way, we are likely to assume that it is the cause, and we will use that element in the hope that it will bring about the desired change. \nEven if it doesn’t, it may take a number of failures to discourage us. If someone provides a metaphysical reason why it should work, failures do not seem to matter at all. \nI am not sure, but I think it was the literary critic Cyril Connolly who made a startling observation in this regard. Insurance companies, he said, have the most sophisticated questionnaires to assess the risks involved in issuing a life insurance policy to an applicant. The questionnaires are based on meticulous research of mortality statistics. Connolly was struck by the fact that the questionnaires never ask the question “Do you pray?” And he wondered why people continued to pray for survival in all sorts of crisis, when the greatest experts of mortality clearly had found no evidence that it had an effect. \n\nAll this involves anticipation.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321016047641881360622":^°°,^"jQuery321016047641881360622":^°°,^"jQuery321016047641881360622":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1575889369995°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"C9r1i7ipo5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":348,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":770°Ӻ,"quote":"This is an important difference, and it has to be remembered when one speaks of “shared meanings.” The conceptual structures that constitute meanings or knowledge are not entities that could be used alternatively by different individuals. They are constructs that each user has to build up for him- or herself. And because they are individual constructs, one can never say whether or not two people have produced the same.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563883332428°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D5l3rmx70s","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1366,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1516°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, when we intend to stimulate and enhance a student’s learning, we cannot afford to forget that knowledge does not exist outside a person’s mind.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, when we intend to stimulate and enhance a student’s learning, we cannot afford to forget that knowledge does not exist outside a person’s mind.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563883164876°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Decgnreoeu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":964°Ӻ,"quote":"The concept of adaptation stems from biology and it indicates a particular relationship between living organisms or species and their environment. To say that they are adapted means no less but also no more than that they have been able to survive given the conditions and the constraints of the world in which they happen to be living.\nIn other words, they have managed to evolve a fit or, as I prefer to say, their physical characteristics and their ways of behaving have so far proven viable in their environment. \n\nPiaget took the notion of adaptation out of the biological context and turned it into the cornerstone of his “genetic epistemology.” He had realized early on that whatever knowledge was, it was not a “copy” of reality. The relationship of viable biological organisms to their environment provided a means to reformulate the relationship between the cognitive subject’s conceptual structures and that subject’s experiential world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°,^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°,^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563877013334°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eitjn1doih","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":964,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1209°Ӻ,"quote":"Knowledge, then, could be treated, not as a more or less accurate representation of external things, situations, and events, but rather as a mapping of actions and conceptual operations that had proven viable in the knowing subject’s experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Knowledge, then, could be treated, not as a more or less accurate representation of external things, situations, and events, but rather as a mapping of actions and conceptual operations that had proven viable in the knowing subject’s experience.","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563876991950°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gkvf0wh3s1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":889°Ӻ,"quote":"The use Piaget makes of the notion of adaptation is therefore not the same as that suggested by the contemporary school of thought that goes by the name of “Evolutionary Epistemology.” Unlike this school that formed around the work of Konrad Lorenz, in Piaget’s constructivist theory one cannot draw conclusions about the character of the real world from an organism’s adaptedness or the viability of schemes of action. In his view, what we see, hear, and feel, i.e. our sensory world, is the result of our own perceptual activities and therefore specific to our ways of perceiving and conceiving. Knowledge, for him, arises from actions and the agent’s reflection upon them. The actions take place in an environment and are grounded on and directed at objects that constitute the organism’s experiential world, not “things in themselves” that have an independent existence.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563883102572°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Icz56bfc0w","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1042°Ӻ,"quote":"As I have said many times, the need to adjust what one considers the “correct” meanings of the words one uses does not end with childhood. It happens over and over again that we discover, after many years of successfully using a given word, that we use it in a situation where the meaning we have attributed to it does not seem compatible with the meaning it appears to have for other users of the language. A dictionary will in many cases resolve the problem — and, in doing so, confirm the illusion that meanings are, after all, fixed entities that do not depend on individual usage. But a moment’s thought on how anyone acquires the meaning of a word would indeed reveal that this is an illusion. The dictionary presents definitions and examples that invariably consist of other words which give rise to meanings only in so far as the reader interprets them. Such interpretation can be done only in terms of the chunks of perceptual and conceptual experience the individual reader has associated with the dictionary’s words.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563883372931°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Km2wat9pdg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":771,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":909°Ӻ,"quote":"At best one may observe that in a given number of situations their constructs seem to function in the same way, i.e. they seem compatible.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"At best one may observe that in a given number of situations their constructs seem to function in the same way, i.e. they seem compatible.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563883322095°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M3oefrropl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":200,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":347°Ӻ,"quote":"If two people share a room, there is one room and both live in it. If they share a bowl of cherries, none of the cherries is eaten by both persons.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"If two people share a room, there is one room and both live in it. If they share a bowl of cherries, none of the cherries is eaten by both persons.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563883251277°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N6hbjgfncj","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":200°Ӻ,"quote":"This issue has recently been somewhat confused by talk of “shared knowledge” and “shared meanings.” Such talk is often misleading because there are strikingly different ways of sharing.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563883259923°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Revr82oshc","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1042,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1352°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, no matter how one looks at it, an analysis of meanings always leads to individual experience and the social process of accommodating the links between words and chunks of that experience until the individual deems they are compatible with the usage and the linguistic and behavioral responses of others.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, no matter how one looks at it, an analysis of meanings always leads to individual experience and the social process of accommodating the links between words and chunks of that experience until the individual deems they are compatible with the usage and the linguistic and behavioral responses of others.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563883354194°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"S4oedfosh5","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1365°Ӻ,"quote":"From this point of view, the notion of environment is obviously not the ordinary one. In the common sense description of our world, the environment is what surrounds all of us and we think of it as existing as such, whether we happen to be in it or not. In the constructivist model, “environment” has two quite distinct meanings. On the one hand, when we speak of ourselves, it refers to the totality of permanent objects and their relations that we have abstracted from the flow of our experience. On the other, whenever we focus our attention on a particular item, “environment” refers to the surroundings of the item we have isolated, and we tend to forget that both the item and its surroundings are parts of our own experiential field and not an observer independent “objective” world. \nThis, I believe, is a crucial aspect to consider if we want to approach teaching and education from the constructivist position. Too often teaching strategies and procedures seem to spring from the naive assumption that what we ourselves perceive and infer from our perceptions is there, ready-made, for the students to pick up, if only they had the will to do so. This overlooks the basic point that the way we segment the flow of our experience, and the way we relate the pieces we have isolated, is and necessarily remains an essentially subjective matter.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563883208838°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Zcoxc69a3l","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":889,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":1125°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, when Piaget speaks of interaction, this does not imply an organism that interacts with objects as they “really” are, but rather a cognitive subject that is dealing with previously constructed perceptual and conceptual structures.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210434043887701232032":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, when Piaget speaks of interaction, this does not imply an organism that interacts with objects as they “really” are, but rather a cognitive subject that is dealing with previously constructed perceptual and conceptual structures.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563883056095°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Frhb3rw86n","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":1189,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1780°Ӻ,"quote":"That is to say, no matter how hard investigators try to adapt their analyses to the “foreign” ways of children, the model they build up will always be a model constructed out of concepts that are necessarily the investigators’. Because children’s ways of thinking are never directly accessible, the investigators’ model can never be compared to a child’s thought in order to determine whether there is or is not a perfect match. The most one can hope for is that the model fits whatever observations one has made and, more importantly, that it remains viable in the face of new observations.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"That is to say, no matter how hard investigators try to adapt their analyses to the “foreign” ways of children, the model they build up will always be a model constructed out of concepts that are necessarily the investigators’. Because children’s ways of thinking are never directly accessible, the investigators’ model can never be compared to a child’s thought in order to determine whether there is or is not a perfect match. The most one can hope for is that the model fits whatever observations one has made and, more importantly, that it remains viable in the face of new observations.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884840369°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gafk6bxja9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1307°Ӻ,"quote":"Traditionally, there has been a certain amount of detachment between teachers of mathematics and cognitively oriented educational scientists who endeavored to develop theories about the learning of mathematics. At present, however, there are signs of a rapprochement, at least on the part of some of the scientists, who have come to realize that their theories must ultimately be evaluated according to how much they can contribute to the improvement of educational practice. Healthy though this realization is, it at once raises problems of its own. At the outset there is the research scientists’ inherent fear of getting bogged down in so many practical considerations that it will no longer be possible to come up with a theory that may satisfy their minimum requirements of generality and elegance. Then, when scientists do come up with a tentative theory, there is the difficulty of applying it in such a way that its practical usefulness is demonstrated. This would require either scientists’ direct involvement in teaching or \tthe professional teachers’ willingness and freedom to become familiar with the theory and to incorporate it into actual teaching practice for a certain length of time. In both cases, it will help if scientists and teachers can establish a consensual domain.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884552112°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gdvkufdrum","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":324°Ӻ,"quote":"Teachers may be predominantly interested in the progress of the individual children they are teaching; but their assessment of progress and, indeed, their very job as teachers would become practically impossible if their method of teaching mathematics had to be adapted in all details to each individual child.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884819157°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gotorp36to","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1114°Ӻ,"quote":"Both educational scientists and teachers in the field of mathematics education try to model the children’s mathematical reality and how that reality may be cognitively built up piece by piece. The first, the scientists, may be mainly interested in establishing the hard core of a mathematics learning theory that would be applicable to as large a number of children as possible, but the viability of that theory, to quote Lakatos again, depends on “confirmations or ‘verifications’ that sustain a scientific research program. ” Consequently, in order to “confirm” or “verify” their theory, the scientists must “test” it by observing individuals. But – and this is crucial from the cognitive point of view – the tests in this context do not primarily concern the level of performance of new children but rather the question of whether or not the model can be maintained in the face of observations and teaching experiments with new children. However, it is not only in the context of justification but also in the context of re-invention that the scientific investigators need to observe individuals.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884727217°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"I23sae3dn3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":1307,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1439°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, they must come to share some basic ideas on the process of education and the teaching of mathematics in particular.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In other words, they must come to share some basic ideas on the process of education and the teaching of mathematics in particular.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563883533364°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ih0f4dwh4t","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":139,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1189°Ӻ,"quote":"The situation is extreme when the work involves numbers and mathematical operations and aims at developing some insight into how individual children think about numbers and how they operate with them. Anyone who has seriously tried to investigate what actually goes on in children’s heads when they are struggling to solve an addition or subtraction problem at the limit of their present capability will have realized that the children’s mathematical world is indeed outlandish from the adult’s point of view. \nYet, children who have not been totally alienated from the number game and have at least a modicum of motivation do not act randomly. They do proceed according to some method, even if that method would seem unorthodox to the experienced reckoner. To get an inkling of what that method might be, investigators cannot but use their own imagination and try to conceive a reasonable path that might connect such manifestations of children’s operating as can be observed, with steps that could possibly lead to an answer to the given question.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°,^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884900074°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ito9w9ufjm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1518°Ӻ,"quote":"There is no denying the uncertainty inherent in all conjectures about another’s mental states and processes. Yet, it would be foolish to say that, because their accuracy is inherently uncertain, such conjectures should be considered useless. This inherent uncertainty pertains not only to psychology and its investigations of the mind but also to the “hardest” of the sciences (cf. Popper, 1963). In this respect, then, a cognitively oriented educational methodology differs radically from behavioristically oriented ones. If the educator’s objective is the generation of certain more or less specific behaviors in the student, the educator sees no need to ask what, if anything, might be going on in the student’s head. Whenever the student can be made to produce the desired behaviors in the situations with which they have been associated, the learning process will be deemed successful. Students do not have to see why the particular actions lead to a result that is considered “correct”; what matters is that they produce such a result. From our point of view, this exclusive focus on performance differentiates what we would call training from the kind of teaching that aims at understanding (cf. von Glasersfeld, 1989). \nIn contrast, cognitively oriented educators will not be primarily interested in observable results, but rather in what students think they are doing and why they believe that their way of operating will lead to a solution. The rationale of this shift of focus is simply this:","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321064532752634131472":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563892076772°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ju9i7zdhyu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1050°Ӻ,"quote":"For Lakatos, theories were hypothetical-deductive systems and the theoretical activity of the scientist constituted the primary source of progress of a research program. From the constructivist perspective, one particular aspect of this position must be stressed. Even the hard core of a research program (i. e., those beliefs that the program takes for granted) should not be considered as eternal truth. The history of science shows that, no matter how successful research programs are, they eventually collapse and are superseded by others with different hard cores. In fact, the knowledge constituted by a hard core is viable as long as it serves the purposes and helps to attain, with the help of the models in its “protective belt”, the goals of the established community of researchers. When it ceases to do this and, in Lakatos’ words, “degenerates” – either because some anomalies can no longer be disregarded for practical reasons, or because the goals of the community are shifted-a new research program must be generated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884640163°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N5ujgpvawi","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":1518,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1976°Ӻ,"quote":"if one wants to generate understanding, the reasons why a student operates in a certain way are far more indicative of the student’s stage of conceptual development than whether or not these operations lead to a result that the teacher finds acceptable. Only when teachers have some notion of the conceptual structures with which students operate, can they try to intervene in ways that might lead students to change something in these conceptual structures.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321064532752634131472":^°°Ӻ,"text":"if one wants to generate understanding, the reasons why a student operates in a certain way are far more indicative of the student’s stage of conceptual development than whether or not these operations lead to a result that the teacher finds acceptable. Only when teachers have some notion of the conceptual structures with which students operate, can they try to intervene in ways that might lead students to change something in these conceptual structures.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563892052867°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Nprpymwev6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":919,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":1046°Ӻ,"quote":"therefore, they need first of all a plausible model of the conceptual structures with which students are operating at the time.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321064532752634131472":^°°Ӻ,"text":"therefore, they need first of all a plausible model of the conceptual structures with which students are operating at the time.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563892095021°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Oekr7le9yk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1364°Ӻ,"quote":"If both educational scientists and mathematics teachers want to profit from this shift in the psychological paradigm, they must come to regard the learner as a relatively autonomous entity, an intelligent entity that is first and foremost concerned with making sense (i. e. some kind of order) in its own experiential world. This conviction forms the hard core of a new research program in truly cognitive psychology as well as the basis of a teaching methodology that is significantly different from the traditional one. In the traditional view, the child was a relatively malleable entity that could be shaped by good examples, by practice and drill, and above all by the judicious allocation of reinforcement. The really effective teachers, of course, have always known – at least since Socrates – that examples, drill, and overt reinforcement are quite effective in producing a desired behavior; but precisely because they were good teachers they also knew that generating understanding was a worthier educational objective than merely modifying behavior. To generate understanding is also a much more difficult objective to attain. To some extent, however, this greater difficulty is compensated by the fact that understanding is self-reinforcing because, from the children’s point of view, it leads to making sense of their experiential world.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884693786°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Pprt9zjifg","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":919°Ӻ,"quote":"When such notions regarding states and operations in anther person’s head come to be organized in a coherent structure, they constitute hypothetical models. Though the states and operations that concern educational scientists are essentially the same that concern teachers, they will be organized somewhat differently because the goals of the two disciplines are not quite the same. The researchers want to build up a model that illustrates a way in which students construct mathematical knowledge. Because it would be much more useful to have one model, rather than several different ones, researchers must focus on features which, they believe, will be widely generalizable. Above all, they must establish patterns of change and development, and basic principles of how change and development may be induced. Teachers, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the progress of groups of students;","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321064532752634131472":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563892116245°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Qf1fiu9hmu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":584°Ӻ,"quote":"In contrast to this, scientists who have founded and advanced their work on the revolutionary conceptual changes brought about by relativity, quantum mechanics, genetic epistemology, and cybernetics tend to be extremely wary of the notions of truth and objectivity in the ontological sense. They have become very conscious of the fact that observation is a generative rather than a passive process, that all data are “theory-laden,” and that, as von Foerster (1978) so neatly put it, “objectivity is the illusion that observation could take place without an observer.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563884585325°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ts6m6p4c9i","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":1114,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1687°Ӻ,"quote":"In order to formulate even the most tentative model of cognitive change, educational scientists must witness the growth of mathematical knowledge in particular children and clarify and substantiate their interpretations by means of deliberate interventions. Conceptual analysis alone is simply not sufficient as a source of insight in model building. It is only on the basis of models of particular children, that a more general model can eventually be abstracted – and the models of particular children are a natural bridge between educational scientists and the teachers.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In order to formulate even the most tentative model of cognitive change, educational scientists must witness the growth of mathematical knowledge in particular children and clarify and substantiate their interpretations by means of deliberate interventions. Conceptual analysis alone is simply not sufficient as a source of insight in model building. It is only on the basis of models of particular children, that a more general model can eventually be abstracted – and the models of particular children are a natural bridge between educational scientists and the teachers.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884717833°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"V003cd9ksd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":1364,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":1551°Ӻ,"quote":"In adopting the new, cognitive paradigm, then, it becomes imperative that both teachers and researchers acquire some theoretical notions of how this “making sense” can be conceptualized.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":" In adopting the new, cognitive paradigm, then, it becomes imperative that both teachers and researchers acquire some theoretical notions of how this “making sense” can be conceptualized.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884669087°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Vzvbroqbxa","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":138°Ӻ,"quote":"Working with children is in many ways like working with foreigners with whom one has only fragments of a language in common.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Working with children is in many ways like working with foreigners with whom one has only fragments of a language in common.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563884860654°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wlmz0nwwa6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","startOffset":1050,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ3Ӻ","endOffset":1368°Ӻ,"quote":"A model, then, “simulates reality”; it is a conceptual construct that is treated as though it gave an accurate picture of the real world, but has the actual function of making experimental results and other experiential elements compatible with the general assumptions that are inherent in the research program’s core.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°,^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"A model, then, “simulates reality”; it is a conceptual construct that is treated as though it gave an accurate picture of the real world, but has the actual function of making experimental results and other experiential elements compatible with the general assumptions that are inherent in the research program’s core.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884625586°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Wn9qz8ed09","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","startOffset":584,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":831°Ӻ,"quote":"Just as the interpretation of a piece of language is always guided by the individual interpreter’s experience and expectations, so the interpretation of what one observes is always governed by some theory one has in mind and a goal one has chosen.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Just as the interpretation of a piece of language is always guided by the individual interpreter’s experience and expectations, so the interpretation of what one observes is always governed by some theory one has in mind and a goal one has chosen.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884576593°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ygtpo8ulgm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":325,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":888°Ӻ,"quote":"Teachers, therefore, need an at least partially generalized theory and a model of the learner that is general enough to serve as a basis for the establishment of more than one individual model. Ideally, then, the teachers’ models of individual students will be instantiations of the educational scientists’ more general model of mathematics learning; and conversely, the individual models the teachers construct for individual students will be a continuous testing ground for the theoretical assumptions the scientists have incorporated in the more general model.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°,^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°,^"jQuery3210092476566737965452":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Teachers, therefore, need an at least partially generalized theory and a model of the learner that is general enough to serve as a basis for the establishment of more than one individual model. Ideally, then, the teachers’ models of individual students will be instantiations of the educational scientists’ more general model of mathematics learning; and conversely, the individual models the teachers construct for individual students will be a continuous testing ground for the theoretical assumptions the scientists have incorporated in the more general model.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563884810252°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"A8lufo6hwa","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":709°Ӻ,"quote":"In that first section of the book he does, of course, expound his theory of the genesis of the object concept, while the subsequent sections deal with the concepts of space, causality, time and, finally, the universe. Though he treats the construction of these concepts sequentially, he makes it very clear that he does not consider them sequential in the child’s development. In his view, one conceptual construction gives rise to all these concepts. In other words, experiential objects, space, causality, time— and I would add the concepts of change, motion, substance, identity, and self—all stem from one common initial construction and are therefore connate and inextricably interrelated.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563895870974°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"B4xmtlx8ai","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ20Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ20Ӻ","endOffset":390°Ӻ,"quote":"When I visually distinguish a hand from the writing pad and the table on which it lies, I carry out exactly the same kinds of operations as when I distinguish the coffee cup from the table on which it stands, or the picture from the wall on which it hangs, or the cardinal outside my window from the branch on which it happens to be perched and from the rest of the landscape.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"When I visually distinguish a hand from the writing pad and the table on which it lies, I carry out exactly the same kinds of operations as when I distinguish the coffee cup from the table on which it stands, or the picture from the wall on which it hangs, or the cardinal outside my window from the branch on which it happens to be perched and from the rest of the landscape.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563901117317°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Bo421c5wz9","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":534,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":1181°Ӻ,"quote":"This may not be nearly as paradoxical as it sounds. The linguistic example of names may once more help to illuminate the point. Having established four-leggedness as the invariant critical feature of the complex experience associated with the word dog, the child focuses on four-leggedness and uses the word dog whenever that feature is available among the experiential material. That means that the child will assimilate all sorts of items—many of which he would later call cat, horse, sheep or cow—and in doing so, he will disregard the experiential elements that might distinguish them from the original experience associated with the word dog.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563896148727°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Cczcstcm68","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ19Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":1236°Ӻ,"quote":"Perhaps the most serious obstacle that has impeded traditional psychology from arriving at a plausible analysis of the concept of “self” is the assumption that the dichotomy between an organism and its environment is basically the same as the dichotomy between an experiencing subject and what it experiences. As argued in the section “Observer and Observed,” the distinction between an organism and its environment can be made only by an observer of the organism. The organism itself has no access to distal data, to items outside itself. But with the construction of permanent objects, the organism externalizes some of the invariants it abstracts from its experience and treats them, from then on, as independent external items (see “Equivalence and Continuity,” above). This externalization, as we have seen, goes hand in hand with the establishing of internal representations or concepts, and this dual development of objects, which are “perceptual,” and concepts, which are “representational,” leads to a sharp division between two forms of experience, one “external” and the other “internal.” (There are, of course, illusions, dreams, and hallucinations that, from the subject’s point of view, blur that division.)","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563901086551°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"D0j0gt3d6j","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ2Ӻ","endOffset":281°Ӻ,"quote":"If the feedback model is to be of use in the study of the more complex forms of behavior we see in animals, and in humans, we shall have to give it some capability for learning. In Craik’s words (1966, p. 59),\nWe should now have to conceive a machine capable of modification of its own mechanism so as to establish that mechanism which was successful in solving the problem at hand, and the suppression of alternative mechanisms. Although this may seem a great demand, we can be comforted by the reflexion that animals and man can only modify their activity within the limits imposed by their anatomy, or the materials and machines available; though it is a great demand, it is not an infinitely great one.\nIn a sense, the solution lies in this very early statement of the problem. It consists in establishing and recording for every kind of error signal (problem) “that mechanism which was successful in solving the problem.” In other words, if there are several kinds of disturbance and, consequently, several kinds of error signals, the system has to discover which of the activities in its behavioral repertoire is most likely to correct a particular error signal. On the simplest level this can be achieved only through inductive inference.\nA living system, due to its circular organization, is an inductive system and functions always in a predictive manner; what occurred once will occur again. Its organization (both genetic and otherwise) is conservative and repeats only that which works (Maturana, 1970, pp. 15–16).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321061599690319170592":^°°,^"jQuery321061599690319170592":^°°,^"jQuery321061599690319170592":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563895378027°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Dd1wdooq3z","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":717,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1035°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, if there are several kinds of disturbance and, consequently, several kinds of error signals, the system has to discover which of the activities in its behavioral repertoire is most likely to correct a particular error signal. On the simplest level this can be achieved only through inductive inference.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321018445904016442962":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In other words, if there are several kinds of disturbance and, consequently, several kinds of error signals, the system has to discover which of the activities in its behavioral repertoire is most likely to correct a particular error signal. On the simplest level this can be achieved only through inductive inference.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563894666018°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ddnyagkamn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":862,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":1308°Ӻ,"quote":"It allows us to proceed much as a bricklayer, who can devote all his energy and attention to the creation of a wall or an arch, without ever stopping to ask where the bricks he is using came from or how they were made. And just as the characteristics of the bricks (e.g., shape and size) make it impossible for the bricklayer to build certain structures, so the ready-made conceptual building blocks impose constraints on any future construction.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"It allows us to proceed much as a bricklayer, who can devote all his energy and attention to the creation of a wall or an arch, without ever stopping to ask where the bricks he is using came from or how they were made. And just as the characteristics of the bricks (e.g., shape and size) make it impossible for the bricklayer to build certain structures, so the ready-made conceptual building blocks impose constraints on any future construction.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563898625529°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"E31cg4n600","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1733,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":2040°Ӻ,"quote":"To refer once more to the feedback model, one might say that assimilation, insofar as it adjusts sensory signals, reduces the generation of error signals. Accommodation, on the other hand, occurs only when there is a discrepancy or disturbance for which the organism does not yet have an established remedy.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"To refer once more to the feedback model, one might say that assimilation, insofar as it adjusts sensory signals, reduces the generation of error signals. Accommodation, on the other hand, occurs only when there is a discrepancy or disturbance for which the organism does not yet have an established remedy.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563896168679°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eaw8nug54n","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":814°Ӻ,"quote":"Sketchy and incomplete though they are, I hope the preceding paragraphs have shown that there are several relatively independent sources from which facets of the self percept can be developed. Much remains to be worked out; above all, the detailed analysis of the process by which these facets become integrated into what we so strongly feel to be a unitary concept of our self. While we can work out a plausible model for the self as an entity of our sensorimotor world of experience, this model cannot throw any light on what we feel to be our self as experiencing entity. The reason lies in the very structure of our conception of knowledge. In the Western tradition of science and rational explanation, knowledge by its very nature requires a dichotomy between the knower and the things he knows.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563901470249°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Egekgp55vu","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":994,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":1293°Ӻ,"quote":"There seems to be no way around the assumption that, as far as the organism is concerned, an “object” must be a construct, actively abstracted from a number of experiences by holding on to a somewhat flexible constellation of characteristics and allowing each of them to vary within a certain range.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"There seems to be no way around the assumption that, as far as the organism is concerned, an “object” must be a construct, actively abstracted from a number of experiences by holding on to a somewhat flexible constellation of characteristics and allowing each of them to vary within a certain range.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563895908466°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Ek33dv7qzk","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","startOffset":1080,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ11Ӻ","endOffset":1332°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence this use of an invariant scheme is by no means a manifestation of the concept of object permanence, because its invariance arises from and consists in the repetition of an activity and does not yet involve the invariance of an independent object.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence this use of an invariant scheme is by no means a manifestation of the concept of object permanence, because its invariance arises from and consists in the repetition of an activity and does not yet involve the invariance of an independent object.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563896238908°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Eqgunictjl","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":541,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":850°Ӻ,"quote":"Without ever perceiving it, we know that it is at the heart of whatever continuity or invariant we construct in our perceptual world. As teenagers, at one time or another, many of us stood in front of a looking glass and wondered: where am I? it is a question we are still unable to answer when we are adults.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563901423662°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"F8plub7cte","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":853,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","endOffset":1545°Ӻ,"quote":"Categorizing experiential objects in the particular way prescribed by the language the child has to acquire is, of course, not quite the same as deriving an object-concept from two or more experiences (see “Equivalence and Continuity,” below). But in both cases differentiation and abstraction seem to play much the same role. In the naming of objects it is the conventional nature of linguistic expressions that compels the child to structure his concepts in a certain way. In the construction of recursively usable object-concepts it is the organism’s active search for recurrence and regularity that compels it to create “sameness” by focusing on similarities and disregarding differences.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563896055972°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Fb6tslteaz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","startOffset":1057,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ12Ӻ","endOffset":1425°Ӻ,"quote":"Now, if the invariant can be used on the representational level, without an activity, it becomes like a program or a subroutine that is invariant in that it is stored somewhere in a memory from which it can be retrieved. It is this change of status that gives rise to the concepts of permanence and of identity, a further step in the construction of permanent objects.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Now, if the invariant can be used on the representational level, without an activity, it becomes like a program or a subroutine that is invariant in that it is stored somewhere in a memory from which it can be retrieved. It is this change of status that gives rise to the concepts of permanence and of identity, a further step in the construction of permanent objects.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563896291702°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"G8314lh3pp","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":1541,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":1733°Ӻ,"quote":"I hope this brief exposition of the complex interaction of assimilatory and accommodatory processes has indicated that this part of Piaget’s theory is compatible with the cybernetic approach.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563896220825°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gs82cvn8ty","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":1185,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1322°Ӻ,"quote":"For many five-year-olds, for instance, the sun today and the sun yesterday are not yet one and the same individual (Piaget, 1971, p. 87).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"For many five-year-olds, for instance, the sun today and the sun yesterday are not yet one and the same individual (Piaget, 1971, p. 87).","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563899770807°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gtgp6gcjgz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ25Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ25Ӻ","endOffset":719°Ӻ,"quote":"As a metaphor—and I stress that it is intended as a metaphor—the concept of an invariant that arises out of mutually or cyclically balancing changes may help us to approach the concept of self. In cybernetics this metaphor is implemented in the “closed loop,” the circular arrangement of feedback mechanisms that maintain a given value within certain limits. They work towards an invariant, but the invariant is achieved not by a steady resistance, the way a rock stands unmoved in the winds but by compensation over time. Wherever we happen to look in a feedback loop, we find the present act pitted against the immediate past, but already on the way to being compensated itself by the immediate future.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563901528632°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Gv92fgoj8x","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ8Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":448°Ӻ,"quote":"Suppose a very young child applies the word dog to every four-legged creature he sees. He may have abstracted a limited set of attributes and created a large category, but his abstraction will now show up in his vocabulary. Parents will not provide him with a conventional name for his category, e.g., quadruped, but instead will require him to narrow his use of dog to its proper range...\nThe child who spontaneously hits on the category four-legged animals will be required to give it up in favor of dogs, cats, horses, cows, and the like ... The schoolboy who learns the word quadruped has abstracted from differentiated and named subor- dinates. The child he was abstracted through a failure to differentiate. Abstraction after differentiation may be the mature process, and abstraction from a failure to differentiate the primitive.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Suppose a very young child applies the word dog to every four-legged creature he sees. He may have abstracted a limited set of attributes and created a large category, but his abstraction will now show up in his vocabulary. Parents will not provide him with a conventional name for his category, e.g., quadruped, but instead will require him to narrow his use of dog to its proper range...\n\nThe child who spontaneously hits on the category four-legged animals will be required to give it up in favor of dogs, cats, horses, cows, and the like ... The schoolboy who learns the word quadruped has abstracted from differentiated and named subor- dinates. The child he was abstracted through a failure to differentiate. Abstraction after differentiation may be the mature process, and abstraction from a failure to differentiate the primitive. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563896045425°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"H3e51o6egn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":527,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":880°Ӻ,"quote":"Here I shall confine myself to pointing out that the kind of knowledge our simple organism acquires by installing connections between error signals and activities is, indeed, a form of construction, and since it deals exclusively with the proximal data of the organism’s own subjective experience, one would be justified in calling it wholly subjective.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Here I shall confine myself to pointing out that the kind of knowledge our simple organism acquires by installing connections between error signals and activities is, indeed, a form of construction, and since it deals exclusively with the proximal data of the organism’s own subjective experience, one would be justified in calling it wholly subjective.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563895666281°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"H9ojjvlqal","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ24Ӻ","startOffset":815,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ24Ӻ","endOffset":1043°Ӻ,"quote":"In other words, we can come to know only what we consider to be in some sense separate from our knowing selves. By questioning something, by the very act of asking what it is, we have already set our self, the questioner, apart.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"In other words, we can come to know only what we consider to be in some sense separate from our knowing selves. By questioning something, by the very act of asking what it is, we have already set our self, the questioner, apart.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563901453225°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hk69rq47nz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ19Ӻ","startOffset":1236,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ19Ӻ","endOffset":1480°Ӻ,"quote":"Both the internal and the external, however, are explicitly experience, and the division between them, therefore, is a division between two types of experience and not the division between an experiencing subject and the objects it experiences.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563900136055°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hl1my5l736","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":1924,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ","endOffset":2400°Ӻ,"quote":"As long as the linear sequence of attention focused on sensory signals is the only dimension of the child’s experience, it is logically impossible to connect two experiential items across an interval during which none of the signals constituting them is continuous. Such a connection has to be created outside the ongoing experiential sequence, so that it can subsist, as it were, in parallel and is not broken by the actual sensory experiences that occur during the internal.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563899318387°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Hq4m25toh1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ23Ӻ","startOffset":477,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ23Ӻ","endOffset":540°Ӻ,"quote":"This central item, the experiencer himself, remains mysterious.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"This central item, the experiencer himself, remains mysterious.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563901415475°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"I27jtuivlz","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","startOffset":709,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ6Ӻ","endOffset":1006°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence, mention of “steps” in subsequent paragraphs does not imply a chronological but a logical sequence. There are certain steps that are logically indispensable prerequisites for others. But the logic is our logic, an observer’s logic, and as such it applies to a model the observer is building.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence, mention of “steps” in subsequent paragraphs does not imply a chronological but a logical sequence. There are certain steps that are logically indispensable prerequisites for others. But the logic is our logic, an observer’s logic, and as such it applies to a model the observer is building.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563895861681°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"I4hz7ma47u","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ","endOffset":527°Ӻ,"quote":"For an observer, of course, it may be plausible to establish all sorts of relations between the organism’s “output” (i.e. the effect of its activities on the environment) and its “input” (i.e. the environmental “stimuli” assumed to cause the organism’s sensory signals). But these items may not be quite as straightforward as they appear. I have elsewhere argued for a radical constructivist view of knowledge (von Glasersfeld, 1975, 1976, 1977; Richards and von Glasersfeld, 1978) on all levels of organization.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563895678374°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Idrp87ovae","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":566°Ӻ,"quote":"Even if we wanted to believe that perception is nothing but an organism’s internal replication of a ready-made external world in which objects are given, we would have to explain how such an internal replication is constituted. This question runs into the same difficulty regardless of whether it is asked by a realist or by a constructivist. Neither can disregard the simple fact that an “object,” from the point of view of the experiencing organism (i.e., in terms of the organism’s sensory experience) is never quite the same on different occasions.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563895969663°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"J9jqbrdr4b","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","startOffset":887,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ15Ӻ","endOffset":1004°Ӻ,"quote":"Hence we may safely assume that attention can also shift between items when some or all of them are representational.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"Hence we may safely assume that attention can also shift between items when some or all of them are representational.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563898756055°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jcoy3u2rzx","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":716°Ӻ,"quote":"If the feedback model is to be of use in the study of the more complex forms of behavior we see in animals, and in humans, we shall have to give it some capability for learning. In Craik’s words (1966, p. 59),\nWe should now have to conceive a machine capable of modification of its own mechanism so as to establish that mechanism which was successful in solving the problem at hand, and the suppression of alternative mechanisms. Although this may seem a great demand, we can be comforted by the reflexion that animals and man can only modify their activity within the limits imposed by their anatomy, or the materials and machines available; though it is a great demand, it is not an infinitely great one.\nIn a sense, the solution lies in this very early statement of the problem. It consists in establishing and recording for every kind of error signal (problem) “that mechanism which was successful in solving the problem.”","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321018445904016442962":^°°,^"jQuery321018445904016442962":^°°,^"jQuery321018445904016442962":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563895065076°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jfxfuijhx1","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","startOffset":567,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ7Ӻ","endOffset":994°Ӻ,"quote":"For example, the visual experience that we consider an instance of a specific object is different every time. The object’s shape changes according to the angle, and its size according to the distance from which it is seen. Its color changes according to the illumination, and other parameters are no less variable according to changes in the context. What, then, constitutes the invariant object which the organism recognizes?","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"For example, the visual experience that we consider an instance of a specific object is different every time. The object’s shape changes according to the angle, and its size according to the distance from which it is seen. Its color changes according to the illumination, and other parameters are no less variable according to changes in the context. What, then, constitutes the invariant object which the organism recognizes?\n","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563895959622°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Js950dj36j","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ13Ӻ","endOffset":470°Ӻ,"quote":"The second development made possible by the introduction of the representational use of invariants is that they can now be used as building blocks for conceptual constructions that move further and further away from the raw material of sensory or motor signals. This shift constitutes one of the salient characteristics of all the “higher,” more sophisticated mental operations and it has consequences for epistemology far beyond the scope of this chapter.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The second development made possible by the introduction of the representational use of invariants is that they can now be used as building blocks for conceptual constructions that move further and further away from the raw material of sensory or motor signals. This shift constitutes one of the salient characteristics of all the “higher,” more sophisticated mental operations and it has consequences for epistemology far beyond the scope of this chapter.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563898503926°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Jv9v5wdu9q","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","startOffset":868,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ5Ӻ","endOffset":1180°Ӻ,"quote":"The rep- resentation, therefore, will have to be no more and no less than a hypothetical model of functions, entities, and events that could “explain” regularities in the organism’s experience. And as a cyberneticist would expect, there is no way to match the model against the “real” structure of the black box.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"The rep- resentation, therefore, will have to be no more and no less than a hypothetical model of functions, entities, and events that could “explain” regularities in the organism’s experience. And as a cyberneticist would expect, there is no way to match the model against the “real” structure of the black box.","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Schlussfolgerung3","data_creacio":1563895773061°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Kftaxg4kd3","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ20Ӻ","startOffset":391,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ20Ӻ","endOffset":980°Ӻ,"quote":"In all these cases I am recognizing certain objects to which I have attributed relative consistency (closure) and permanence. Having successfully externalized permanent objects, I am now experiencing them as parts of “distal reality.” From the purely visual point of view, the operations by means of which I separate objects from the rest of the visual field or “ground” are always the same kind. And the observer’s distinction between an organism and its environment is normally made in the visual field (which is not to say that such a distinction could not be made in the tactual mode).","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563901132979°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Luok9sj7zd","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ9Ӻ","endOffset":205°Ӻ,"quote":"As observers, we may legitimately speak of the organism and its “external environment,” but the organism cannot make that distinction with regard to itself; it merely has its own experience.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563896127884°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"M4xqecwszm","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ","startOffset":480,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ17Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":1184°Ӻ,"quote":"How do we construct continuity across such enormous experiential gaps? I believe we acquire the ability in small steps.\nThe first step is to assume continuity of a composite whole on the strength of an experientially continuous part. We do this every time we watch a moving object that for a moment partially disappears and then comes into full sight again. In an infant’s early life, that is a frequent experience, since there are nearly always some visual obstacles in the immediate environment behind which parts of people disappear. Visual tracking is manifest very early and soon enables the infant to follow an item even when it wholly disappears for a moment (Bower, 1974). In that case it cannot be a visual part of the experiential item. Rather it is the proprioceptive signals generated by the tracking motion that supply the continuity. The essential feature, however, is the experiential continuity of some signal sequence that connects the percept that disappears with the percept that reappears, and that can hold the child’s attention so that no other item comes into focus. If there is no such sequence and, consequently, there is a refocusing of attention in the interval, the two experiential items will not be construed as one individual, no matter how similar they may be as percepts.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°,^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563899854969°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"Mr0ewqq6yn","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","startOffset":0,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ/pӶ1Ӻ","endOffset":796°Ӻ,"quote":"When an infant, for instance, assimilates some visual elements to the invariant pattern that, for him, constitutes a rattle, and grasps and shakes a piece of wood that happens to be within reach, then the absence of the auditory element expected to ensue may cause a discrepancy that cannot be eliminated by assimilation. In that case, attention is likely to be focused on any of the formerly disregarded visual or tactual elements by means of which the piece of wood could be discriminated from the rattle. Once the discrimination has occurred, the new elements, with or without some of the old ones, can be associated in an act of accommodation to form a novel scheme. This novel scheme, from then on, will serve as a relatively independent invariant for the assimilation of future experiences.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"When an infant, for instance, assimilates some visual elements to the invariant pattern that, for him, constitutes a rattle, and grasps and shakes a piece of wood that happens to be within reach, then the absence of the auditory element expected to ensue may cause a discrepancy that cannot be eliminated by assimilation. In that case, attention is likely to be focused on any of the formerly disregarded visual or tactual elements by means of which the piece of wood could be discriminated from the rattle. Once the discrimination has occurred, the new elements, with or without some of the old ones, can be associated in an act of accommodation to form a novel scheme. This novel scheme, from then on, will serve as a relatively independent invariant for the assimilation of future experiences. ","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Beispiel3","data_creacio":1563896207063°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N2vhtsw614","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ10Ӻ","endOffset":743°Ӻ,"quote":"Piaget suggests this frequently by saying that the organism must be considered an active experiencer rather than a passive receiver of stimuli. In the excerpts quoted above, he is even more specific: the organism assimilates items in order to suck, look at, or grasp. These activities, like all others which the organism has or acquires, have a certain sequential pattern and usually lead to certain experiential results. They are procedures toward certain experiential goals. But to be attained, these goals require the support (i.e., the presence) of more or less specific elements of experience. And there may be occasions when the elements present could not be assimilated to conform to the expected results of the activity.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563896214914°
^"permissions":^"read":ӶӺ,"update":ӶӺ,"delete":ӶӺ,"admin":ӶӺ°,"user":^"id":6,"name":"Sarah Oberbichler"°,"id":"N54woncfr6","ranges":Ӷ^"start":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ16Ӻ","startOffset":14,"end":"/divӶ3Ӻ/divӶ4Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ1Ӻ/divӶ16Ӻ","endOffset":444°Ӻ,"quote":"An analysis of the actual procedure of comparison also has conceptual implications. If the direction of comparison is from item A to item B, in the sense that the characteristics found in A are then checked in B, item B may be considered the same (in the likeness sense) if no difference is registered in the checked char- acteristics. But in that case B may or may not have characteristics which are not represented at all in A.","highlights":Ӷ^"jQuery321088204143127806022":^°°Ӻ,"text":"","order":"mw-content-text","category":"Prämisse3","data_creacio":1563899216075°
